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INTRODUCTION
There has been a remarkable increase during the last decade in
the imposition of overlapping civil, administrative, and criminal
sanctions for the same misconduct,' as well as a steady rise in the
severity of those sanctions.2 In response, defendants have balked,
' Special taxes, forfeitures, and penalties of various kinds are commonly extracted
in addition to criminal convictions, see infra notes 162-78, and criminal conduct is
punishable under multiple criminal and civil statutes. In several states, for example,
a drug offender may face fines, imprisonment, civil forfeiture, and a tax for the same
conduct. See infra note 173 (collecting cases in which a defendant faces both criminal
prosecution and a tax for drug-related conduct); see also PETER FINN & MARIA 0.
HYLTON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, USING CIL REMEDIES FOR CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR:
RATIONALE, CASE STUDIES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 9-78 (1994) (discussing the
use of civil remedies for a variety of criminal behavior, using case studies, and
outlining effective and constitutionally defensible ways of using such remedies); Mary
M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law
Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42
HASTINGS LJ. 1325, 1325-27, 1333-44 (1991) (illustrating with examples why "the
current phenomenon of civil remedies blending with criminal sanctions never has
been more actively or consciously pursued" and surveying how civil remedies are
"used to complement enforcement of the criminal law"); PeterJ. Henning, Precedents
in a Vacuum: The Supreme Court Continues to Tinker with Double Jeopardy, 31 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1, 4-5, 34-35 (1993) (describing overlapping penalties). For a thorough and
recent analysis of the increased role of punitive civil sanctions in law enforcement, see
Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil
Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1796-98, 1800-01, 1844, 1849-54 (1992); see also Sandra
Guerra, The Myth of Dual Sovereignty: Multijurisdictional Drug Law Enforcement and
DoubleJeopardy, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1159, 1207-08 & n.245 (1995) (stating that successive
prosecutions by state and federal prosecutors, "although still a small fraction of the
total volume of criminal cases, have proliferated" and citing examples).
2 As part of the continuing"war on drugs," legislatures have authorized sentences
for nonviolent drug offenders that greatly exceed sentences formerly imposed. Many
of these are mandatory sentences that do not vary with the particular characteristics
of the offense or offender. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 5-15 (1991) (recounting the historical development of mandatory minimum
sentencing provisions and discussing the present and pending legislation); see also
United States v. Spencer, 25 F.3d 1105, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting over 100
separate federal mandatory minimum penalty provisions as of 1991). Penalties for
violent offenders are also rising. More than a dozen states passed "three-strikes"
legislation in 1993 and 1994. See Richard C. Reuben, Get-Tough Stance Draws Fiscal
Criticism, A.B.A.J.,Jan. 1995, at 16, 16-17 (discussing the results of a study focused
on the high costs of "three strikes" legislation, particularly in California). Fine
ceilings, too, have risen. See Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
596, 98 Stat. 3134 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621-3623 (1988 & Supp. V
1993)) (increasing some fines for corporations to $1 million); U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8C2.4, .6 (1993) (setting the base fine for convicted
organizations at the greatest of(1) the pecuniary gain to the defendant organization,
(2) the pecuniary loss from the offense, or (3) an amount set according to the
1995]
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arguing that legislators and the juries, judges, prosecutors, and
regulators who apply legislatively authorized sanctions have
overstepped the bounds of punishment permitted by the Constitu-
tion. Claiming that their penalties violate the DoubleJeopardy, Due
Process, Excessive Fines, and Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clauses in the Bill of Rights, civil and criminal defendants are
prompting courts to reevaluate constitutional limits on excessive
and successive penalties. Over the past six years, the United States
Supreme Court has addressed some of these challenges, but its
decisions have been tentative or contradictory.
The resulting uncertainty surrounding constitutional limits on
punishment is most troublesome in cases in which defendants face
cumulative or successive penalties for the same conduct. In one or
more proceedings, defendants may be convicted of multiple
criminal charges, subjected to both civil and criminal penalties,
punished by more than one state or by both state and federal
governments, or ordered to pay multiple punitive damage awards
that are shared between the winning plaintiffs and the states in
which plaintiffs bring suit.3
In this Article, I propose an approach for evaluating when these
overlapping penalties exceed constitutional limits-an approach that
recognizes- that the various guarantees of the Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments must be considered together, as a forest
rather than as separate free-standing trees. I begin with the premise
that the contours of constitutional limits on the amount of punish-
ment that can be inflicted for a particular wrong, traditionally a part
of Eighth Amendment and due process law, are inseparable from
the constitutional limitations on the frequency with which an
offender can be punished for that wrong, typically rooted in double
jeopardy doctrine. The two forms of regulation operate in tandem
to regulate the totality of punishment.
A somewhat imperfect but useful analogy illustrates the point.
When Congress first set out to detect and deter the laundering of
illegally obtained cash, it insisted that banks report all cash
transactions over $10,000. Faced with only a per-transaction limit
on amount, money launderers happily laundered just as much
tainted cash as they had before by breaking larger transactions into
seriousness of the offense between $5000 and $72.5 million, and providing for
aggravating factors that can increase the base fine by as much as 400%).
' See infra note 20 (collecting sources that discuss statutes requiring certain
plaintiffs to split their punitive damage recoveries with the state).
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multiple transactions of less than $10,000. It was not long before
Congress realized that effective control of this behavior would
require, at a minimum, that banks report not only single transac-
tions over $10,000, but also multiple transactions that, when added
together, totalled $10,000 or more.4 It is time that courts attempt-
ing to limit punishment under the Bill of Rights learn the same
lesson. A per-proceeding or per-charge limit on the size of a
penalty leaves the government free to extract as many separate
penalties as it wishes. So long as double jeopardy, due process, and
common-law preclusion rules permit successive penalties for the
same conduct, Eighth Amendment and due process rules limiting
the amount of punishment must consider multiple penalties
together. The need for some sort of "cumulative excessiveness"
review thus varies inversely with the degree of protection against
multiple penalties for the same conduct: the less vigorous the
protection against multiple penalties, the more vigorous proportion-
ality review must become, and vice versa.
Building upon this intuitively simple relationship, I propose in
this Article several modifications to existing Fifth and Eighth
Amendment doctrine. To illustrate the pressing need for attention
to this area of the law, I first summarize in Part I the existing
constitutional limits on multiplicity and proportionality of punish-
ment and detail some of the puzzles created by the Court's most
recent decisions. In Part II, I suggest purging the concept of
proportionality from double jeopardy law and scaling back double
jeopardy to a bar against multiple punishments for the same
offense, as legislatively defined. I argue that legislatures are free to
create, and prosecutors and courts are free to enforce, multiple
penalties-separate offenses-that punish the same conduct, but that
the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause limit the total
amount of punishment that legislatures and prosecutors can pile
upon one offender in this way. In Part III, I explore how such
"cumulative excessiveness" review might work under the Eighth
Amendment. In particular, I examine how courts can determine
which penalties to cumulate together and when those accumulated
penalties exceed the limits of the Eighth Amendment.
" See Sarah N. Welling, Smurfs, Money Launderingand the Federal Criminal Law: The
Crime of Structuring Transactions, 41 FLA. L. REV. 287, 295-301, 307-09 (1989).
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I. THE COURT'S EFFORTS TO DEFINE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON
SUCCESSIVE AND EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENT
Two problems have confounded the Court in its attempts to
define constitutional limits on the government's ability to punish.
The first is the difficulty of determining when punishment is
unconstitutionally disproportionate: How much is too much? The
second is the puzzle posed by any theory that limits multiple
punishment: What is it that may be punished only once? A
legislatively defined offense, a discrete act or transaction, a course
of conduct, a collection of evidence, or something else?
Not only the scope, but also the source of constitutional limits
on the amount and repetition of punishment are controversial.
Constitutional constraints on penalties could plausibly be attributed
to one or all of several cryptic clauses-the Due Process Clauses, the
Excessive Fines and Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clauses, or the
Double Jeopardy Clause. In disputing which text is the proper
source of restrictions on the frequency or severity of penalties, some
of the Justices' opinions appear to treat these limits like hot
potatoes, tossing them from one clause to the next, hoping they will
be cooler to handle somewhere else. Debates over which part of the
Bill of Rights is the best doctrinal home for a particular, often
novel, theory of constitutional regulation are not uncommon and
still dominate, for example, much of the commentary about jury
discrimination and abortion. These debates, however, usually enjoy
a well-accepted body of precedent that establishes rudimentary
boundaries of scope and purpose for at least one of the doctrinal
options, providing a settled pivot around which a debate can
revolve. Because of the Court's limited or inconsistent declarations
about the scope of constitutional prohibitions on excessively severe
or duplicative penalties, no such pivot exists.
A. Proportionality Review
The Court has recognized that the Bill of Rights contains some
limits that require that punishment be proportionate to the wrong
punished, but it has done so only with profound reluctance. Often,
it has opted not to enforce a penalty because of some flaw in the
procedure that produced it, rather than because the penalty itself
is unduly severe. For example, Professor Joseph Hoffmann has
lamented that the Court's death penalty jurisprudence in the years
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since Gregg v. Georgia5 has been a complex tangle of procedural
review of death sentencing proceedings, with little substantive
review of who deserves death and who does not.' Procedure, not
proportion, was also the focus of the Court's latest attempt to
define limits on punitive damage awards in private litigation.
7
Some Justices prefer to sidestep proportionality review of penalties
under both the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and the Due
Process Clauses by reading such review right out of these provisions,
at least in particular contexts. Justice Scalia and Chief Justice
Rehnquist have insisted that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause bars only particular methods of punishment, regardless of
offense or offender.' Justice Scalia has also argued that the Due
5 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
'See Joseph L. Hoffmann, Is Innocence Sufficient? An Essay on the U.S. Supreme
Court's Continuing Problems with Federal Habeas Corpus and the Death Penalty, 68 IND.
L.J. 817, 834 (1993) (arguing that the Court's process-oriented approach to
interpreting the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause has
failed, and that the Court should "put some 'substance' back into the Eighth
Amendment"); see also Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 11
(1980) (noting that the Court's "theoretical shifts... were accompanied by continued
emphasis on procedural rather than substantive questions"); MargaretJ. Radin, Cruel
Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV.
1143, 1143-50 (1980) (describing the Court's review of the death penalty under the
Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause as a "super due
process" approach in which the constitutionality of a death sentence depends
primarily on the procedural safeguards applied in the sentencing process). Professor
Hoffmann acknowledges that the Court has at times proclaimed that death is
excessive punishment for certain classes of offenses or certain classes of offenders.
See Hoffmann, supra, at 824; see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822-23
(1988) (holding that the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of persons who were
under the age of 16 when they committed their offenses); Ford v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986) (holding that the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of
those who are insane at the time of execution); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797
(1982) (concluding that a defendant who participated in a robbery during which a
murder was committed, but who did not do the killing, could not be executed
consistently with the Eighth Amendment); Cokerv. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,592 (1977)
(concluding that death is a disproportionate penalty for the crime of raping an adult
woman). This area of the law also illustrates what Professor Albert Alschuler has
termed "a central dynamic of American criminaljustice: Millions for procedure but
not one dime for outcome." Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and theJuty:
Voir Dire, Peremptoiy Challenges, and the Review ofJuiy Verdicts, 56 U. CHL L. REV. 153,
226 (1989).
See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2339-42 (1994) (striking down
Oregon's procedure for imposing punitive damages because it lacked sufficient
safeguards to protect against the imposition of arbitrary awards).
' See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 975-85 (1991) (plurality opinion)
(concluding that "Solem was simply wrong; the Eighth Amendment contains no
proportionality guarantee"). Justice Scalia later admitted that a disproportionate fine
may violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. See infra text
1995]
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Process Clauses contain absolutely no substantive limit on penalties
at all.9 In other cases, the Court has dismissed claims of unconsti-
tutional disproportion or excessiveness by conceding that the
Constitution does contain a limit of sorts, but concluding, without
explaining what the limit is, that the penalty at issue does not
surpass it. ° Even when a majority of the Court has reached the
merits of whether a given penalty is unconstitutionally severe under
either the Eighth Amendment or the Due Process Clauses, its
decisions have provided little guidance to lower courts.
1. Review of Proportionality Under the Eighth Amendment
In 1993, the Court, for the first time in more than forty years,
identified a penalty that may have violated the Excessive Fines
Clause. "Rescuing" the Clause "from obscurity,"" the Court
accompanying notes 13-19.
' See Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 814 (1994) (Scalia,J., concurring) ("Except
insofar as our decisions have included within the Fourteenth Amendment certain
explicit substantive protections of the Bill of Rights... I reject the proposition that
the Due Process Clause guarantees certain (unspecified) liberties, rather than merely
guarantees certain procedures as a prerequisite to deprivation of liberty."). In the
context of punitive damages, Justice Scalia has admitted that the guarantee of
procedural due process may require limited review of proportionality but has
suggested that courts need only enforce state, not federal, norms of proportionality.
See Honda Motor Co., 114 S. Ct. at 2342 (ScaliaJ., concurring) (emphasizing that post-
judgment review is "an important traditional procedure for enforcingstate-prescribed
limits" on punitive damages (emphasis added)). Justice Scalia and at least some
United States Attorneys continue to shun proportionality review even under the
Excessive Fines Clause in civil forfeiture cases. See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct.
2801, 2814-15 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that excessiveness analysis for
statutory in rem forfeitures should involve an instrumentality question-the
relationship of the property to the offense-rather than a proportionality question);
United States v. 461 Shelby County Rd. 361, 857 F. Supp. 935, 937 (N.D. Ala. 1994)
(mem.) (deducing from the Department of Justice memorandum on which the
government's brief was modelled that the "United States obviously wants, at all costs,
to avoid 'proportionality' as the controlling criterion for judging the excessiveness
question").
10 See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991) (upholding
as constitutional a $1 million punitive damages award for insurance fraud that was
four times the amount of compensatory damages awarded and more than the
maximum fine that could have been imposed for insurance fraud under state statute).
" In 1947, the Court sliced a $3.5 million criminal contempt fine to $700,000
after finding the original sanction excessive given the defendant's financial resources.
See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 302-07 (1947).
"2 Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1958 n.2 (1994)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Clause was "rescued from obscurity" by
Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993), and Austin v. United States, 113
S. Ct. 2801 (1993)).
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held in Alexander v. United States"3 that criminal asset forfeiture is
a "fine" under the Eighth Amendment and remanded the case for
a determination of whether the fine was "excessive."14 Its advice
was sparse: "It is in the light of the extensive criminal activities
which petitioner apparently conducted through this racketeering
enterprise over a substantial period of time that the question of
whether or not the forfeiture was 'excessive' must be consid-
ered." 5 During the same term, the Court held that civil awards
can qualify as "fines" under the Eighth Amendment.16 In Austin
v. United States,"7 the Court agreed that the civil judgment forfeit-
ing Austin's home under the federal drug forfeiture statute was
"punitive" rather than "remedial" and was therefore a fine limited
by the Eighth Amendment."8 Yet the Court continued to avoid the
"excessiveness" issue."9 In hundreds of lower court opinions
decided since Alexander and Austin, judges have disagreed over
which civil forfeitures or other civil sanctions are punitive enough
to qualify as "fines"20 and over which fines are "excessive."
21
's 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993).
'4 See id. at 2775-76.
1Id. at 2776. Alexander had been convicted of 20 counts of racketeering and
other crimes and was ordered to forfeit all of his business assets and proceeds, worth
several million dollars. See id. at 2769-70.
"' Only four years earlier the Court had rejected the claim that the Excessive Fines
Clause limited punitive damages in private civil suits. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 275 (1989).
17 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
18 See id. at 2810-12.
'" Responding tojustice Scalia's proposed test for excessiveness of civil forfeitures,
the Court stated only in a footnote, "We do not rule out the possibility that the
connection between the property and the offense may be relevant, but our decision
today in no way limits the Court of Appeals from considering other factors in
determining whether the forfeiture of Austin's property was excessive." Id. at 2812
n.15.
2o Some defendants' claims to protection under the Eighth Amendment are quite
novel. For example, nearly a dozen states have recently adopted statutes that require
plaintiffs in punitive damage actions to share part of their awards with the state. See
e.g., Paul F. Kirgis, Note, The Constitutionality of State Allocation of Punitive Damage
Awards, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 843, 845 n.14, 874-75 (1993) (discussing the split-
recovery statutes of 10 states and the split-recovery bills of three other states);
Matthew J. Klaben, Note, Split-Recovery Statutes: The Interplay of the Takings and
Excessive Fines Clauses, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 104, 106 (1994) (listing 10 states that have
enacted split-recovery statutes and five additional proposed state and federal bills).
Defendants who have been assessed punitive awards in some of these states have
argued that their awards are "excessive fines," claiming that the state-payee
distinguishes these awards from private damage awards that escape Eighth
Amendment review. Compare Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at 298-99 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that the Eighth Amendment
1995]
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Similar confusion surrounds standards for assessing claims
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. Although the Court has endorsed individual assess-
ment of death sentences under the Eighth Amendment, its position
on noncapital penalties has seesawed.22 Its latest word was a badly
limits such awards) and McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1579
(M.D. Ga. 1990) (finding that Georgia's allocation statute violated the Excessive Fines
and Double Jeopardy Clauses) with Burke v. Deere & Co., 780 F. Supp. 1225, 1242
(S.D. Iowa 1991) (finding that because the state share of a punitive damage award was
paid into a trust fund to be administered by state courts, the statute extracting 75%
of a $50 million punitive damage award did not violate either the Excessive Fines
Clause or the Double Jeopardy Clause), rev'd on other grounds, 6 F.3d 497 (8th Cir.
1993), and cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1063 (1994) and Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 868 (Iowa 1994) (finding that the diversion of the plaintiff's
punitive damage award does not transform a distribution-scheme statute into either
a criminal or quasi-criminal statute and therefore does not trigger double jeopardy
or excessive fines protection) and Tenold v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 873 P.2d 413, 423-24
(Or. Ct. App. 1994) (in banc) (finding that a split-recovery statute does not implicate
the Eighth Amendment).
1 See e.g., United States v. 429 S. Main St., 52 F.3d 1416, 1421-22 (6th Cir. 1995)
(upholding, over dissent, forfeiture of the owner's house for two sales of marijuana,
totalling $75, to government agents who arranged for the sales at the house); United
States v. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493, 1495, 1498-99 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding
forfeiture of a $150,000 house for gambling in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955(d)
excessive under the Eighth Amendment); United States v. 461 Shelby County Rd. 361,
857 F. Supp. 935, 940 (N.D. Ala. 1994) (mem.) (finding forfeiture of a drug dealer's
house excessive); United States ex rel. Smith v. Gilbert Realty Co., 840 F. Supp. 71, 74-
75 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (holding that the government's effort to make a defendant pay
$290,000 in penalties for false claims that created only $1630 in actual losses violates
the Excessive Fines Clause, although a $35,000 penalty would not); United States v.
835 Seventh St., 820 F. Supp. 688, 696 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding forfeiture of a
$70,000 house for the sale of less than seven grams of marijuana excessive under the
Eighth Amendment), appeal dismissed, 28 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 1994); City of Tampa
Police Dep't v. Acosta, 645 So. 2d 551,551-52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (agreeing that
forfeiture of a newly purchased automobile worth more than $21,000 was an excessive
fine for the purchase of $20 worth of crack cocaine); State v. Hill, 635 N.E.2d 1248,
1256-57 (Ohio 1994) (remanding for determination of excessiveness, over dissent that
considered forfeiture of an apartment complex so excessive as to constitute a patent
constitutional violation).
The United States Department of Justice is among the most affected by this
controversy. See Memorandum from Jo Ann Harris, Assistant Attorney General, to
All United States Attorneys, All Section Chiefs and Office Directors, Criminal
Division, and All Asset Forfeiture Components (Jan. 7, 1994), reprinted in 11 Dep't
Just. Manual (P-H) B-584.138-229 to -230 (1994) [hereinafter Memorandum] ("The
absence of a defined standard is causing a problem for federal attorneys who are
being required to respond to numerous constitutional challenges to forfeitures
Compare Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374-75 (1982) (per curiam) (upholding
a sentence of 40 years for the possession of less than nine ounces of marijuana) and
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,284-85 (1980) (upholding a mandatory life sentence
after three minor nonviolent property felonies) with Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,303
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fractured decision in Harmelin v. Michigan,23 a 1991 case in which
the Court rejected a first-time drug offender's Eighth Amendment
challenge to Michigan's mandatory sentence of life without parole
for the possession of 672 grams of cocaine. SixJustices agreed that
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause requires some propor-
tionality review of some noncapital sentences, but no single theory
for applying proportionality commanded a majority. 4  Lower
courts have questioned which of the two proportionality analyses
advanced by Harmelin is required by the Eighth Amendment 5 and
(1983) (finding that a mandatory sentence of life without parole for a seventh minor
nonviolent felony was "significantly disproportionate" and thus invalid under the
Eighth Amendment) and Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (striking
down a statute criminalizing addiction to narcotics as violative of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments) and Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382 (1910)
(finding unconstitutional a mandatory sentence of 15 years of cadena temporal-hard
and painful labor in chains-for falsifying official records).
23 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
21 Four Justices joined Justice Scalia in rejecting individualized proportionality
review for sentences other than death, ensuring the survival of mandatory sentencing
schemes. See id. at 994-96. On other issues, no majority appeared. Justices Scalia
and Rehnquist rejected proportionality review entirely. See supra note 8 and
accompanying text. Justices Blackmun and Stevens agreed with Justice White, who
advocated proportionality review for all noncapital penalties under the Eighth
Amendment, using the analysis set out in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. at 292. See
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1009 (White, J., dissenting). Solem held that the Eighth
Amendment requires: 1) a comparison of the gravity of the offense and harshness
of the penalty; 2) a comparison of the questioned sentence to sentences imposed on
other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and 3) a comparison of the questioned
sentence to sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-92. Agreeing with neither extreme, Justice
Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, concluded that "[t]he Eighth
Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence [but]
forbids only extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime," and
that "intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional analyses are appropriate only in the
rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence
imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionaity." Harmelin, 501 U.S. at
1001, 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
' At least one court has apparently concluded that Harmelin did not change the
need to apply full proportionality review of the Solem type to all cases. See United
States v. O'Banion, 943 F.2d 1422, 1432-33 (5th Cir. 1991) (concluding under the
Solem proportionality analysis that imposing a felony sentence for failing to report the
importation of monetary instruments in excess of $10,000 did not violate the Eighth
Amendment). Other courts have followed Justice Kennedy's approach. See United
States v. Cupa-Guillen, 34 F.3d 860, 864-65 (9th Cir. 1994) (upholding a 100-month
sentence for illegal re-entry into the United States and rejecting the argument that
it was "grossly disproportionate" to the crime), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 921 (1995);
United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1130-38 & n.12 (3d Cir. 1991) (upholding a
sentence of 17 and a half years imprisonment and $150 special assessment for three
drug offenses usingJustice Kennedy's modified Solem analysis), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
1995]
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whether either has any relevance outside the context of sentences
of life without parole.
26
2. Substantive Due Process
Limits on Punishment
As for the constraints of substantive due process, they remain a
perpetual source of some of the most troublesome interpretive
questions in constitutional law, as much in this context of limiting
the severity of penalties as in other contexts. Civil litigants regularly
claim that punitive damage awards exceed due process limits, but
the Court has yet to strike down an award on this basis. Only last
year the Court clearly stated that due process limits the severity of
punitive civil awards.27 The prior term, in TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp.,2 s a majority of Justices agreed that a $10
million punitive award, 526 times the amount of actual damages, did
not violate the due process rights of the defendant, 29 but could not
agree why. The Court appears ready to tackle this issue once again,
having agreed to review the constitutionality of punitive damages
awarded in BMW of North America v. Gore.30 The Court's recent
activity is beginning to soften lower court resistance to due process
challenges by defendants who face successive punitive damage
1110 (1992); United States v. Hopper, 941 F.2d 419,422 (6th Cir. 1991) (upholding
a 10-monthjail sentence for selling a machine gun using the "narrow proportionality
principle" applied by the Harmelin plurality); see also United States v. 429 S. Main St.,
52 F.3d 1416, 1424 n.1 (6th Cir. 1995) (GuyJ, concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("Recent cases question the applicability of a proportionality principle to the
Eighth Amendment at all."); Craig W. Palm, RICO Forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment:
When Is Everything Too Much?, 53 U. P1Tr. L. REv. 1, 54 (1991) (concluding that the
three inconsistent approaches in Harmelin make it "very difficult to articulate with any
degree of certainty the current state of the proportionality doctrine in non-capital
cases").
26See United States v. Lockhart, 58 F.3d 86, 89 (4th Cir. 1995) ("It is well settled
that proportionality review is not appropriate for any sentence less than life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole." (emphasis added)); United States v.
Kratsas, 45 F.3d 63, 67 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that the Solem proportionality review
still applies after Harmelin to life sentences or the death penalty, and upholding a
sentence of life without release).
See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2335 (1994) ("[T]he
Constitution imposes a substantive limit on the size of punitive damage awards.").
28 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
' See id. at 2722-23.
30 115 S. Ct. 932 (1995), granting cert. to 646 So. 2d 619 (Ala. 1994).
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awards for the same conduct,"1 but the parameters of this emerg-
ing protection remain murky at best. 2
" For years, defendants claiming "punitive overkill" from successive awards had
little hope of success. See James R. May, Fashioning Procedural and Substantive Due
Process Arguments in Toxic and Other Tort Actions Involving Punitive Damages After
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 22 ENVTL. L. 573, 613-15 (1992)
(collecting cases); Charles D. Stewart & Philip G. Piggott, Punitive Damages Since
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 693, 713-15
(1993) (same); Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Propriety of Awarding Punitive Damages
to Separate Plaintiffs Bringing Successive Actions Arising Out of Common Incident or
Circumstances Against Common Defendant or Defendants ("One Bite" or "First Comer"
Doctrine), 11 A.L.R.4TH 1261 (1982 & Supp. 1994) (same); see also Dennis N.Jones et
al., Multiple Punitive Damages Awardsfora Single Course of Wrongful Conduct: The Need
for a National Policy to Protect Due Process, 43 ALA. L. REV. 1, 32-33 (1991) (arguing
that a rational policy is needed to "protect the due process rights of defendants
against an unreasonably excessive aggregate amount of punitive damages"); Richard
A. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness,
Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 61 (1983) (proposing that courts
aggregate punitive damage claims in class actions to prevent excessive awards); Alan
Schulkin, Comment, Mass Liability and Punitive Damages Overkill, 30 HASTINGs L.J.
1797, 1800-08 (1979) (describing various approaches designed to control multiple
punitive damage awards).
2 See, e.g., Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1389, 1391 (3d Cir. 1993) (in banc)
(denying the defendant's due process argument on evidentiary grounds without
deciding whether the aggregate amount of successive punitive awards may exceed the
"maximum amount tolerable under the Due Process Clause," but halving the punitive
award from $2 million to $1 million under Virgin Islands law, in part because the trial
court "gave insufficient consideration to the effect of successive punitive awards in
asbestos litigation"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 650 (1994); Tudor Assocs. v. AJ & AJ
Servicing, 843 F. Supp. 68, 79-80 (E.D.N.C. 1993) (setting aside a $7 million award
because the defendants had already paid a $350,000 punitive damages judgment in
a state court action based on the identical facts); Bradley v. Hubbard Broadcasting,
471 N.W.2d 670, 679 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (reducing a punitive damage award of
$500,000 in a defamation case to $100,000, in part because "the jury was unaware
that an additional civil penalty of $200,000 would be imposed" upon the defendant
for its actions, over dissent that argued that the separate penalties should stand); see
also W.R. Grace & Co. v. Waters, 638 So. 2d 502, 506 (Fla. 1994) (mandating
bifurcated proceedings so that a defendant facing punitive damages can "build a
record for a due process argument based on the cumulative effect of prior awards");
Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854,867 (Iowa 1994) (rejecting
a due process challenge based on prior punitive awards because the defendant failed
to show it had been "sufficiently punished for its manufactur[e] and sale" of an
asbestos product).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, too, has recognized
that the multiple imposition of punitive damages for the same course of conduct may
violate due process if the defendant can show (1) that the first jury "understood its
assignment to be the selection of that sum of money appropriate to punish the tort-
feasor for the full extent of its wrongful conduc4 not merely a sum appropriate as
punishment for the injuries to the plaintiffs in the lawsuit," or (2) that the judge was
"provided with a factual basis sufficient for evaluating the entire scope of the
defendant's wrongful conduct" so that she could "determine that the aggregate of
prior awards punishes the entirety of the wrongful conduct to the limit of due
1995]
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B. Limits on Multiplicity
The Court has had even less success in providing a coherent
rationale for explaining and applying constitutional limits on
duplicative penalties. The primary source of any such limitation in
the criminal context has been the Double Jeopardy Clause, which
prohibits twice placing a defendant "in jeopardy of life or limb" for
the "same offence."38  Some aspects of the double jeopardy
guarantee are well settled. For instance, the Clause prohibits a
prosecutor or judge from unnecessarily aborting a trial and starting
over on the same offense,3 4 appealing or setting aside even an
"erroneous" jury acquittal,3 5 or reprosecuting a defendant on the
same charge after an acquittal or conviction. 6 Yet a fundamental
question remains unanswered: Who defines when two charges or
penalties are the "same offence"-courts or legislatures? Before I
turn to an analysis of the Court's contradictory positions on this
question, let me capsulize this debate.
process." Simpson v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 901 F.2d 277, 280-81 (2d Cir. 1990)
(emphasis added), cert. dismissed, 497 U.S. 1057 (1990); see also Racich v. Celotex
Corp., 887 F.2d 393, 398 (2d Cir. 1989) (recognizing the defendant's due process
claim, but denying relief because the defendant failed to preserve its objection in the
trial court).
s 5 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673-76 (1982) (holding that if the
defendant successfully moves for a mistrial, doublejeopardy bars a second trial if the
basis for the mistrial was prosecutorial orjudicial conduct intended to prejudice the
defendant into moving for a mistrial); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 516
(1978) (stating that a mistrial order must be supported by a "high degree" of
necessity); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 737 (1963) (barring retrial of the
defendant after a mistrial caused by the prosecutor's failure to ensure the presence
of his witnesses).
" See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978) ("A judgment of acquittal,
whether based on a jury verdict of not guilty or on a ruling by the court that the
evidence is insufficient to convict, may not be appealed and terminates the
prosecution when a second trial would be necessitated by a reversal."); Sanabria v.
United States, 437 U.S. 54, 75 (1978) (stating that a defendant may not be retried
after an acquittal, even if the legal rulings underlying the acquittal were "egregiously
erroneous"); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957) (preventing retrial on
a greater charge after a jury has rejected a greater offense for a lesser one); see also
Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of DoubleJeopardy, 1978 Sup.
CT. REV. 81, 122-55 (discussing acquittal rules).
I See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2855 (1993) ("[The Double
Jeopardy Clause] applies ... to successive prosecutions for the same criminal
offense.").
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1. Deference to Legislative Choice
At one end of the interpretive spectrum lies the legislative
deference approach, premised on the belief that by referring to
"offence" the Framers intended that prosecutors and judges adhere
to legislative choices regarding the appropriate classification of
conduct into culpable units-the word "offence," presumably,
referring to a preexisting legislative definition. 7  Legislatures
could be trusted to divide wrongdoing into appropriate units for
punishment and prosecution, but prosecutors and judges could not
necessarily be trusted to respect those choices."8 Under this view,
if Congress intends to create two separate offenses by enacting two
separate provisions, then the Fifth Amendment does not prevent
prosecutors from seeking successive penalties under both, regardless
of how similar or even identical the two provisions appear.
This approach to the Double Jeopardy Clause protects defen-
dants against cumulative and successive penalties in at least two
ways. First, it mandates a presumption, favorable to defendants, that
sanctions of sufficient similarity were intended by the legislature to
be mutually exclusive alternatives-the same offense, not two
different offenses.3 9 The Court's formula for determining when
two provisions are so similar that they must be presumed to be the
"same offence" has come to be known as the Blockburger test: two
provisions are presumed to describe and punish the same offense
unless each provision requires proof of a fact that the other does
not.4" The Clause bars prosecutors from enforcing both of two
provisions that fail this test, unless a clear indication of contrary
legislative intent appears to rebut this presumption.41 A classic
" See Akhil R. Amar &Jonathan L. Marcus, DoubleJeopardy Law After Rodney King,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 38-39 (1995).
" See Barry Friedman, Dialogue andJudicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 603-04
(1993) (noting the majoritarian nature of the Court's doublejeopardyjurisprudence).
" The Court has explained that the Clause requires this presumption notbecause
a legislature is powerless to punish a person for the same thing using two separate
statutes, but because "ordinarily" legislatures do not do so. See Whalen v. United
States, 445 U.S. 684, 691-92 (1980).
4 See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
4' See, e.g., Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 (1985) ("Insofar as the
question is one of legislative intent, the Blockburger presumption must of course yield
to a plainly expressed contrary view on the part of Congress."); Ohio v.Johnson, 467
U.S. 493, 499 n.8 (1984) ("Even if the crimes are the same under Blockburger, if it is
evident that a state legislature intended to authorize cumulative punishments, a
court's inquiry is at an end."); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 337-42 (1981)
(allowing dual prosecutions for offenses arising from a single agreement or conspiracy
1995]
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example of this deferential approach in action is the case of Missouri
v. Hunter.42 In Hunter, the Court upheld two sentences imposed
in a single trial under two separate state statutes, one that punished
armed robbery, and one that punished "armed criminal action."
43
The Court agreed that the statutes were presumptively the "same
offence" because neither required proof of a unique element, but
found that the state legislature had nevertheless specifically
authorized cumulative punishment under the two statutes.
44
Upholding the multiple punishment, the Court starkly proclaimed,
"Legislatures, not courts, prescribe the scope of punishments."
45
Not only does the deferential interpretation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause presume, absent contrary proof of legislative intent,
that the government must choose between offenses that lack distinct
elements, the deferential interpretation defers to the legislature on
only this point-the definition of "same offence." The Clause
prohibits legislatures from obliterating by statute other parameters
of double jeopardy protection. For example, legislators could not
simply choose to redefine when "jeopardy" attaches or when, if ever,
acquittals may be appealed.46
2. Limiting Legislative Choice
The competing view, which I will term the antimajoritarian
interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the phrase
"same offence" does more than create a defendant-friendly
constitutional presumption which serves as a proxy for legislative
intent when no better evidence of that intent is available. Instead,
the phrase refers to some indivisible unit of culpability that the
government is powerless to punish twice. This reading would defeat
deliberate legislative efforts to create two separate crimes or two
separate penalties for the same conduct. Based upon a distrust of
legislatures, this approach presumes that legislators undervalue or
ignore the threats to liberty posed by cumulative penalties and
successive prosecutions.47 Justice Marshall articulated this view in
with dual objectives).
42 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
43 Id. at 362.
44 See id. at 368-69.
45 Id. at 368.
46 See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text; infra note 79.
47 See, e.g.,JAY A. SIGLER, DOUBLEJEOPARDY 169-82, 189, 195-96 (1969) (arguing
that because the roles of the prosecutor, and the criminal law that he or she wields,
are so much broader than they were at the founding, double jeopardy law can no
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his dissent in Missouri v. Hunter, when he argued that the phrase
"the same offence" has content independent of legislative pro-
nouncement, so that "two crimes that do not satisfy the Blockburger
test constitute 'the same offence' under the Double Jeopardy Clause
regardless of the legislature's intent to treat them as separate offenses."
48
3. The Conflict
In its 1991 decision in Grady v. Corbin,49 the Court reached an
uneasy truce between these two competing views of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Nine Justices agreed that the legislative deference
approach governed whether or not multiple penalties imposed in
the same proceeding punished the "same offence," but five Justices
adhered to a version of the antimajoritarian approach to determine
whether or not successive prosecutions punished the "same
offence." The Court reasoned that greater protection was required
in the successive prosecution context because multiple trials, as
compared to multiple penalties in the same trial, pose the greater
threat to a defendant's interests in finality, accuracy, freedom from
harassment, and jury leniency.
50
To give independent content to the meaning of "same offence,"
the Court could have adopted any one of a variety of rules,
including the one Justice Marshall had advocated earlier in Hunter.
The specific rule adopted by the Court in Grady was more complex,
however. Stated in basic terms, the Court held that even if two
offenses A and B are not the "same offence" under Blockburger, the
government may not prosecute a defendant for offense B after
prosecuting him for offense A if the government will "establish" an
"essential element" of offense .9 with "conduct that constitutes"
offense A."1
Within two years, two of the five Justices who joined this
compromise were no longer on the Court. The truce dissolved. In
longer be constrained by formal reference to legislatively defined offenses).
4s Hunter, 459 U.S. at 374 (emphasis added).
49 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
'Justice Brennan, joined by four other Justices, defended this arrangement,
stating, "Even when a State can bring multiple charges against an individual under
Blockburger, a tremendous additional burden is placed on that defendant if he must
face each of the charges in a separate proceeding." Id. at 519.
" Id. at 510 (barring a state from prosecuting a defendant for manslaughter after
the defendant had already pleaded guilty to two misdemeanors based on the same
incident).
1995]
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1993, a new majority concluded in United States v. Dixon5 2 that
Grady should be overruled. The Court held that the Blockburger test
governs not only the ability of prosecutors to seek multiple penalties
in the same proceeding, but also their ability to bring successive
prosecutions. 5  Even though the Court in earlier cases had
deferred to the legislative prerogative only when considering
multiple punishments at a single trial,54 Dixon rejected any distinc-
tion between the meaning of "same offence" in the context of
multiple punishment as opposed to the context of multiple
prosecutions. "[I]t is embarrassing to assert that the single term
'same offence' . . . has two different meanings," one for successive
prosecutions and another for successive punishments, Justice Scalia
wrote for the Court.55 Dixon gave the go-ahead to government
attorneys to cumulate prosecutions or penalties against offenders
for the same course of conduct, as long as the legislature had approved.'
52 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
" For the majority, Justice Scalia wrote:
Unlike Blockburger analysis, whose definition of what prevents two crimes
from being the "same offence". . . has deep historical roots and has been
accepted in numerous precedents of this Court, Grady lacks constitutional
roots. The "same-conduct" rule it announced is wholly inconsistent with
earlier Supreme Court precedent and with the clear common-law under-
standing of double jeopardy.
Id. at 2860.
54 See, e.g., Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 369 (1983) (stating that the Court
had to defer to the legislature's wish to impose cumulative punishment in a single
trial).
55 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2860. This year in Witte v. United States, the Court cited
Dixon for the proposition that "the same inquiry generally applies '[i]n both the
multiple punishment and multiple prosecution contexts.'" 115 S. Ct. 2199, 2204
(1995) (quoting Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2882); see also George C. Thomas III, A
Blameworthy Act Approach to the Double Jeopardy Same Offense Problem, 83 CAL. L. REV.
(forthcomingJuly 1995) (manuscript at 22, on file with author) ("How is it that same
offense is a chameleon that changes meaning in different procedural contexts?").
'Justice Souter, dissenting in Dixon, criticized its sweeping results. Without more
protection than Blockburger provides, he argued, the government, by
defining its offenses with care ... could not merely add punishment to
punishment (within Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment limits), but could
bring a person to trial again and again for that same conduct, violating the
principle of finality, subjecting him repeatedly to all the burdens of trial,
rehearsing its prosecution, and increasing the risk of erroneous conviction,
all in contravention of the principles behind the protection from successive
prosecution included in the Fifth Amendment. The protection of the
DoubleJeopardy Clause against successive prosecutions is not so fragile that
it can be avoided by finely drafted statutes and carefully planned prosecu-
tions.
Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2890.
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Dixon could have ended the debate about whether legislatures
can define what "same offence" means for double jeopardy. But a
separate strand of the antimajoritarian approach survived Grady's
demise. This strand originated in 1989 in United States v. Halper,5"
two years before Grady and four years before Dixon. Halper had
filed sixty-five false claims for Medicaid reimbursement, bilking the
government out of a total of $585 in overpayments. 58 He was
prosecuted, convicted, sentenced to two years in prison, and fined
$5000. The United States then sued Halper, seeking $130,000
under the Federal False Claims Act.59 Reviewing Halper's double
jeopardy challenge, the Court first concluded that the False Claims
Act penalty was punishment that triggered the protection of the
AlthoughJustice Souter's plea to require more than Blockburgers presumption
failed to persuade a majority in Dixon, the several opinions in Dixon revealed
disagreement about the application of Blockburger in the context of contempt. The
companion cases addressed in the decision each involved the successive prosecution
of a defendant for contempt and for a substantive offense that formed the basis for
the contempt charge. See id. at 2853. Justices Scalia and Kennedy applied Blockburger
differently than the remaining members of the Court who reached the issue. Scalia
and Kennedy looked to thejudicial order allegedly violated by the contemnor for the
elements of the contempt offense, essentially treating the judge who had issued the
order as a separate legislature. See id. at 2856-58. They found that the judge had
included proof of the substantive offense as an element of the contempt offense. See
id. at 2858. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas took a
different tack, arguing that the elements of contempt, as set out in the contempt
statute rather than thejudge's order, were different offenses under Blockburger from
those of the underlying crime. See id. at 2865-68 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). Justice
Blackmun, too, found that the separate interests addressed by the contempt statute
and the substantive crime rendered them separate offenses. See id. at 2880
(Blackmun,J., dissenting). I doubt that these Justices would disagree about how to
apply Blockburger outside of the context of contempt.
Some have not interpreted Dixon as I have. See United States v. $405,089.23, 33
F.3d 1210, 1217 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that the quest for legislative intent
in Hunter is not appropriate in successive prosecution cases, even after Dixon),
amended on other grounds by 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995), and petition for cert. filed, 64
U.S.L.W. 3161 (U.S. Aug. 28, 1995) (No. 95-346); Todd v. State, 884 P.2d 668, 675-77
& n.7 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994) (suggesting that Dixon may not allow legislative intent
to authorize successive prosecutions as opposed to multiple punishments in a single
trial),petitionforhearinggranted, No. S-6709, 1995 Alas. LEXIS 2 (AlaskaJan. 9, 1995);
Elizabeth T. Lear, Contemplating the Successive Prosecution Phenomenon in the Federal
System, 85J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 625, 628 n.18 (1995) (suggesting that even after
Dixon, legislative intent is an appropriate guide only in the multiple punishment
context, not the multiple prosecution context).
57 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
See id. at 437.
s See id. at 438. Under the Federal False Claims Act, Halper was subject to
penalties of $2000 per offense and an amount equal to twice the damages sustained
plus costs. See id. The Act now provides for treble damages and penalties of $5000
to $10,000 per claim, plus costs. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988).
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Double Jeopardy Clause, even though it was imposed under a civil
statute."0 The Court then took another leap, holding that the
Double Jeopardy Clause barred the government from seeking this
second penalty after securing a criminal conviction for the same
conduct, even though Congress had authorized both penalties.
61
Consider, for a moment, how Halper might have come out had
the case reached the Court after the Dixon decision. One would
have expected the Court to have reasoned something like this:
In Dixon we held that there is only one meaning for "same
offence" under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Our cases demon-
strate that while we must presume, under Blockburger, that a
legislature does not intend to allow a prosecutor to punish a
defendant under both of two provisions that lack distinct elements,
this presumption is rebuttable with clear evidence that the
legislature intended both provisions to apply. Hunter. Here, the
elements of the civil penalty and the criminal penalty are identical,
but the intent of Congress to allow both criminal and civil
penalties for Halper's fraud is clear. Thus, double jeopardy does
not bar the subsequent sanction.
Instead, the Court in Halper interpreted the DoubleJeopardy Clause
to offer, in the context of civil penalties that follow convictions,
more protection against the evils of multiple penalties than the
legislature provides. Dixon's later rejection of this same theory in
the context of successive criminal penalties created a strange
paradox. The two cases are based upon two premises about the
Fifth Amendment's reach which are irreconcilable. Halper's Double
Jeopardy Clause protects defendants against oversights and
overreaching in the legislative process; Dixon's Double Jeopardy
Clause binds other government actors to legislative will. Not only
are the theories underlying the two cases at odds, but side by side
they produce a ridiculous maxim: A once-punished criminal
defendant is spared subsequent civil penalties for the identical
wrong, but must endure subsequent criminal prosecutions.
Amazingly, Halper's theory has survived Dixon. This past term,
in Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch,6" the Court, relying on
o I discuss the propriety of treating civil sanctions as punishment under the Bill
of Rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause infra part III.A.3. For my present
purpose, which is to illustrate the inconsistency of the Court's double jeopardy
theory, it is sufficient to assume that the civil penalty in Halper was indeed
"punishment" subject to limitation by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
"' See Halper, 490 U.S. at 447-49.
62 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
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Halper, held that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited Montana
from collecting a state tax on the possession of illegal drugs from
the defendants once it had convicted them of drug possession.63
The Court seemed to have forgotten its holding in Dixon; it
appeared to overlook the possibility that the tax and the possession
charges were not the "same offence" within the meaning of the
Clause, either because the criminal statute and the tax provision
contained distinct elements or because the Montana legislature
intended to punish drug possessors with both penalties.64
The juxtaposition of Kurth Ranch and Dixon cuts double
jeopardy adrift from any consistent theory that may help the judges
and litigants who must navigate its limits on overlapping penalties.
In stark contrast to the Court's deference to legislative intent in
63 See id. at 1948.
64 See id. at 1945, 1948. Justice Scalia, Grady's strongest opponent, joined by
Justice Thomas, advocated abandoning the Halper rule that would prohibit multiple
punishment authorized by the legislature. See id. at 1959 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He
argued that "by extending the no-double-punishments rule to civil penalties, while
simultaneously affirming that it demanded more than mere fidelity to legislative
intent, Halper gave the rule a breadth of effect it had never before enjoyed." Id. at
1957. He cited Justice Felix Frankfurter, see id. at 1955-56, who had expressed this
vision of double jeopardy 50 years earlier:
[W]here two such proceedings merely carry out the remedies which
Congress has prescribed in advance for a wrong, they do not twice put a
man in jeopardy for the same offense. Congress thereby merely allows the
comprehensive penalties which it has imposed to be enforced in separate
suits instead of in a single proceeding. By doing this Congress does not
impose more than a single punishment. And the double jeopardy clause
does not prevent Congress from prescribing such a procedure for the
vindication of punitive remedies.
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 555 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); ef. Regina and Green, 41 O.R.2d 557,559 (Ont. High Ct. ofJustice 1983)
(explaining that even a punitive forfeiture following conviction does not violate the
double jeopardy protection in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and
reasoning that an accused is notfinally punished until all possible authorized penal
consequences for the offense have been exhausted).
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, has this year again reiterated his
dissatisfaction with the Halper rule, stating, "This is one of those areas in which I
believe our jurisprudence is not only wrong but unworkable as well .... " Witte v.
United States, 115 S. Ct. 2199, 2209 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia's dissent in Kurth Ranch has already been applauded by some
jurists. See, e.g., United States v. Haywood, 864 F. Supp. 502, 505 (W.D.N.C. 1994)
(stating that "[t]his Court is of the opinion that [the Framers of the DoubleJeopardy
Clause] did not contemplate the prohibition of multiple punishments, but merely
multiple prosecutions," and citingJustice Scalia's opinion in Kurth Ranch); People v.
Vaughn, 524 N.W.2d 217, 233 n.7 (Mich. 1994) (Boyle, J., concurring) (noting the
"[f]rustration with the inability of some to appreciate the absence of a multiple-
punishment component of the Double Jeopardy Clause").
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Dixon, its opinions in Halper and Kurth Ranch flout legislative will.
Congress had authorized cumulative criminal and civil sanctions for
Mr. Halper's conduct;6 5 Montana intended to impose cumulative
civil and criminal penalties upon its drug possessors."6 Even if
Blockburger warranted a presumption that these legislatures never
meant to authorize the imposition of two separate penalties, that
presumption was rebutted. Because double jeopardy, under Dixon,
does not bar a legislature from authorizing multiple criminal
penalties for the same conduct, it need not bar the substitution of
a civil penalty for an otherwise permissible criminal one.67 Dixon,
then, has a stranglehold on Halper's logic; efforts to resuscitate
Halper short of overruling Dixon itself are doomed to fail.6"
65 Cf. SENATEJUDICIARY COMM., FALSE CLAIMS AMENDMENTS AcT OF 1986, S. REP.
NO. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1986) (explaining that 31 U.S.C. § 3731(d) was
added to give a plea of nolo contendere in criminal fraud cases collateral estoppel
effect in a subsequent civil fraud action), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5296-
97.
66 See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1960 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that "the
Montana legislature authorized these taxes in addition to the criminal penalties for
possession of marijuana").
67 The same can be said about those forfeiture cases in which courts have found
that civil forfeiture precludes criminal prosecution for the same activity. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 571-72 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that a consent
judgment in a civil forfeiture proceeding barred later prosecution); United States v.
$405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the government
violated the DoubleJeopardy Clause by obtaining convictions in a criminal case and
continuing to pursue a forfeiture action), amended on other grounds by 56 F.3d 41 (9th
Cir. 1995), and petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3161 (U.S. Aug. 28, 1995) (No. 95-
346). These cases make sense under Halper and Kurth Ranch, but are inconsistent
with the reasoning of Dixon, because Congress clearly authorized both penalties. See,
e.g., United States v. Hendrickson, 22 F.3d 170, 175-76 (7th Cir.) (stating that "it is
readily apparent that forfeiture was considered by the Sentencing Commission and
was intended to be imposed in addition to, not in lieu of, incarceration"), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 209 (1994); United States v. Crook, 9 F.3d 1422, 1426 (9th Cir. 1993)
(finding that civil forfeiture is not an authorized basis for departing below the
sentencing range required by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and noting that even
though Congress provided that fines should be set with collateral civil consequences
of conviction in mind, no similar provision was included for length of incarceration),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1841 (1994); United States v. Smith, 874 F. Supp. 347, 350
(N.D. Ala. 1995) (mem.) ("It is impossible to make a successful argument that
Congress did not actually intend to permit both the 'civil' forfeiture of a drug dealer's
real property and his incarceration, based on precisely the same conduct .... ").
" Others would instead prefer to distinguish Halper or Kurth Ranch. For efforts
to make this distinction, see Covelli v. Crystal, No. 534178, 1994 WL 722976, at *6,
*8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 21, 1994) (concluding that Kurth Ranch and Halper are
"wholly inconsistent with the entire approach to double jeopardy analysis traditionally
associated with Blockburger," but suggesting that "[m]ultiple criminal proceedings [like
those in Dixon] are typically required by the perceived demands ofjustice," while "the
demands ofjustice do not require" coexisting civil and criminal penalties since the
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And if this fundamental inconsistency is not reason enough to
take a hard look at the Court's regulation of multiple penalties
under the Fifth Amendment, Kurth Ranch has highlighted another
problem-the difficulty of distinguishing between punitive civil
sanctions governed by the Double Jeopardy Clause and remedial
civil awards that should escape double jeopardy review. Halper
unloosed a steady stream of double jeopardy challenges by con-
victed defendants facing civil forfeitures, administrative penalties,
tax assessments, and other civil sanctions, Kurth Ranch being the
most prominent example.69 Also popular are "reverse-Halper"
claims, affording those accused of a crime a basis for resisting
criminal prosecution under the DoubleJeopardy Clause using prior
civil sanctions as a shield."0 Halper and Kurth Ranch have left
civil penalties could just as easily be obtained by increasing the criminal fine);
Henning, supra note 1, at 45 (suggesting, prior to Kurth Ranch, that Halper applies
only to cases involving fixed penalties assigned without regard to the severity of
conduct); Thomas, supra note 55 (manuscript at 72-73) (arguing that the civil penalty
sought in Halper was beyond that authorized by the spirit, although not the text, of
the statute itself).
" See, e.g., United States v. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d at 1221-22 (finding that civil
forfeiture of proceeds under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993) and 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(6) (1988), after conviction violates double jeopardy); United States v.
Barnette, 10 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir.) (holding that the government could seek
$50.5 million in a false claims suit after obtaining a criminal conviction and sentence
of $7 million), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 74 (1994); United States v. Mayers, 957 F.2d 858,
860 (11th Cir.) (per curiam) (holding that criminal prosecution for filing false
insurance claims did not preclude civil proceedings for filing false Medicare
payments), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 989 (1992); Patel v. United States, No. 91-C-4407,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 560, at *8-10 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 17, 1992) (holding that double
jeopardy barred the Department of Agriculture from collecting $79,986 in civil
penalties from the defendant, who had previously been sentenced to 60 days on work
release, three years' probation, and $640 costs and restitution for fraud, because the
fine bore no rational relationship to the goal of making the government whole);
United States v. Hall, 730 F. Supp. 646, 647, 654-55 (M.D. Pa. 1990) (mem.) (holding
that the government could not seek a civil penalty of $1 million where the defendant
had already been convicted and sentenced to one year's imprisonment, two years'
probation, 400 hours of community service, and a $10,000 fine); New Mexico
Taxation & Revenue Dep't v. Whitener, 869 P.2d 829, 833-34 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993)
(barring assessment of $80,070.38 in drug taxes after the defendant had pled guilty
and lost $33,000 in forfeiture because the Department failed to show how the
assessment was proportionate to the remedial goals of the state), cert. granted, 871
P.2d 984 (N.M. 1994).
0 See, e.g., Ursey, 59 F.3d at 571-72 (reversing a drug conviction following civil
forfeiture on double jeopardy grounds); United States v. Hudson, 879 F. Supp. 1113,
1116 (W.D. Okla. 1994) (finding that a prior civil penalty from the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency was "punishment" barring indictment for the same
conduct); United States v. Sanchez, No. M-90-020, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20194, at
*18 (S.D. Tex. June 8, 1990) (finding that double jeopardy barred a smuggling
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courts with numerous prickly problems, such as determining when
jeopardy "attaches" in punitive civil proceedings or when a
defendant waives his double jeopardy claim of multiple punishment
by nonappearance or settlement.
71
prosecution following Customs fines of $232,000); State v. Cook, 870 P.2d 413, 417
(Ariz. Ct. App.) (affirming an order dismissing criminal charges against a defendant
who had already been assessed $150,000 in penalties by the state securities
commission), vacated and remandedfor reconsideration in light ofUnited States v. Dixon,
115 S. Ct. 44 (1994); see also David S. Rudstein, CivilPenaltlies and Multiple Punishment
Under the Double Jeopardy Clause: Some Unanswered Questions, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 587,
601-02 & nn.84-85 (1993) (analyzing and collecting several reverse-Halper claims).
Some federaljudges have released prisoners whose convictions on drug charges
followed the civil forfeiture of their assets. See Oakes v. United States, 872 F. Supp.
817, 826-29 (E.D. Wash. 1994) (mem.) (granting a convicted defendant's petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 because the conviction was obtained after civil forfeiture, in
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause); United States v. McCaslin, 863 F. Supp.
1299, 1307 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (same).
71 See United States v. Morgan, 51 F.3d 1105, 1110-11 (2d Cir.) (finding that
absent explicit terms, the defendant did not waive the doublejeopardy defense when
he signed a civil contempt order, even though the defendant knew of the pending
criminal investigation), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 171 (1995); United States v. Barton, 46
F.3d 51, 52 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting thatjeopardy may attach upon filing of an answer
in a forfeiture proceeding); United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193,201 (5th
Cir. 1991) (finding that the mere execution of a promissory note covering a $232,000
civil fine for smuggling marijuana under 19 U.S.C. § 1584 (1988 & Supp. V 1993),
which provides a $500 per ounce fine, is not punishment triggering the double
jeopardy bar against later prosecution for drug trafficking charges), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 123 (1992); United States v. Lane, 891 F. Supp. 8, 11 (D. Me. 1995) (finding
that double jeopardy had not attached in a prior forfeiture proceeding in which the
defendant had failed to make a claim, even though there was no question that the
defendant was the owner of the property forfeited); United States v. Tamez, 881 F.
Supp. 460, 464-65 (E.D. Wash. 1995) (holding that in a claim of successive
prosecution, rather than multiple punishment, jeopardy attaches at the time of
conviction in criminal prosecutions and at the time of the forfeiture decree in civil
forfeiture proceedings, instead of at the time the defendant enters into a stipulation
of forfeiture); United States v. Martin, Nos. 95-C-609, 90 CR 452, 99 WL 124126, at
*5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 1995) ("Jeopardy attaches in a forfeiture proceeding at the time
evidence is first presented to the trier of fact."); United States v. Messino, 876 F.
Supp. 980, 983 (N.D. Il. 1995) (mem.) (noting that no jeopardy attaches in a civil
forfeiture case until a hearing on the merits or until a pretrial release of assets);
Smith, 874 F. Supp. at 350 (holding that double jeopardy did not bar subsequent
prosecution even though the defendant had filed an offer of judgment in a civil
forfeiture case); Quinones-Ruiz v. United States, 873 F. Supp. 359, 362-63 (S.D. Cal.
1995) (finding that the defendant did not waive the double jeopardy defense when
he failed to contest forfeiture); United States v. Sanchez-Cobarruvias, No. 94-0732-
IEG, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20418, at *10-11 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 1994) (holding that
an administrative agency's final determination triggers double jeopardy, so that
jeopardy attaches at the entry of a U.S. Customs Service Disposition Order in custom
forfeiture case).
PORTIONING PUNISHMENT
Confusion over Halper's distinction between punitive and
remedial civil sanctions mushroomed after the Court in Austin
added to the first category the forfeiture of assets under the federal
civil drug forfeiture statute. Kurth Ranch presented an opportunity
to clarify the difference between punishment and remedy, but the
Court squandered its chance. A majority ofJustices concluded that
Montana's tax on the possession of drugs had crossed the line
separating those civil sanctions that government is free to pile upon
an offender from those that trigger double jeopardy protection,
72
but the decision offered little assistance to courts in locating this
line. The majority opinion first rejected, then invoked, rough
equivalence with government loss as a litmus test for nonpunitive
sanctions.7" In separate opinions Justice O'Connor embraced this
relationship as determinative and Justice Rehnquist condemned it
as irrelevant.74
C. The Challenge
This summary of the Court's efforts to control punishment
under the Bill of Rights reveals a seriously unstable combination.
Conflicting limits on multiplicity accompany ambiguous and
tentative limits on proportionality. Defendants who face overlap-
ping civil or criminal sanctions cannot predict their exposure;
prosecutors and legislatures cannot predict whether their enforce-
ment efforts will survive constitutional challenge; and judges'
interpretative pronouncements about these several constitutional
provisions vary widely.
The place to begin in trying to bring more coherence to these
rules is, I submit, the Double Jeopardy Clause. The rules of double
jeopardy should form the foundation upon which other limits on
punishment can be built. If double jeopardy doctrine permits
legislatures to authorize successive penalties for the same conduct,
then the more flexible commands of the Eighth Amendment and
the Due Process Clauses must pick up the slack. I seek to resurrect
Justice Felix Frankfurter's suggestion from fifty years ago that the
appropriate source of constraints on legislative ability to cumulate
punishment is the limit on proportionality in the Eighth Amend-
72 See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1948.
7 See id.
"4See infra text accompanying notes 209-11.
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ment and not the limit on multiplicity in the Fifth Amendment.
Justice Frankfurter wrote:
If it be suggested that a succession of separate trials for the
enforcement of a great number of criminal sanctions, even though
set forth in advance in a single statute, might be a form of cruelty
or oppression, the answer is that the Constitution itself has
guarded against such an attempt "to wear the accused out by a
multitude of cases with accumulated trials" ... by prohibiting
"cruel and unusual punishments."75
I suggest that we follow the logical consequences of this insight and
evaluate punishment under a robust Eighth Amendment that
transcends legislative choice.
II. PROTECTING LIBERTY WITHOUT HALPER OR GRADY: DOUBLE
JEOPARDY PROTECTION CONTINGENT UPON LEGISLATIVE
DEFINITIONS OF OFFENSE
As my summary of the troubled state of double jeopardy law
suggests, the Court remains undecided whether to leave to legisla-
tures the ability, through their statutory definitions, to expand and
contract a defendant's exposure to the risks of successive punish-
ments and prosecutions. These risks include the unjustified
cumulation of penalties by prosecutors bent on harassing defen-
dants, undue trauma and burdens from successive trials, the erosion
of the jury's power to grant leniency, the conviction of innocent
defendants as a result of repeated attempts to convict, and cumula-
tive punishment that is too severe.7" The Court in Dixon appears
ready to delegate to legislatures a portion of control over the degree
to which a defendant is protected from these harms; the Court in
Halper and Kurth Ranch seeks to retain more of this control in the
judiciary, by setting a constitutional standard of "same offence" that
the legislature cannot circumvent. The resulting combination is
perverse: The DoubleJeopardy Clause provides more protection to
defendants who face overlapping criminal and civil punishment than
it provides to defendants who face multiple criminal punishment.
Yet once-convicted criminals like Halper who face additional civil
punishment cannot as a class have greater entitlements to finality,
7' United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 556 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted).
76 See, e.g., United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 127-31 (1980) (listing well-
settled rationales for double jeopardy protection).
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jury leniency, and proportionate punishment, or more reason to
fear prosecutorial abuse and inaccurate judgments, than once-
convicted criminals who face additional criminal prosecution. Just
as the Court recognized in Dixon that it would "add chaos to our
double jeopardy jurisprudence by pretending that Grady survives
when it does not,"" continuing to pretend that Halper survives
Dixon is at least as destructive.
In the following sections, I defend from a functional standpoint
the legislative deference interpretation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause that the Court adopted in Dixon. I leave to others the
historical analysis of the Clause and its meaning, on the assumption
that the murky history of the Double Jeopardy Clause itself will
support the legislative deference approach of Dixon at least as well
as the competing approach." None of the risks that the Grady and
Kurth Ranch majorities sought to avert requires judicial regulation
of legislative choices regarding the division of culpable conduct into
separately punishable units under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Each risk is better addressed by a combination of other consti-
tutional safeguards and a meaningful presumption against multiple
punishment whenever penalties overlap. 9  The phrase "same
offence" in the Double Jeopardy Clause is not the only textual
provision in the Bill of Rights that protects the interests of a
defendant in finality, accuracy, prosecutorial good faith, jury
nullification, and proportionate punishment. The Due Process,
Cruel and Unusual Punishments, and Excessive Fines Clauses also
protect these interests, supplementing Dixon's more deferential
interpretation of double jeopardy protection.
United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2864 (1993).
See Thomas, supra note 55 (manuscript at 16-18, 49-50) (noting English con-
fusion at the time the DoubleJeopardy Clause was framed about what constituted the
same offense and asserting that double jeopardy has "always operated as a limitation
on prosecutors and judges but not on the lawgiver"). But see Charles L. Cantrell,
Double Jeopardy and Multiple Punishment. An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 24
S. TEx. L.J. 735, 770 (1983) (arguing that "the proper historical context" reveals the
legislative deference approach in Blockburger to be "fundamentally flawed").
71 1 do not endorse legislative control over aspects of double jeopardy doctrine
other than the definition of "same offence." For instance, legislatures should not be
free to manipulate the time at which jeopardy attaches, what constitutes jeopardy, or
when civil penalties are punitive enough to become regulated by the Clause. See, e.g.,
Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 37-38 (1978) (striking down a state statute providing that
jeopardy does not attach injury trials until after the first witness is sworn).
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A. The Constitutionally Based Presumption
Against Multiplicity
The most important feature of the legislative deference
interpretation of "same offence" is its presumption against succes-
sive punishment. As Professor Michael Moore has argued, with
thousands of criminal and civil penalties regulating conduct in this
country, a legislature cannot be expected to consider all other
possible punishments whenever it codifies a particular penalty for
an act or class of acts."0 Thus, it is not reasonable for courts to
assume that every time a legislature adopts or amends a criminal
statute, it meant to provide to prosecutors an additional, rather than
alternative, sanction for particular conduct, or to assume that the
legislature was fully aware of the effects of its added penalties on
repose, proportionate punishment, jury power, or any of the other
interests purportedly served by limiting successive punishment.
Because legislatures are not omniscient, the DoubleJeopardy Clause
mandates a default rule favorable to the accused. Whenever two
penalties meet some threshold of similarity, we presume they were
intended to serve as alternatives, unless the government produces
evidence of legislative intent to authorize the imposition of both.
The presumption serves as a predictable means of identifying those
sanctions which the legislature would most likely view as alternative
rather than cumulative, rebuttable by evidence showing that the
legislature knew exactly what it was doing when it added an
additional penalty for the same conduct. Because legislators often
are not aware of or do not consider multiplicity, double jeopardy
protection will in many cases depend on the degree of similarity
required to trigger the presumption and the clarity of contrary
intent required to rebut it.
Although I am confident that such a presumption is integral to
the Clause, I am not convinced that the formulation of this
presumption in Blockburger is the best proxy for legislative intent.
Several critics, including most recently, Akhil Amar and Jonathan
Marcus, George C. Thomas III, and Michael Moore, have continued
to attack the efficacy of the Blockburger test for the sameness of
"0 See MICHAEL S. MooRE, ACT AND CRIME 336 (1993) ("[I]t serves the legislature
poorly to cast upon it the burden of considering all other possible punishments under
all other possible statutes when it is setting the punishment for some class of acts
covered by any particular statute.").
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offenses"1 and have proposed various alternative formulas that may
prove to be better predictors of legislative intent than Blockburger.
8 2
s For decades, commentators and judges have attempted to define which offenses
are the same, and the problem continues to be the focus of much of the contempo-
rary scholarly criticism of double jeopardy doctrine. See id. at 325-90 (discussing
legal, moral, and metaphysical approaches to analyzing the "sameness" of action-
types); Amar & Marcus, supra note 37, at 28-49 (analyzing four subcategories of
successive Blockburger prosecutions to point out the logical flaws in differentiating
between "greater" and "lesser included" offenses, and then outlining the inadequacy
of the Blockburger test in cross-sovereign contexts); Thomas, supra note 55 (manuscript
at 15-38) (criticizing the Blockburger test, the same-transaction test, the total identity
test, the partial identity test, and the legal realist test); Peter Westen, The Three Faces
of DoubleJeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L.
REv. 1001, 1004 n.12 (1980) (discussing three purposes for the "same offense"
terminology in the Fifth Amendment and noting the difficulty of formulating only
one definition for "same offense"); see also SIGLER, supra note 47, at 65-69 (discussing
a trial court's discretion in applying either the "single act" test, the "single
transaction" test, the "same offense" test, or the "same evidence" test); Otto
Kirchheimer, The Ac4 the Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513, 534-42 (1949)
(suggesting the "same transaction" test as an alternative to the "same evidence" test);
Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 269-77 (1965) (summarizing offense-
defining tests and supporting case law). For a listing of 20 notes and articles that
have attempted to define "same offence," see George C. Thomas III, Sentencing
Problems Under the Multiple Punishment Doctrine, 31 VILL. L. REv 1351, 1356 & n.22
(1986).
82 See MOORE, supra note 80, at 337-50 (advocating a moral approach to classifying
act-types); Amar & Marcus, supra note 37, at 36-38 & n.183 (arguing that "same
means same" and that double jeopardy does not bar successive prosecution of lesser
or greater included offenses). George Thomas has expanded on Moore's work,
proposing a presumption against punishment under two similar statutes when, after
eliminating the common elements, any leftover act-type would ordinarily be
noncriminal, a presumption that would be rebuttable only by clear evidence of
legislative intent to punish the same act-type cumulatively. See Thomas, supra note
55 (manuscript at 24, 33) (arguing that "offence" refers to an act-type and not to a
set of statutory elements, and stating that "a substantive test of same offense is the
only way to produce a satisfying account of when offenses are truly the same").
My defense of the legislative deference approach is not based upon any hope of
eliminating or avoiding the difficulty of identifying some "Platonic essence" for the
textual phrase "same offence," against which the legislative definitions could be
compared. See Amar & Marcus, supra note 37, at 37 n.184. I mention this because
it is clear from the Court's opinions in Dixon that one of the reasons the Court
rejected Grady in favor of the Blockburger approach was the sheer aggravation of
agreeing upon or applying any other definition of "same offence." See United States
v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2864 (1993). Interpreting the DoubleJeopardy Clause to
defer to legislative intent regarding which offenses are the same will not make this
problem disappear. Some abstract definition of "same offence" is needed to serve as
a proxy when no legislative intent concerning multiplicity appears. More importantly,
as I explain later, some method of dividing conduct into culpable units, independently
of legislative choice, is necessary so long as judges are to regulate, under the Eighth
Amendment and Due Process Clauses, the total amount of punishment that one
person can be forced to endure for his misdeeds.
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B. Misplaced and Misunderstood Functions
When legislative intent to impose successive and cumulative
penalties rebuts the presumption against multiplicity, there is no
persuasive reason to enlist the DoubleJeopardy Clause to negate the
legislature's deliberate choice. Instead, each of the interests that
prompted the Court to prohibit even authorized multiple penalties
under the Double Jeopardy Clause is adequately safeguarded
without such a limitation.
1. Prosecutorial Harassment
Overlapping offenses and penalties for the same conduct give
prosecutors the freedom to prosecute and punish a defendant more
than once for the same conduct. The fear that prosecutors will
deliberately decline to join overlapping penalties in order to
rehearse their case or persecute a defendant has prompted some to
insist that the Clause requiresjoinder of sufficiently similar offenses
and penalties, even when a legislature created them separately.
8 3
Assuming that abusive severance practices demand some constitu-
tional oversight, 4 they can be contained without muddying up the
Double Jeopardy Clause with distinctions about which offenses,
intended by a legislature to be cumulative, can and cannot be
prosecuted in tandem. Independent of any mandatoryjoinder rule
s See supra note 56 (discussing justice Souter's dissent in Dixon).
The position of the present Court on this point is not entirely clear. Halper and
Kurth Ranch show that the Court will allow the prosecutor two bites at the
punishment apple, so to speak, if one of those bites is in a civil proceeding. In
neither case did the Court suggest that it would bar a second attempt to punish a
defendant civilly if the defendant was acquitted earlier. See State ex rel. Fisher v.
Cleveland Trinidad Paving Co., No. 65889, 1994 WL 463810, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App.
Aug. 25, 1994) (rejecting a double jeopardy challenge to civil penalties for
environmental regulatory violations when the previous criminal prosecution resulted
in acquittal, and noting that Halper held the DoubleJeopardy Clause applicable only
if a subsequent penalty follows a criminal prosecution that results in conviction and
sentence). It is not too surprising, given the complexity of these cases, that some
courts have read Halper differently. See United States v. Collette, No. A92-154-CR
(JKS), 1995 WL 413116, at *2-3 (D. Alaska July 5, 1995) (noting confusion on this
point); Bartlett v. Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 654 So. 2d 1149, 1152-54
(Ala. 1994) (examining whether an administrative fine was a penalty, and therefore
barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, even though the defendant's earlier
prosecution had been dismissed); see also Stanley E. Cox, Halper's Continuing Double
Jeopardy Implications: A Thorn by Any Other Name Would Prick as Deep, 39 ST. LOUIS
U. LJ. (forthcoming Summer 1995) (manuscript at 117, on file with author)
(advocating that Halper should be applied to bar second attempts to punish, regardless
of the result).
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that would result from antimajoritarian interpretations of the phrase
"same offence," two doctrines already limit the prosecutor's ability
to try a defendant separately on related charges.
As the Court noted in Dixon, "collateral estoppel" already limits
multiple prosecutions to some degree by barring relitigation of
factual allegations once rejected by a fact-finder. 5 Equitable and
flexible, the doctrine of collateral estoppel8 sometimes binds
separate agencies of the same sovereign even when they have no
opportunity to coordinate their attacks.8" But the Court has
' See Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2863 n.15 (stating that prosecutors "have little to gain
and much to lose" from bringing separate prosecutions because an "acquittal in the
first prosecution might well bar litigation of certain facts essential to the second
one"). Akhil Amar and Jonathan Marcus have explained how collateral estoppel
complements double jeopardy in their recent article proposing a revised interpreta-
tion of "same offence." See Amar & Marcus, supra note 37, at 30-31; see also Anne B.
Poulin, Double Jeopardy: Grady and Dowling Stir the Muddy Waters, 43 RUTGERS L.
REV. 889, 898 (1991) (noting that prosecuting a defendant on a minor charge before
proceeding on the greater one is "a foolish move" because of collateral estoppel).
Estoppel bars not only multiple criminal actions, but also multiple civil actions and
criminal actions after civil ones. See, e.g., Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. United States,
21 Cl. Ct. 117, 124 (Cl. Ct. 1990) (holding that the United States, seeking forfeiture
under 28 U.S.C. § 2514 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), was bound by the unchallenged
factual findings of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA), a
coordinate branch in the federal contract dispute-resolution process).
'8 The Court has rooted collateral estoppel rules in the DoubleJeopardy Clause
itself, see Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445-46 (1970) ("For whatever else the
constitutional guarantee [against doublejeopardy] may embrace ... it surely protects
a man who has been acquitted from having to 'run the gauntlet' a second time."), but
others have argued that the Due Process Clause provides a better source for the same
rules, see Amar & Marcus, supra note 37, at 31 ("The true source of the Ashe
[collateral estoppel] idea is due process, not double jeopardy."); see also Eli J.
Richardson, Eliminating Double-Talk from the Law of Double Jeopardy, 22 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 121, 167-68 (1994) (arguing that the Ashe rule is based on the Due Process
Clause); Westen & Drubel, supra note 35, at 88 n.40 ("[The] decision [where] to place
a certain protection is largely a matter of convenience[; a]fter all, one can view the
Double Jeopardy Clause in its entirety as part of the Due Process Clause without
having to alter one's view of its scope.").
8 See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S 381, 402-03 (1940)
(concluding that ajudgment in a suit between a party and a representative of the
United States bars relitigation of the same issue between that party and another office
of the federal government, because there is privity between officers of the same
government); KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 13.4, at 263-64 (3d ed. 1994) (citing Adkins and stating the rule that an
officer or agency of the government is in privity with every other officer or agency
of the same government). Opponents of the Court's dual sovereignty exception to
doublejeopardy have suggested that estoppel could bind separate sovereigns as well.
See Amar & Marcus, supra note 37, at 47 ("Perhaps, in an age of cooperative
federalism, a state government could be bound by the litigation disabilities of the
federal government, and vice versa-where ordinary citizens are involved and
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crafted the collateral estoppel doctrine to prevent duplicate fact-
finding, not to bar all instances of prosecutorial bad faith in seeking
multiple punishment. A government is estopped from seeking a
second penalty only if a fact-finder has only rejected the govern-
ment's factual allegations, and it is often difficult or impossible to
prove which factual allegations the fact-finder rejected."8  In
addition, the incentives created by collateral estoppel vary in
strength depending upon whether the burden of proof at the
second proceeding is equal to the burden at the first proceeding.
Collateral estoppel is weakest in situations like Halper or Kurth
Ranch, where a fact-finder's rejection of a factual element due to
"reasonable doubt" will never bar later efforts to establish the same
fact by a preponderance of the evidence." As a result, collateral
estoppel provides only limited assurance that prosecutors will not
hold back a related penalty as a trump card in case their first suit
fails.
90
Supplementing estoppel, however, is the defendant's protection
against bad-faith prosecutions under the Due Process Clauses. Due
process has long prohibited prosecutorial conduct that is the
product of illegitimate motives. A prosecutor cannot split up her
governments presumably work together in law enforcement.").
" Collateral estoppel does not preclude relitigation of the same conduct or facts
if "'a rational jury could have grounded its [earlier acquittal] on an issue other than
that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.'" Dowlingv. United
States, 493 U.S. 342, 350 (1990) (citation omitted); see also Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct.
783, 791-92 (1994) (finding that the jury's guilty verdict did not necessarily depend
on a finding that Schiro lacked intent to kill, and therefore the court was not
collaterally estopped from finding that the defendant satisfied an aggravating
circumstance requiring intent). Because general verdicts make it difficult for
defendants to establish estoppel, some commentators have advocated wider use of the
specific verdict or special interrogatories to enhance the value of collateral estoppel
protection. See Amar & Marcus, supra note 37, at 33 n.166 (encouraging the use of
specific verdicts by defendants after acquittal to clarify the verdict's basis and to
"better protect defendants against the risks of erroneous conviction and abusive
prosecution"); Cynthia L. Randall, Comment, Acquittals in Jeopardy: Criminal Collateral
Estoppel and the Use of Acquitted Act Evidence, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 283, 317-25 (1992)
(advocating the use of special interrogatories).
" See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 236-37 (1972)
(collateral estoppel does not bar subsequent civil forfeiture action after criminal
acquittal).
'o See, e.g., Ashe, 397 U.S. at 457 (Brennan,J., concurring) (noting that because the
state, trying the defendant for robbery of one patron after ajury acquitted him of the
robbery of a different patron, "offered no justification for not trying the other
informations at [the first] trial, it is reasonable to infer that the other informations
were held in reserve to be tried if the State failed to obtain a conviction on the [first
charge]").
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charges solely to harass a defendant or to rehearse her case any
more than she could obtain a second trial by "goading" a defendant
into moving for a mistrial,91 prosecute a defendant because of his
race,92 or boost charges solely to punish a defendant for asserting
a constitutional right.9" As the Court relinquishes its regulation of
legislative definitions of "same offence" under the DoubleJeopardy
Clause, it must not overlook, and should instead consider strength-
ening, this supplementary limit on a prosecutor's power.94  A
91 See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667,676 (1982) ("Only where the government
conduct in question is intended to 'goad' the defendant into moving for a mistrial
may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having
succeeded in aborting the first of his own motion."); see alsoJames F. Ponsoldt, When
Guilt Should Be Irrelevant: Government Overreaching As a Bar to Reprosecution Under the
DoubleJeopardy Clause After Oregon v. Kennedy, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 76, 96-99 (1983)
(arguing that the Kennedy decision inadequately protects defendants from prosecu-
torial overreaching because the decision bars retrial only in cases in which the
defendant can show that the prosecution intended to provoke a mistrial, rather than
in the broader class of cases in which prosecutorial misconduct satisfies the plain
error rule, even if such misconduct was intended only to secure conviction).
'9 See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (barring discriminatory prosecu-
tions); see also United States v. Armstrong, 64 U.S.L.W. 3309 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1995) (No.
95-157) (agreeing to review whether the trial court properly ordered discovery in a
selective prosecution claim by an African American defendant), granting cert. to 48
F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc); ef. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608
(1985) (stating that a decision to prosecute cannot be based deliberately on race,
religion, or another arbitrary classification); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374
(1886) (barring discriminatory enforcement of facially neutral regulations).
9 See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 384-86 (1982) (holding that the Due
Process Clause prohibits prosecutors from bringing additional vindictive, retaliatory
charges against a defendant who exercises his right to ajury trial in response to the
original charge); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29 (1974) (holding that the Due
Process Clause prohibits prosecutors from bringing more serious charges against a
defendant in response to his invocation of a statutory right to appeal); North Carolina
v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969) (finding that even though neither the Double
Jeopardy Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause prevents ajudge from imposing a
higher sentence upon retrial to punish a defendant for appealing, the Due Process
Clause does); see also United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977) (recognizing
that the Due Process Clause may provide relief for a bad-faith delay in bringing
charges, even though the delay did not violate the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth
Amendment); cf Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57-59 (1988) (finding that the
Due Process Clause grants relief for bad-faith destruction of evidence). SomeJustices
would undoubtedly oppose this interpretation of due process. See, e.g., Albright v.
Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 814 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the require-
ments of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments "are not to be supplemented
through the device of 'substantive due process'").
Although some have criticized existing due process remedies as ineffectual, see,
e.g., StephenJ. Schulhofer,Jeopardy and Mistrials, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 449, 500 (1977)
(noting the difficulty of successfully maintaining a due process challenge that a
prosecutor retried a defendant deliberately), some lower courts have granted relief
on this basis and others have embraced the theory of using due process to control
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meaningful due process limit would entail a presumption of bad faith
whenever a prosecutor fails to join offenses of sufficient similarity,
rebuttable by an "abuse-neutral" reason, or some similar explana-
tion.95 Combined with estoppel, this supplementary limitation
means that prosecutors are not entirely free from constitutional
constraints on theirjoinder decisions.
96
"bad faith" failure to join related offenses. See United States v. P.H.E., Inc., 965 F.2d
848, 860-61 (10th Cir. 1992) (remanding for determination of whether the
government's deliberate strategy of multiple prosecutions violated due process);
United States v. Easley, 942 F.2d 405, 412 (6th Cir. 1991) ("We recognize ... that
multiple prosecutions brought by the government for the purpose of harassment, or
in bad faith, may violate due process."); Tucker v. Makowski, 883 F.2d 877, 880-81
(10th Cir. 1989) (remanding for a determination of whether the defendant's
"successive trials arising from admittedly separate crimes, but stemming from the
same criminal transaction" violated the defendant's right to due process); Sanchez v.
United States, 341 F.2d 225, 228-29 (9th Cir.) (noting that "planned exposure of an
accused to a succession of trials for offenses dearly subject tojoinder .... for the
deliberate purpose of enhancing the chance of conviction on weak evidence, might
well constitute fundamental unfairness" in violation of the Due Process Clause, but
finding that failure to join offenses was not a deliberate scheme to enhance the
chances of conviction, but was either inadvertent or due to surprise acquittal), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 856 (1965); United States v. American Honda Motor Co., 271 F.
Supp. 979, 987 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (finding "successive grand jury inquiries and
indictments for alleged separate conspiracies arising out of the same transaction may,
and in this situation do, constitute harassment in violation of the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment"); see also United States v. Rosenberg, 888 F.2d 1406, 1427
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (Edwards, J., dissenting in part) (noting that "an unjustified
succession of prosecutions might very well support an inference of prosecutorial
vindictiveness in violation of due process").
" I would lift a standard the Court has used in another due process context and
require that the explanation for failing to join offenses must be based on verifiable,
objective information. See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726 (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting
that "whenever ajudge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new
trial," his reason must be based on objective information concerning conduct
occurring after the time of the original sentencing). Also, I would insist that any
explanation offered asjustification for failure to join related offenses be rejected as
a pretext if the prosecutor's office invokes it only selectivelyjust as some courts reject
race-neutral reasons for peremptory strikes when prosecutors offer them only
selectively. See Amar & Marcus, supra note 37, at 35-36 (arguing that due process
requires prosecutors to offer a "legitimate nonvexatious reason to try [related]
charges separately" and noting that a prosecutor charging a defendant with a lesser-
included offense after securing a conviction and sentence for a greater offense that
carries a greater penalty "would be hard-pressed to come up with ajustification for
[this] action other than a desire to harass the defendant"); Note, supra note 81, at
292-96 (explaining situations in which the prosecution should not be required tojoin
offenses). But see United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2872-74 (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that there is no legitimate reason
for the United States to rush to prosecute criminal contempt rather than waiting to
join the contempt charges with other substantive offenses).
' I do not share the Dixon majority's confidence in the power of resource
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2. Finality and Repose
Requiring the joinder of related sanctions under the Double
Jeopardy Clause, even when the legislature expressly authorizes
separate imposition of those sanctions, has also been said to be an
essential safeguard of finality. Such a rule forces prosecutors to be
efficient and assures defendants, victims, and others that when the
first proceeding or penalty is complete, the ordeal is over.97 By
comparison, an interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause that
allows a legislature to choose to cumulate offenses permits legisla-
tures, not courts, to allocate finality depending upon legislators'
conclusions concerning how much finality is deserved by a person
who performs certain culpable acts.
It does not seem intuitively wrong to allow legislatures, through
their punitive choices, to set at least part of the finality "price" that
must be paid for a given course of culpable conduct. There is no
particular reason why the Double Jeopardy Clause must favor
judicial rather than legislative choices about finality, at least when
it comes to defining what constitutes an offense. Legislatures
remain unable to eviscerate certain basic entitlements to finality
under the Clause. For instance, no statute could effectively
authorize prosecutors to appeal acquittals or arbitrarily abort trials
mid-course and start over. These aspects of finality are guaranteed
by the Double Jeopardy Clause and are not contingent on who
defines when two sanctions are the "same offence." Nor could a
legislature abrogate other constitutional rules that protect finality
directly, such as collateral estoppel, or indirectly, such as the due
process protection against prosecutorial harassment discussed
constraints to promptjoinder of related offenses. Indeed, resources are sometimes
allocated to prosecutors' offices depending on the quantity of convictions obtained,
without regard to whether those convictions are for offenses that could have been
joined together. See Lear, supra note 56, at 631-35. Professor Lear has noted that a
prosecutor's desire to avoid aggravatingjudges may prevent repeated prosecutions
within the same district, but not among separate federal districts. See id. at 631
(asserting that the bench "is hostile to the use of preciousjudicial resources to rehash
events already litigated").
" For arguments that finality is the central protection provided by the Double
Jeopardy Clause, see Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2882 (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("Where successive prosecutions are at stake, the guarantee serves
'a constitutional policy of finality for the defendant's benefit.'" (quoting Brown v.
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479
(1971) (plurality opinion)))); George C. Thomas III, An Elegant Theory of Double
Jeopardy, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 827, 829 (asserting that double jeopardy protects
"verdict finality").
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above."8 The Court has consistently treated finality beyond these
essential components as a fluid concept, an interest that can be
outweighed by other interests." A defendant is not entitled to a
single trial if his first trial ends in mistrial,0 ° if his appeal reveals
that the first trial was tainted with trial error, 10 1 or if a second
offense arising from the same conduct is not complete at the time
of the first trial. 102 Moreover, under the dual sovereignty excep-
tion, a defendant is not protected from a second prosecution for the
same offense if another jurisdiction chooses to prosecute.
0
3
Additionally, the government routinely appeals sentences.10 4  In
each of these contexts, the interest of the defendant in one final
' See supra part II.B.1. Thus, the finality that even Dixon's reading of the Double
Jeopardy Clause protects has content apart from whatever actual expectations a
legislature may offer a defendant. As Justice Black and Professor Westen, among
others, have explained, actual expectations of finality are easily changed by changing
the law. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 162 (1959) (Black,J., dissenting) (noting
that "people have apparently become more accustomed to double trials, once deemed
so shocking" as a result of Supreme Court sanctioning); Westen, supra note 81, at
1005 (noting that the finality argument has two forms, expectations that a defendant
actually has and expectations that a defendant is entitled to have). Nevertheless,
some commentators still refer to actual expectations of finality when defining the
scope of double jeopardy protection. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, The Rodney King Trials
and the Double Jeopardy Clause: Some Observations on Original Meaning and the ACLU's
Schizophrenic Views of the Dual Sovereign Doctrine, 41 UCLA L. REV. 693, 700 (1994)
(stating that the federal defendant who is reprosecuted after an initial state
prosecution "possesses no legitimate expectation of repose that is defeated" because
"the possibility of federal reprosecution [is] widely known").
" See Westen & Drubel, supra note 35, at 105 (arguing that a defendant's
constitutionally protected interest in finality "is not absolute and must be balanced
against society's interest in conducting further proceedings"); see also Poulin, supra
note 85, at 911-15 (noting that the Court has valued the defendant's interest in the
finality of acquittals more highly than the defendant's interest in the finality of
convictions).
" Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672-73 (1982) (explaining that the Double
Jeopardy Clause does not bar a second trial after mistrial if the first trial was
terminated because of a hung jury or as a result of the defendant's own motion,
unless the motion was provoked by the prosecution).
101 See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 40 & n.14 (1982) (explaining that the Double
Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit a retrial after a reversal due to trial error); United
States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896) (allowing reprosecution of a defendant whose
conviction was reversed on appeal).
'o See Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 448-49 (1912) (holding that a prior trial
for assault and battery does not bar a prosecution for a resulting homicide where the
victim had not yet died at the time of the first trial).
" See infra text accompanying notes 151-54.
"0 At least in those jurisdictions that authorize government appeals by statute.
See e.g., United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136 (1980) (finding that the
prosecutor's statutory right to appeal a sentence is not precluded by the Double
Jeopardy Clause).
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adjudication is sacrificed for another goal that the Court has found
more compelling. To permit some arbitrary quantum of finality to
control the meaning of "same offence" is to get it backwards.
Deliberately imposed, separate penalties convey the legislature's
judgment that separate penalty proceedings do not create an undue
burden on finality, but impose only that burden deserved by one
who commits the proscribed acts. A prosecutor's choice to seek all
authorized penalties simultaneously, or to forego some of them
entirely, is a deal for the defendant, not an entitlement.
10 5
Undoubtedly, some defendants will expect more finality than the
amount allocated to them by a legislature's penalty structure.
06
Some of these actual expectations may be based on the promises of
prosecutors who expressly agree to abandon multiple penalty
options, and other expectations may be based on blind confidence
that prosecutors will decline to take advantage of multiple penalties
established by law. A defendant in the first category does not need
the Double Jeopardy Clause to secure finality-due process already
bars prosecutors from breaking their promises to defendants.'0 7
105 Cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364-65 (1978) (holding that
prosecuting a defendant to the full extent of the law after he refused to accept a plea
bargain to a lesser charge did not violate the Due Process Clause). The classic
question in the plea bargaining cases, as here, is whether the defendant has any
enforceable right to leniency, and if so, under what conditions.
0 As Professor Elizabeth Lear has pointed out recently, severaljurisdictions have
already embraced some form of compulsory joinder in criminal prosecutions. See
Lear, supra note 56, at 665 (noting "twenty-three states ... operating under some
version of a transaction-based compulsoryjoinder regime").
'07 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63 (1971) (granting the
defendant relief for breach of a plea bargain). Presently, however, courts may
enforce only those promises that the promisor had the authority to make, a rule that
can dash the expectations of finality of those defendants whose lawyers are unfamiliar
with it. Examples of such worthless promises include agreements by Assistant U.S.
Attorneys that a defendant need not fear later civil proceedings after pleading guilty
and assurances by attorneys representing agencies such as the SEC or the SBA that
settlement of the agency's action will protect a defendant from later criminal or civil
actions. See United States v. Walcott, 972 F.2d 323, 327 (11 th Cir. 1992) (finding that
an SBA agent lacked authority to settle a civil suit to recover a loan); United States
v. Killough, 848 F.2d 1523, 1526 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding that a False Claims Act suit
was not barred by the promise of an Assistant U.S. Attorney in prior criminal
proceedings); United States v. Williams, 780 F.2d 802, 803 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating
that a VA administrator's promise could not bind a U.S. Attorney); Dresser Indus. v.
United States, 596 F.2d 1231, 1237 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding that representations of
the SEC did not bar a criminal prosecution by the Department ofJustice), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1044 (1980); FDIC v. Haddad, 778 F. Supp. 1559, 1569 (S.D. Fla. 1991)
(rejecting the defendant's argument because an "Assistant U.S. Attorney has no
authority to compromise a civil claim of the United States"); see also Johnson v.
Lumpkin, 769 F.2d 630, 634 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that a federal prosecutor's
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A defendant in the second category should rely on his attorney to
seek a "global" settlement of multiple penalty proceedings the first
time around.
3. Risk of Convicting the Innocent
Preventing multiple prosecutions for the same conduct is also
said to prevent prosecutors from gaining an unfair adversarial
advantage at later trials. Permitting separate trials of related
offenses allows prosecutors to "plug holes" in their cases through
rehearsal,"'8 robbing defendants of the opportunity to surprise the
government's witnesses on cross examination or to catch prosecu-
tors without counter proof. This lopsided relationship makes it so
easy for the government to win, the argument goes, that the risk of
convicting innocent defendants becomes intolerable without double
jeopardy protection against rehearsal.0 9
promise does not bind state authorities). But see Thomas v. INS, 35 F.3d 1332, 1337
(9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the INS was bound by the representation of a U.S.
Attorney); United States v. Shaw, 26 F.3d 700, 701-02 (7th Cir. 1994) (declining to
decide if and how equitable estoppel could prevent enforcement of the penalty
provisions in criminal statutes because the defendant did not contend that he relied
to his detriment on an INS form stating that reentry after deportation is punishable
by up to two years imprisonment, when in fact the recidivist statute actually
authorized up to 15 years imprisonment); United States v. Hall, 730 F. Supp. 646,652
(M.D. Pa. 1990) (granting the defendant's motion for summaryjudgment enforcing
the plea agreement, and finding that the Assistant U.S. Attorney's statement during
plea negotiations could reasonably have been understood by the defendant as an
assurance that no civil action would be brought).
108 See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 459 (Brennan,J., concurring) ("One must
experience a sense ofuneasiness with any double-jeopardy standard that would allow
the State this second chance to plug up the holes in its case.").
" See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2877 (1993) (White, J.,
dissenting) (stating that a prohibition against repeated prosecutions prevents the
.government from gradually fine-tuning its strategy, thereby minimizing exposure to
a mistaken conviction"); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978) ("To permit a
second trial... would present an unacceptably high risk that the Government, with
its vastly superior resources, might wear down the defendant so that 'even though
innocent he may be found guilty.'" (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188
(1957))); Susan N. Herman, Double Jeopardy All Over Again: Dual Sovereignty, Rodney
King, and the ACLU, 41 UCLA L. REV. 609, 621-22 (1994) (discussing the unfairness
of a federal trial following a state acquittal); Lear, supra note 56, at 647 (arguing that
some innocent defendants will plead guilty to avoid the expense and fatigue of
successive trials, and that innocent defendants who are tried again "may be convicted
by a well-choreographed presentation of the evidence"); Schulhofer, supra note 94,
at 505-06 (discussing how retrials dim defendants' "prospects for acquittal" because
they allow prosecutors to remedy setbacks from first trials and to learn what the
defense has planned, strategically and substantively).
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This risk is simply overblown. The lawyers who conduct
successive punishment proceedings may not benefit significantly
from the knowledge gained by others who prosecuted the defendant
earlier.' And even if all enforcers worked together like gears in
a well-oiled machine,"' the advantage of surprise of which defen-
dants are deprived is not a basis for a rule ofjoinder more exacting
than the one a legislature creates. Not only is surprise a dwindling
commodity under increasingly popular reciprocal discovery
rules," 2 but it also has very little to do with safeguarding inno-
cence. To insist that any litigant remain less prepared than he
might otherwise be has never advanced accuracy, as decades of
reform in the rules of civil and criminal discovery have recog-
nized." The protectiveness some feel toward a defendant's
opportunity to catch the government off guard may reflect the
concern that overlapping penalty proceedings may jeopardize the
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination or allow the
prosecutor to manufacture false evidence to meet exposed de-
fenses.114 Needless to say, both of these concerns are more properly
addressed directly as claims for relief under the Due Process Clause
for prosecutorial misconduct or as violations of the Fifth Amend-
ment's privilege against self-incrimination.
' See, e.g., Rudstein, supra note 70, at 611 (citing as an example a case in which
Commodity Futures Trading Commission lawyers first sought penalties in an
administrative hearing, and the United States Attorney's office later sought conviction
in a criminal prosecution).
. See Graham Hughes, Administrative Subpoenas and the GrandJuiy: Converging
Streams of Criminal and Civil Compulsoiy Process, 47 VAND. L. REV. 573, 611 n.151, 621-
22 (1994) (notingjoint criminal and civil investigatory task forces in certain regulatory
areas and examples of close cooperation between United States Attorneys and
attorneys for the SEC and the Office of the Inspector General).
12 See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CIMINAL PROCEDURE 1232-33 (8th ed.
1994) (concluding that the trend has been to expand the ability of prosecutors to
obtain pretrial discovery of defense information); Robert P. Mosteller, Discovey
Against the Defense: Tilting the Adversarial Balance, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1567, 1570-71
(1986) (describing the erosion of traditional defense protections, which enables
prosecutors to obtain more information).
11 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (providing for limited discovery by the prosecutor
of defense information prior to trial); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.3 (West 1985 & Supp.
1995) (providing that the defense must disclose to the prosecution the names and
statements of all witnesses it intends to call and any real evidence it intends to offer
at trial).
11. Conversely, Professor Lear recently noted that in her conversations with
prosecutors on this point, they believe that "the government's case does not improve
with age. The government's witnesses have also been cross examined and may well
forget key information during the later trial." Lear, supra note 56, at 647 n.103.
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That the risk of rehearsal to accuracy is inflated is probably best
demonstrated by the absence of any other limitations on govern-
ment rehearsal in the criminal justice system. Outside these double
jeopardy debates, courts and commentators have not been troubled
that government witnesses will learn from one proceeding how to
be a more persuasive witness-"touching up" their testimony, as
Justice Brennan put it." 5 Government witnesses commonly re-
hearse their testimony before trial-before grand juries and at
preliminary hearings, in proceedings concerning other defendants,
and during the routine woodshedding that litigators include as part
of their trial preparation."6  Defendants are routinely retried
using the same witnesses after appeals and mistrials, and sometimes
after trial in another jurisdiction. No basis exists for imposing
greater limits on joinder under the Double Jeopardy Clause, when
these common and well-accepted procedures probably have at least
an equally significant impact on testimonial distortions."
7
Finally, a constitutional rule requiring prosecutors to join
related offenses in a single trial may not be a significant improve-
ment as far as accuracy goes. An innocent defendant may be
convicted because of the sheer volume of charges against him." 8
' See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 459 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
116 Lacking a handy empirical source on this point, I will quote Prosecutor Marcia
Clark. "In every criminal case which goes to trial, the prosecution interviews the
witnesses before they testify," Clark stated in response to a defense challenge
regarding a "practice session" with witness Mark Fuhrman. Andrea Ford & Jim
Newton, Strongest DNA Figure Yet Offered in Simpson Trial, L.A. TIME, June 21, 1995,
at Al, A19.
17 Government attorneys are also allowed to repeat proof of previously
prosecuted conduct or present proof of untried offenses at sentencing hearings.
"Real offense" sentencing requires federal prosecutors to enhance an offender's
sentence with wrongful conduct for which the offender may be separately prosecuted.
See Elizabeth T. Lear, Double Jeopardy, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and the
Subsequent-Prosecution Dilemma, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 725, 744-45 (1994) (arguing that
sentence enhancement for untried offenses raises a "very real possibility" that a
defendant "may be convicted of a crime after repeated dry runs by the government").
The Supreme Court held this year that prosecuting a defendant for an offense and
also using that offense to enhance the sentence for a different offense does not
violate the rights of the defendant under the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Witte v.
United States, 115 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1995) ("A defendant has not been 'punished'
any more for double jeopardy purposes when relevant conduct is included in the
calculation of his offense level under the Guidelines than when a pre-Guidelines
court, in its discretion, took similar uncharged conduct into account."); see also Schiro
v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783, 789 (1994) (noting that the Court has "upheld the use of
prior convictions to enhance sentences for subsequent convictions, even though this
means a defendant must, in a certain sense, relitigate in a sentencing proceeding
conduct for which he was previously tried").
1' See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 70 (1991) (declining to determine whether
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A rule that simultaneously guards against both the risk of wrongful
conviction by aggregation and the risk of wrongful conviction by
rehearsal would require that a prosecutor condense many prosecu-
tions into one, and then trim that single trial to a reasonable scope,
foregoing some charges entirely. Although this may remain the
ideal to which we hope prosecutors will aspire, 1 9 as well as a
laudable goal for future statutory reform, 20 it is not required by
the Double Jeopardy Clause.
4. Jury Nullification
Multiple prosecutions are also said to undermine the jury's
power to shield the accused from the full punishment that the law
provides. 1 1 What power does the jury retain, if its leniency can
be tossed aside by a prosecutor who seeks a second penalty for the
same conduct, albeit under the guise of a different "offence"? The
erroneous admission of similar-acts evidence can constitute a violation of due process
because of this effect); Henry v. Estelle, 33 F.3d 1037, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 1994)
(finding that the admission of testimony concerning alleged incidents similar to those
charged denied defendant's due process), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Duncan v.
Henry, 115 S. Ct. 887 (1995); see also KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 112, at 1084 (noting
an empirical study concluding thatjoinder of offenses in a single trial increases the
likelihood of conviction).
19 Justices Marshall and Stevens in the past advocatedjust this rule. See Missouri
v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 371-74 (1983) (Marshall,J., dissenting) (noting reasons why
"[tihe creation of multiple crimes serves only to strengthen the prosecution's hand");
Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 867-68 (1985) (Stevens,J, concurring) (quoting
Marshall's dissent in Hunter at length in explaining why allowing the simultaneous
prosecution of overlapping offenses "encourages prosecutors to tilt the scales of
justice against the defendant").
12 See Lear, supra note 56, at 670-71 (proposing that severance statutes and rules
be adjusted to accommodate the increased prejudice that would result from a
mandatoryjoinder rule in the federal system).
121 See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1978) (holding that "jeopardy attaches
when thejury is empaneled and sworn," and reasoning that the defendant has a "right
to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal," a right that has "roots deep in
the historic development of trial by jury" and "that lies at the foundation of the
federal [double jeopardy] rule"); see also Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a
Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1190 (1991) (arguing that "the double jeopardy
clause.., should be understood to safeguard not simply the individual defendant's
interest in avoiding vexation, but also the integrity of the initial petit jury's
judgment"); Lear, supra note 56, at 649-50 ("Thejury possesses a 'species of legislative
power-the power to dispense leniency where the law prescribes none .... [Ajury's
initial decision] cannot logically be confined to the specific offense definition; it
represents a rough approximation by the jury of the appropriate punishment for the
defendant's behavior."); Westen & Drubel, supra note 35, at 89-91 (discussing the
interest of a defendant in having his trial completed by a particular tribunal as a right
to conclude his confrontation with society once and for all).
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answer is that criminal jury acquittals remain sacrosanct, charge by
charge,122 and estoppel prevents government attorneys from
relitigating facts rejected by a jury the first time around. There is
no basis for extending to the trial jury any more power to protect
defendants than this ability to be lenient charge by charge, fact by
fact. The function of selecting the appropriate penalty from among
several different charges, as opposed to assessing guilt on particular
charges, is not one that the Constitution has assigned to trial juries.
This function belongs to grand juries or prosecutors.
Indeed, short of some hybrid criminal/civil/administrative
action that also allows the joinder of criminal and civil penalties
from every jurisdiction in which defendant may face punish-
ment, 2 15 one trial jury's verdict may be a particularly unreliable
12 Both outright acquittals and implicit acquittals bar later prosecution efforts.
See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191 (1957) (finding that the jury's decision
to convict the defendant ofsecond-degree murder implicitly acquitted him of murder
in the first degree). Professor Westen has argued that this protection of the jury's
right to nullify is the only persuasive reason for the near absolute ban on appealing
jury acquittals as compared to the less stringent finality afforded other events, such
as mistrials, sentencings, bench trials, and dismissals. See Westen, supra note 81, at
1018. Nullification is also unique to criminaljuries; estoppel provides the appropriate
respect for decisions favorable to the defendant when successive penalties follow civil
or administrative proceedings.
..s The majority in Dixon observed that nothing "short of a same-transaction
analysis will eliminate this problem." United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2863
n.15 (1993). But evenjoining all the available crimes from the same transaction in the
first trial would not provide the jury a full view of the civil and criminal penalties a
defendant may face. On the inability of government attorneys to bring overlapping
penalties in the same proceeding, see Henning, supra note 1, at 55 nn.285-86.
Not surprisingly, several lower courts interpreting Halper's mandate that
prosecutors should seek civil and criminal sanctions in a single proceeding have given
little weight to the purported interest of an accused in one jury's assessment of
punishment. These courts seemed to have concentrated on actual expectations of
finality rather than on an entitlement to the first jury's assessment, assuming that as
long as the defendant has notice, in the form of simultaneous filing of civil and
criminal actions, no multiple punishment problem arises. See, e.g., United States v.
18755 N. Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he simultaneous pursuit
... of criminal and civil ... sanctions falls within the contours of a single,
coordinated prosecution."); United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1993)
("[C]ourts must look past the procedural requirements and examine the essence of
the actions at hand by determining when, how, and why the civil and criminal actions
were initiated."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994). But see United States v.
$405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir. 1994) ("We fail to see how two separate
actions, one civil and one criminal, instituted at different times, tried at different
times before different factfinders, presided over by different district judges, and
resolved by separatejudgments, constitute the same 'proceeding.'"), amended on other
grounds by 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995), and petitionfor cert.filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3161 (U.S.
Aug. 28, 1995) (No. 95-346); United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, 1465 (7th Cir.)
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guide of the punishment a community would assign to a particular
defendant for his misdeeds. 24 Perhaps two hundred years ago
juries were able to structure sentencing, given the combination of
grand jury charging, no plea bargaining, and predictable sentences
for many crimes,125 but today's juries are almost entirely out of
the loop when it comes to determining the punishment an offender
receives for his conduct. Prosecutors are the key players, selecting
from among charges that are accompanied by limited ranges of
penalties and selecting which of the defendant's assets to for-
feit.126 A judge selects penalties from within the range offered to
him by the prosecutor's charging decision and the jury's finding of
guilt. With the exception of capital cases, juries rarely sentence
defendants.127 Even a jury's decision to acquit, or to convict a
(Suggesting that simultaneous initiation of civil and criminal penalty proceedings is
insufficient to avoid double jeopardy bar, and noting that the Court "did not think
the fact that the two [actions in Kurth Ranch] were pending contemporaneously
mattered"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 669 (1994).
124 Moreover, the concern that government will ride roughshod over a jury's
verdict is unwarranted in the majority of multiple prosecution and multiple
punishment contexts. In more than 80% of criminal cases, the defendant waives his
right to a jury trial by pleading guilty or accepting a bench trial. See Westen &
Drubel, supra note 35, at 133-35 (explaining why there is no equivalent right to judge
nullification). When a defendant waives ajury trial and accepts either the prose-
cutor's offer or a judge's fact-finding, he also waives his right to jury nullification.
Although a second prosecution after a plea or bench trial that has resolved a similar
charge might raise a question about the prosecutor's motives, it would not cheapen
the value ofjury nullification at all.
"2 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief Histoiy of the Criminal
Juiy in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 921-25 (1994) (discussing the rapid
growth of plea bargaining, which was unheard of in the United States before 1804);
John H. Langbein, On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The Disappearance of Criminal
Jury Trial, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119, 120 (1992) ("'There was no plea
bargaining in felony cases in the eighteenth century.'"). See generally LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1993) (detailing changes
in the criminal justice system during American history).
" See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A PleaforLess
Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 926 (1991) (terming plea bargaining "the most
important part of the sentencing process"); Elizabeth T. Lear, Is Conviction Irrelevant?,
40 UCLA L. REv. 1179, 1229-33 (1993) (explaining the enhanced power of
prosecutors under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
1' See Paul H. Robinson, Are Criminal Codes Irrelevant?, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 159, 189
(1994) ("[W]hether a trier of fact holds an offender liable under one grade or the
next has little practical effect on the sentence that most sentencingjudges have the
discretion to give."). A few states still allow juries to select sentence length.
Arkansas, Kentucky, and Texas, for instance, allowjuries to choose the term of years
that convicted defendants will serve. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-103 (Michie 1994)
(bifurcating guilt determination and sentencing but still allowing the jury to impose
a sentence); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.055(2) (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1994) (providing
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defendant of a lesser charge, does not represent an informed
community choice regarding just deserts, for courts do not allow
juries to learn what punishment follows from their verdicts of
guilt. 2 ' Unless that first jury has before it information about the
full extent of a defendant's actions and the option of subjecting the
defendant to the maximum punishment that he may face in multiple
proceedings for the entirety of those actions,'2 9 there is no reason
to interpret its verdict as the community's assessment of the
maximum amount of punishment the defendant deserves.
5. Proportionate Punishment
The remaining reason to trump deliberate legislative choice to
cumulate penalties with a constitutional standard for "same offense"
is to prevent excessive punishment.' For instance, the Court's
for jury determination of a sentence within a statutorily defined range); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07(2)(b) (West Supp. 1995) (stating that the defendant may
elect that the jury determine the sentence).
121 See, e.g., United States v. McDonald, 933 F.2d 1519, 1526 (10th Cir.) (affirming
a lower court's decision to deny a defense request to inform thejury of the sentence),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 897 (1991). But see United States v. Datcher, 830 F. Supp. 411,
415 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (granting defendant's request to inform the jurors about a
"draconian sentence" in argument, and reasoning that "if community oversight of a
criminal prosecution is the primary purpose of a jury trial, then to deny a jury
information necessary to such oversight is to deny a defendant the full protection to
be afforded by jury trial"); COMMITTEE ON MORE EFFECTIVE USE OFJURIES, ARIZONA
SUPREME COURT, JURORS: THE POWER OF 12, at 104-07 (1994) (on file with author)
("Of all the factors that might persuade a jury to exercise its power to nullify in
criminal cases, the fact that the defendant stands to receive what in the jurors'
judgment is a grossly xnfair sentence appears to be one of the most rational. Still,
we do not tell them."). Researchers attempting to quantify or detect the effect of
penalty-severity knowledge on conviction decisions disagree about the strength of the
effect. See, e.g., Martin F. Kaplan, Setting the Record Straight (Again) on Severity of
Penalty: A Comment on Freedman et al., 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 697, 698 (1994)
(disputing the claim that penalty severity has no effect on verdicts).
" Cf Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 718 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (D.N.J. 1989)
(noting the difficulty of barring subsequent punitive damages awards once a
defendant has already been punished by a prior award for the same conduct, and
noting that the various state limits on punitive awards make it "impossible for this
court to ensure that the 'one and only' prior award contemplated the 'full' damage
caused by a defendant's wrongful conduct," and noting that a "jury making a prior
award of punitive damages may not have considered the full effect of a defendant's
conduct with respect to those people other than the plaintiff[s] who were injured by
such conduct").
"o See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 80, at 310 (stating that "the multiple punishments
ban of double jeopardy is justified by the same value that justifies proportionality
review under the Eighth Amendment: both are concerned with excessive punish-
ment").
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decision in Halper barring government attorneys from seeking
super-compensatory civil penalties after already securing a criminal
conviction appeared to many (including Justice Scalia in hind-
sight"'1) to be the Court's way of preventing the imposition of
cumulative penalties that it considered excessive."3 2 Halper, like
Kurth Ranch, clearly cut down on the total punishment available to
government enforcers in such cases, but it did so in an inept and
haphazard way. By barring later efforts to punish defendants with
penalties that cannot be joined with penalties obtained in earlier
prosecutions, the Court has forced government attorneys to choose
only one penalty. This is the case even when no single penalty
option has any relationship either to the total punishment that the
legislature meant to assign to particular conduct, or, more impor-
tantly, to any constitutional ceiling on the amount of punishment
permissible for particular conduct. It is not surprising to find the
Court enlisting the Double Jeopardy Clause as yet another pro-
cedural substitute for direct review of the proportionality of the
punishment that legislatures authorize. But a mandate to use only
one of several authorized penalties is a poor way to prevent
punishment from exceeding a constitutional ceiling on severity.1
33
151 See Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1958 n.2 (1994)
(ScaliaJ., dissenting) (suggesting that the Court in Halper "was motivated by concern
for the harsh consequences of applying a per-transaction penalty to a 'prolific but
small-guage offender'" (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989))).
"52 See Elizabeth S.Jahncke, Note, United States v. Halper, Punitive CivilFines, and
the Double Jeopardy and Excessive Fines Clauses, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 147 (1991)
(stating that the decision revealed the Court's attempt "to protect Halper from such
a disproportionate fine within a double jeopardy framework").
1"5 See MARTIN L. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 203 (1969) (noting that "rules
against multiple convictions provide a means-although a clumsy and inadequate one-
of controlling sentencing by the trial courts," and concluding that "it would be
preferable to do away completely with [the rules] against multiple convictions and
punishments and to provide a full and adequate right of appeal against sentence to
protect the accused from unwarranted punishment"); Henning, supra note 1, at 67-71
("The question the Court never addressed is whether disproportionality is even a
relevant factor in determining whether a multiple punishment is constitutionally
permissible. The answer is that it has no role in the analysis, especially when applied
to civil asset forfeitures."); Rudstein, supra note 70, at 602-05 (criticizing the effect of
barring criminal proceedings following civil punishment); Westen & Drubel, supra
note 35, at 114 (noting that "the multiplication of statutes" punishing a single act may
result in excessive punishment, but stating that "the statutes would be unconstitution-
al under the Eighth Amendment rather than the DoubleJeopardy Clause");Jahncke,
supra note 132, at 139 (arguing that despite Halper the ability to impose severe
punishment in one proceeding still remains); Note, Double Jeopardy and the Multiple-
Count Indictment, 57 YALE L.J. 132, 138 (1947) (criticizing the use of doublejeopardy
doctrine to limit the amount of punishment, and noting that "[r]eview of sentences
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The Court would do better to confront the risk of disproportionate
penalties directly, under the Eighth Amendment, than to employ the
clumsy proxy of mandatory joinder under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
C. When Seeking the Intent of One Legislature Lacks Meaning
Let me address a final concern about the legislative deference
approach to doublejeopardy and its rebuttable presumption against
allowing multiple penalties of sufficient similarity. The idea of
comparing two offenses to determine whether a legislature intended
them to be alternative or cumulative assumes that one legislature
has promulgated both offenses. The task of discerning legislative
intent breaks down when separate lawmaking bodies define
overlapping offenses.
The clearest need for interlegislative analysis arises under a
challenge that today remains only hypothetical-when a defendant
claims that doublejeopardy bars the successive imposition of similar
offenses enacted by different sovereigns. By expressly permitting
the legislatures and prosecutors of separate sovereigns to act
independently of each other, the "dual sovereignty" exception to
double jeopardy law presently defeats all such claims. Given this
gap in double jeopardy protection, courts need not worry today
about whether one or both of two separate sovereigns really
intended to punish the same wrong twice. For example, a federal
prosecutor may charge a defendant with a crime that looks just like
a state crime for which the defendant was already prosecuted in
state court. Because of the dual sovereignty exception, she need not
search for evidence of congressional intent to impose its penalties
on top of state penalties, nor for evidence that the state legislature
on the merits ... would allow the desired result to be achieved without turning
conceptualistic handsprings").
Judges, too, have noted the counter-intuitive effects of Halper's rule, especially
in reverse-Halper cases. See United States v. McCaslin, 863 F. Supp. 1299, 1306 (W.D.
Wash. 1994) ("[I]ntuition may suggest that the forfeiture rather than the prison
sentence should yield-i.e., that the criminal sanction should be upheld and the
defendant reimbursed for the loss of his property."). One commentator's proposal
illustrates the awkwardness. Professor Rudstein argues that the government should
be allowed to either (1) reopen the civil proceeding and secure an award just below
the- punishment threshold, and then renew its criminal prosecution, or (2) secure a
criminal conviction with no sentence, but with all of the collateral consequences of
a criminal conviction. See Rudstein, supra note 70, at 610, 614-15; see also United
States v. Collette, 892 F. Supp. 232, 235-36 (D. Alaska 1995) (concluding that Halper
and Austin bar only additional punishment, not subsequent conviction).
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anticipated that the federal government could proceed separately
for the same offense.
But the dual sovereignty exception to double jeopardy may not
withstand renewed attacks by its critics,13 4 and other, more subtle
versions of the dual-legislature problem already exist today. First,
consider a case like Dixon in which contempt penalties overlap with
more typical offenses. The judge in a contempt proceeding
functions as a virtual legislature by defining the scope of prohibited
conduct as well as the sanctions for violating that prohibition. In
Dixon, Justices Scalia and Kennedy implicitly recognized the
legislative role ofjudges in contempt proceedings when they applied
Blockburger. Instead of looking to the contempt statute for the
elements of contempt, Justices Scalia and Kennedy examined the
order which the contemnor was alleged to have violated, 3 ' treating
154 See infra note 154. Professor Amar andJonathon Marcus address the difficulty
of comparing separate jurisdiction's offenses for "sameness," should the dual
sovereignty exception to double jeopardy be abolished. They advocate a test for
determining whether two offenses of separate sovereigns are the same that "would
not presume legislative intent to create separate offenses merely because different
words are used" by separate legislatures, but that would "seek to discern whether in
fact the statutes substantively describe the same offense with the same real elements."
Amar & Marcus, supra note 37, at 44.
,' See United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2856-58 (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion):
The statute ... provides that "[a] person who has been conditionally
released... and who has violated a condition of release shall be subject to
.. prosecution for contempt of court."... Dixon could not commit an "of-
fence" under this provision until an order setting out conditions was
issued.... [T]he "crime" of violating a condition of release cannot be
abstracted from the "element" of the violated condition. The Dixon court
order incorporated the entire governing criminal code .... Because Dixon's
drug offense did not include any element not contained in his previous
contempt offense, his subsequent prosecution violates the DoubleJeopardy
Clause.
See also id. at 2859 n.5 (stating that the terms of the court's order "define the
prohibited conduct .... To ignore the CPO when determining whether two offenses
are the 'same' is no more possible than putting aside the statutory definitions of
criminal offenses").
ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas disagreed on this
point, arguing that the appropriate source of comparative elements was the contempt
statute itself, not the judge's specific order. They also argued that allowing a
contempt prosecution to bar a prosecution for the much more serious substantive
offense was "counter-intuitive" and "defies commonsense." Id. at 2867 (Rehnquist,
CJ., dissenting).
I agree, in part, with all of them. In the context of successive prosecutions for
contempt, any presumption against multiple penalties must compare the statutory
offense with the order violated, not the contempt statute, because of the unique grant
of legislative authority given to judges. Yet the application of the Blockburger
1995]
148 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144:101
the judge as a second lawmaker.
The dual-legislature problem also arises whenever separate
legislatures make law for a single sovereign. Congress and terri-
torial legislatures act independently, but the Court considers them
one under the Double Jeopardy Clause. 3 6  For example, the
defendants in a recent case challenged their federal prosecution for
murder for hire following an earlier acquittal in Puerto Rico of
charges that they attempted to murder the same victim.13 7 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit applied the
Blockburger presumption even though "[t]he statutes under which
[defendants] were charged were drafted by two distinct legislatures"
that "hardly intended the statutes each drafted to share space in the
same criminal code," causing what the court termed an "awkward fit
between Blockburger and this case." 3  The criminal prohibitions
of state and local legislatures, although independently enacted, also
are subject to the "same offence" test.1
3 9
presumption creates a result that makes little sense. That is a problem with the
presumption and the standards for finding sufficient rebutting proof, however, not
a problem with the choice of whether to look initially for evidence of legislative intent
in the contempt statute itself or in the judge's order.
" See Puerto Rico v. Shell Co. (P.R.), 302 U.S. 253, 264 (1937) ("Both the
territorial and federal laws and the courts, whether exercising federal or local
jurisdiction, are creations emanating from the same sovereignty. Prosecution under
one of the laws in the appropriate court, necessarily, will bar a prosecution under the
other law in another court." (citations omitted)); Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S.
333, 354-55 (1907) ("[T]he cases holding that the same acts committed in a state of
the Union may constitute an offense against the United States and also a distinct
offense against the state, do not apply here, where the two tribunals that tried the
accused exert all their powers under and by authority of the same government-that
of the United States.").
117 See United States v. Sanchez, 3 F.3d 366, 367 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1051 (1994).
"' Id. at 367. The Court of Appeals concluded that the two offenses were distinct
under Blockburger because murder for hire required proof of "the promise of
remuneration," and the attempt charge required "proof of an act unequivocally
directed at the offense." Id.; see also Virgin Islands v. Foster, 734 F. Supp. 210, 212
(D.V.I. 1990) (applyingBlockburger to offenses passed by Congress and the legislature
of the Virgin Islands territory). But see United States v. Lopez Andino, 831 F.2d 1164,
1168 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding, over dissent, that Puerto Rico is a separate sovereignty
for purposes of double jeopardy), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1034 (1988).
... See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 318-22 (1978) ("City and state...
are not two separate sovereigns to whom the citizen owes separate allegiance in any
meaningful sense, but one alone. And the 'dual sovereignty' concept.., does not
permit a single sovereign to impose multiple punishment for a single offense....");
Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 395 (1970) (holding that in the context of prosecu-
tions by both the state and municipal governments, "a 'dual sovereignty' theory is an
anachronism" and thus "the second trial constituted double jeopardy").
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The fiction of the unitary legislature loses its credibility in
these situations, 40 and some alternative is required if the Double
Jeopardy Clause is to retain its focus on legislative intent to
determine when two proceedings or penalties involve the "same
offence." In my view, the most sensible approach, and the approach
most protective of defendants' interests, is to apply the presumption
against multiple penalties across legislatures but require rebutting
evidence of intent to cumulate penalties by both lawmakers.
14 1
In sum, there is no functional justification for an interpretation
of the Double Jeopardy Clause that includes a meaning for "same
offence" other than that provided by legislatures. To read the Bill
of Rights to protect defendants from legislative choices regarding
punishment makes sense, but it makes better sense to limit
cumulative penalties under the Eighth Amendment and the Due
Process Clauses, provisions that are more easily read to impose
antimajoritarian rules.
III. LIMITS ON PROPORTIONALITY
The remainder of this Article examines the Eighth Amendment's
limits on proportionality in light of legislative ability to fragment
conduct into separate offenses under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The Amendment must protect against the most serious risks of
140 Agencies, too, are sometimes granted so much discretion to define the offenses
for which penalties maybe sought that they might be regarded as virtual "legislatures"
upon which double jeopardy analysis must focus. With continued expansion of
administrative penalties, it becomes less and less tenable to presume that every aspect
of administrative, civil, and criminal enforcement is fully coordinated by Congress.
Yet because of the variety of congressional controls over agency action, Congress is
more likely to become aware of the overlap between -criminal and administrative
penalties than to understand the overlap between certain nonadministrative penalties.
Professor Lear has argued, however, that one particular agency cannot be trusted to
speak the will of Congress. She maintains that the statements of the United States
Sentencing Commission cannot provide the necessary congressional intent to override
the Blockburger presumption. See Lear, supra note 117, at 750-51 & nn.104-09
("Realistically, the Guidelines represent the intent of the Sentencing Commission
rather than of Congress.").
141 Professor George Thomas has also criticized the dual sovereignty exception and
has argued that it is possible to apply a presumption against multiple punishment-
even one that is rebuttable by legislative intent-across sovereigns. It is unclear
whether Thomas's presumption against overlapping punishment of separate
sovereigns could be rebutted by evidence of contrary intent of either sovereign, or
whether it would require that both sovereigns anticipate cumulation. See Thomas,
supra note 55 (manuscript at 70) ("If the legislature intends to punish the same
culpable act-type more than once in the dual sovereignty context, it need only say
SO.").
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disproportionate penalties posed by double jeopardy law, but it
must also accommodate the extraordinary variety of approaches to
punishment in our federal system, including punishment practices
only crudely tuned to an individual offender or his offense, such as
treble damage awards and mandatory minimum sentences. In the
following sections, I offer several suggestions for shaping Eighth
Amendment law to perform this function, each of which grows out
of my initial premise that the Eighth Amendment complements the
Double Jeopardy Clause to create a coherent set of limits on
punishment. In Part A, I argue that the Eighth Amendment
requires review of the proportionality of all penalties against the
same offender for his conduct, even if those penalties call for
different sacrifices (property or liberty), are payable to separate
sovereigns, or are imposed in separate proceedings (civil, criminal,
or administrative). I also suggest ways in which courts can deter-
mine when to count a civil sanction or a sanction imposed by a
separate sovereign among the penalties totalled for purposes of
Eighth Amendment review. In Part B, I address the next step after
identifying which penalties to cumulate-identifying a disproportion-
ate total. Not wishing to rehash past debates over the appropriate
formula for determining how much punishment is too much, I limit
my discussion in this section to suggestions that follow directly from
my argument that the Eighth Amendment protects defendants not
only from single, disproportionate criminal sentences, but also from
disproportionate penalties that cumulate as a result of multiple
punishment proceedings. In particular, I suggest that certain types
of penalties warrant closer review for excessiveness and criticize
methods ofjudging excessiveness under the Eighth Amendment that
do not consider the severity of the sanction relative to the offend-
er's culpability.
A. Scope of Protection: Guidelines for Application
If the Eighth Amendment is to serve as a backup for the
cumulative punishment that double jeopardy permits, then courts
must be able to assess the effects of several penalties together.
Judges, however, are used to evaluating the proportionality of
penalties one at a time.14 2 Until very recently, the awkward limits
142 Consider, for example, the Court's dicta in a case disposing of the claim of
excessive punishment raised byJohn O'Neil, who was sentenced to nearly 55 years in
prison for 307 violations of a Vermont law prohibiting the sale of liquor. O'Neil had
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of the Halper rule and pre-Dixon successive prosecution cases have
held cumulative penalties somewhat in check. With the adoption of
the legislative deference approach to the "same offence" for double
jeopardy in Dixon, cumulative penalties will probably occur more
often. Judges and litigants must start thinking of Eighth Amend-
ment limits in a broader way, not simply penalty-by-penalty. Any
approach that ignores the successive and overlapping nature of
punishment contains the same fatal flaw that doomed Congress's
early efforts to control money laundering. In the quest for simplic-
ity, it ignores the simplest math. Any portion is the sum of smaller
sub-portions; proportionate penalties can add up to disproportion-
ate punishment.
1. Proportionality Review for All Penalties:
Exemptions for None
To begin with, no penalty can be exempt from judicial review
for proportionality under the Eighth Amendment. 4 ' Justice Scalia
and Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, have concluded that the
Eighth Amendment includes no protection against dispropor-
tionately long sentences and limits only those punishments that are
uniquely inhumane in method.144 Other Justices would allow for
filled 307 separate mail orders for small quantities of liquor. Before noting that the
Eighth Amendment did not bind the states, the Court stated:
The punishment imposed by statute for the offence with which the
respondent, O'Neil, is charged, cannot be said to be excessive or oppressive.
If he has subjected himself to a severe penalty, it is simply because he has
committed a great many such offences. It would scarcely be competent for
a person to assail the constitutionality of the statute prescribing a punish-
ment for burglary, on the ground that he had committed so many burglaries
that, if punishment for each were inflicted on him, he might be kept in
prison for life. The mere fact that cumulative punishments may be imposed
for distinct offences in the same prosecution is not material upon this
question. If the penalty were unreasonably severe for a single offence, the
constitutional question might be urged; but here the unreasonableness is
only in the number of offences which the respondent has committed.
O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 331 (1892).
'43 As the Court itself has stated, "no penalty is per se constitutional." Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983).
'" See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 975-85 (1991) (plurality opinion)
(concluding that the Framers, as well as contemporaneous legislatures and courts,
understood the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to prohibit particular modes
of punishment, rather than disproportionate punishment); see also Anthony F.
Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57
CAL. L. REV. 839, 839-44 (1969) (suggesting that the Framers considered "cruel and
unusual" to refer to torturous methods of punishment).
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some judicial second-guessing of the proportionality of sentences,
but may limit that review to cases involving the extreme penalties of
death or life without parole.14 5 Moreover, although the Court has
agreed to limit forfeitures and contempt penalties under the
Excessive Fines Clause, it has not considered an Eighth Amendment
challenge to any other type of monetary penalty. It may yet choose
to limit review under the Excessive Fines Clause to only those
monetary sanctions that lack legislated ceilings.
146
If the Court were to limit proportionality review in these ways,
the bulk of the sanctions imposed in this country would escape
review entirely. Very few convicted defendants receive sentences of
death or life without parole. The only penalties that lack caps set
by the legislature are forfeitures, 147 contempt fines, 148 fines for
"" Cf. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy,J., concurring in part and concurring
in thejudgment) (noting that "[p]etitioner's life sentence without parole is the second
most severe penalty permitted by law"); id. at 1028 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
that a death sentence and a life sentence without parole share a common characteris-
tic: "The offender will never regain his freedom."); see also supra note 26 (citing
similar appellate court decisions).
'" Typically, neither contempt fines nor forfeitures are capped by the legislature.
See infra notes 147-48. On the other hand,Justices Scalia and Thomas suggested in
Kurth Ranch that the result in Halper could be attributed to excessive fines analysis,
even though in Halper the legislature had set a maximum amount for fines. See
Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1958 n.2 (1994) (Scalia,J.,
dissenting).
Another possibility is that the Court will limit proportionality review to monetary
sanctions only, on the theory that the profit motive supports ieading the Eighth
Amendment to provide for closer review of "fines" than other forms of penalties. See
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 979 n.9 (plurality opinion) ("[I]t makes sense to scrutinize
governmental action more closely when the State stands to benefit."). In my view,
however, this difference in economic incentives does not warrant abandoning review
of nonmonetary sentences altogether. Sentences of imprisonment are, as a class,
more severe than sentences that do not involve the deprivation of liberty, and may
require closer scrutiny for that reason. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 289 (characterizing a
fine as a "lesser punishment" compared to imprisonment). Notably, even after Austin
and Alexander, at least one court appears to be under the impression that proportion-
ality review is required only for terms of imprisonment. See United States v. Chandler,
36 F.3d 358, 365 (4th Cir. 1994) ("[The] proportionality principle, if it does exist in
the Eighth Amendment, derives from the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and
not the Excessive Fines Clause."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1792 (1995).
147 Legislatures typically set no upper limits on the value of forfeitable assets,
although many forfeiture statutes require that the government must establish some
relationship between the property subject to forfeiture and the prohibited activity.
See Chandler, 36 F.3d at 369 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring) (stating that because the
jury in a contested civil forfeiture action under 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988) must find both
that the property was used or intended to be used to facilitate illegal activity and that
the owner was aware of that use, the jury "determines ... to a great extent that
forfeiture ... is not harsh or excessive," thus "foreclosing an Eighth Amendment
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treason, 149 and punitive damage awards. 5 °  If one looks at the
typical penalty in isolation, precluding constitutional review does
not appear to be that unreasonable, especially because a legislature
and at least one representative of another branch (prosecutors,
judges, sentencing commissions, etc.) have already approved of its
severity. But if one recognizes that penalties are, in many cases,
neither imposed nor experienced in isolation, but as part of a
package of punishment made up of civil, administrative, and
criminal sanctions from multiple sources, then immunizing classes
of penalties from constitutional scrutiny has more serious conse-
quences. The Eighth Amendment is of little use as a limit on
challenge in all but egregious circumstances"). Still, this relationship test is not very
exacting. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 669 (1974)
(finding a vessel worth $19,800 forfeitable under Puerto Rico law, even though only
one marijuana cigarette was found aboard); United States v. 1990 Toyota 4Runner,
9 F.3d 651,654 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding a car forfeitable merely because it was driven
to a meeting where the logistics of a drug deal were discussed); United States v.
Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1415 (9th Cir. 1987) (remanding to the trial court to
determine whether 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2) authorized forfeiture of defendant's entire
92% stock interest in a company worth $3 million, even though defendant's benefit
from his illegal conduct totalled only $335,000); People ex rel. Waller v. 1989 Ford
F350 Truck, 642 N.E.2d 460, 466 (I1. 1994) (remanding to the trial court to
determine whether forfeiture of a pick-up truck, in which the defendant was found
with a small packet of cocaine and $55.99 in his pocket, violated the Excessive Fines
Clause).
Once this statutory minimum relationship is established, no further statutory
ceiling exists forjudges to onsult in order to determine whether a given forfeiture
is too severe. Instead, the degree of punishment imposed by criminal or civil
forfeiture is limited only by the prosecutor's discretion in choosing to seek or to
refrain from seeking forfeiture of a particular asset. See United States v. 461 Shelby
County Rd. 361, 857 F. Supp 935, 939 (N.D. Ala. 1994) ("When the United States
undertakes a forfeiture, it is the United States which has selected the amount of the
'fine', and not the Congress, and not the courts.").
14' See International Union v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552, 2559 (1994) ("Unlike most
areas of law, where a legislature defines both the sanctionable conduct and the
penalty to be imposed, civil contempt proceedings leave the offended judge solely
responsible for identifying, prosecuting, adjudicating, and sanctioning the contuma-
cious conduct."); Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Getting Beyond the Civil/Criminal Distinction: A
New Approach to the Regulation of Indirect Contempts, 79 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1026-27 &
nn.4-6 (1993) (noting the unlimited power ofjudges to impose severe contempt fines,
and describing cases involving "breathtakingly severe" fines).
149 See 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1988) (providing that individuals who are convicted of
treason against the United States "shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not less
than five years and fined not less than $10,000").
"5 Many states have not imposed caps on punitive damage awards in private
litigation, either in the form of absolute dollar amounts or multiples of compensatory
damages. Some of these damage awards, if shared with the state, may qualify as fines.
See infra text accompanying notes 232-33.
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disproportionate punishment that results from cumulative penalties
if it exempts most penalties entirely.
2. Cumulating Penalties of Separate Sovereigns
Just as courts that review punishment under the Eighth
Amendment must consider all types of penalties in order to assess
the true totality of punishment that the government exacts, they
must not ignore certain penalties just because they were imposed in
a different jurisdiction. The Eighth Amendment can and should
bridge the gap left by doublejeopardy's dual sovereignty exception,
an exception that allows the states,"'1 the federal government,
152
and tribal governments 153 to each prosecute the same defendant
for essentially the same crime.154 Preventing a single jurisdiction
"' See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) (rejecting a double jeopardy
challenge to an Alabama conviction and death sentence after the defendant had pled
guilty to the same murder in Georgia and was sentenced there to life in prison). But
cf. Daniel A. Braun, Praying to False Sovereigns: The Rule Permitting Successive
Prosecutions in the Age of Cooperative Federalism, 20 AM.J. CRIM. L. 1, 5 & n.15 (1992)
(noting that nearly half of the states have statutes that limit reprosecution under these
circumstances).
15 See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195-96 (1959) (rejecting a double
jeopardy challenge to a federal prosecution for conspiracy to destroy a federal facility
after a state conviction for conspiracy to destroy the same property); Bartkus v.
Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 139 (1959) (rejecting a double jeopardy challenge to a state
robbery prosecution after the defendant had been acquitted of federal bank robbery
charges); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (rejecting a double
jeopardy challenge to federal prosecution for manufacturing, transporting, and
possessing alcohol after a state conviction for the same offense).
"' See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 329-30 (1978) (holding that tribal
prosecution for contributing to the delinquency of a minor does not bar prosecution
for statutory rape in federal court). But see Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333,
351-52 (1907) (barring a Phillipine prosecution for an assassination after acquittal at
a military court-martial for homicide, and rejecting the argument that the defendant
"committed two distinct offenses-one against military law and discipline, the other
against the civil law").
"5 Academics have renewed their attack on the dual sovereignty exception,
arguing either for complete abolition or drastic curtailment. See Amar & Marcus,
supra note 37, at 2 (proposing "to abandon the general dual sovereignty doctrine in
doublejeopardy law"); Braun, supra note 151, at 36 (arguing that the dual sovereignty
exception is theoretically flawed); Cassell, supra note 98, at 708-19 (providing a
critique of the dual sovereignty exception); Michael A. Dawson, Popular Sovereignty,
Double Jeopardy, and the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, 102 YALE L.J. 281, 282 (1992)
(arguing that "[t]he dual sovereignty doctrine is unconstitutional because it
denegrates the principle of popular sovereignty underlying the Double Jeopardy
Clause"); Guerra, supra note 1, at 1161-62 (arguing that the "dual sovereignty
exception violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the Double Jeopardy Clause");
Herman, supra note 109, at 618 & n.32 (collecting a dozen law review articles and
notes published since 1930 criticizing the dual sovereignty exception); Paul Hoffman,
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from imposing a disproportionately severe penalty is not much of
a shield against excessive punishment if several jurisdictions can
freely cumulate punishment for the same wrong.1 55  A dual
sovereignty exception to the Eighth Amendment is, for this reason,
a mistake.
The incorporation of Eighth Amendment protections through
the Fourteenth Amendment against the states undermines any basis
for reviewing the punishment of separate sovereigns separately.
Incorporation appropriately brought an end to one sovereign's
ability to use evidence illegally obtained by another sovereign.
1 56
The same argument supports cumulating, rather than separating,
penalties of state and federal governments under the Eighth
Amendment.
157
Double Jeopardy Wars: The Case for a Civil Rights "Exception", 41 UCLA L. REV. 649,
661-71 (1994) (arguing for the abolition of the dual sovereignty doctrine, with an
exception for civil rights cases). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit recently questioned "whether it makes much sense to maintain the fiction that
federal and state governments are so separate in their interest that the dual
sovereignty doctrine is universally needed to protect one from another." United
States v. All Assets of G.P.S. Auto. Corp., No. 94-6115, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 26482,
at *50 (2d Cir. Sept. 18, 1995).
155 I assume here that the Court will eventually apply the Eighth Amendment's
Excessive Fines Clause to the states. It would be remarkable if the Court did not,
given its prior treatment of both the Bail and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clauses. See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) (noting that the Bail Clause
"has been assumed" to apply to the states); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667
(1962) (applying the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to the states, invalidating
a state criminal statute as cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment). Agreement on this point appears universal. See, e.g.,
Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 283-84 (1989)
(O'Connor,J., dissenting) (arguing that all elements of the Eighth Amendment should
apply to the states);John C.Jeffries,Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive
Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 148, 151-58 (1986) (stating that the "applicability [of the
Excessive Fines Clause] to the states seems clear"); Lyndon F. Bittle, Comment,
Punitive Damages and the Eighth Amendment: An Analytical Framework for Determining
Excessiveness, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1433, 1440-41 (1987) (discussing the applicability of the
Excessive Fines Clause to the states).
" See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964) (barring a state
from compelling a witness to give testimony that might be used against him in federal
prosecution); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960) (barring the
introduction in a federal prosecution of evidence illegally seized by state officers).
157 Incorporation is the basis on which some critics have attacked the dual
sovereignty exception to doublejeopardy. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 102 n.3
(1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that Murphy and Elkins "can be read to
suggest that despite the independent sovereign status of the Federal and State
Governments, courts should not be blind to the impact of combined federal-state law
enforcement on an accused's constitutional rights"); Amar & Marcus, supra note 37,
at 12-26 (noting that although the Court eventually recognized that the dual
1995)
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Indeed, the most persuasive reason to retain a dual sovereignty
exception to the Fifth Amendment's prohibition of duplicative
penalties fails to support a similar dual sovereignty exception to the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of disproportionate penalties.
Without such an exception to doublejeopardy, an offender who had
been acquitted or punished only moderately by one sovereign could
entirely escape punishment in another sovereign's courts. The
classic worst-case scenario is one involving a state official accused of
violent, racially motivated state crimes against an African-American
victim. An acquittal in state court could completely undermine the
nation's legitimate punitive objectives by barring a later federal
prosecution for the same offense. 5 The same difficulty does not
arise with cumulative excessiveness review under the Eighth
Amendment. The effects of ignoring state, federal, tribal, and even
international boundaries under the Eighth Amendment are less
drastic. The only time an all-governments-are-one approach to
Eighth Amendment review would affect a sovereign's ability to
punish an offender is when the offender's prior punishment
approaches excessiveness. In that situation, it is not likely that any
legitimate punitive interest of the subsequent sovereign would be
frustrated because the offender has already received plenty of
punishment.
Other interjurisdictiona tensions may arise from a rule of first-
come-first-serve under the Eighth Amendment, but none are serious
enough to warrant a different rule. Lucrative civil penalties,
forfeiture, and state-shared punitive damage awards are becoming
increasingly popular supplements to costly incarceration, prompting
governments to compete to be the first to punish a defendant; now
revenue, not simply justice, is at stake.'59 Some high-profile cases
generate political capital as well and have occasionally fueled
competition between federal and state authorities.' 0 The poten-
sovereignty doctrine was no longer defensible in the realms of unreasonable searches
and compelled self-incrimination, it has refused to dismantle the doctrine as applied
to double jeopardy).
15 Opponents of the dual sovereignty exception in double jeopardy law have
addressed this problem. See Amar & Marcus, supra note 37, at 23-24 (suggesting that
incorporation undermines the blanket dual sovereignty exception, but arguing that
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment must permit reprosecution of state officials
for civil rights violations when prior state prosecutions have "failed to vindicate
Fourteenth Amendment values"); Hoffman, supra note 154, at 661-66 (arguing for a
civil rights exception to the proposed elimination of the dual sovereignty exception).
... See e.g., infra notes 251-56 and accompanying text (discussing the monetary
incentives of forfeiture).
o See, e.g., Cassell, supra note 98, at 702 & n.55 (summarizing the competition
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tial of an unseemly "race to the courthouse" by separate sovereign
plaintiffs to see who gets to collect the spoils of penalty proceedings
is an unfortunate byproduct of any system which limits total
punishment by reference to all government extractions. But the
frustration of one sovereign's alleged entitlement to the potential
revenues from prosecution cannot override a defendant's interest
in protection from excessive punishment at the hands of separate
sovereigns. The Eighth Amendment's limit on punishment binds all
governments, state and federal, and cannot be cast aside merely
because one jurisdiction is deprived of the opportunity to take
credit for some quantum of the punishment that a defendant
endures. Moreover, when more than one sovereign assists in
investigating, apprehending, or prosecuting a wrongdoer, the
participating governments can arrange to share the defendant's
assets. Repeated competition in the context of forfeiture, for
instance, has led federal authorities to adopt "pot-splitting" rules in
order to resolve competing claims against a single asset.161 Similar
solutions are possible should enough cases arise in which the total
of separate sanctions sought by competing sovereigns exceeds
constitutional limits.
between state and federal authorities in the BCCI scandal); see also John C. Coffee,
Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models-and What Can
Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1888 (1992) (noting reasons why agencies would
insist on maintaining criminal prosecutions even if punitive civil sanctions were
available, including fostering their image as "tough, 'no-nonsense' enforcer[s]" of the
law, enhancing recruiting efforts, maintaining morale, and obtaining funding).
161 See 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (authorizing the Attorney
General to transfer property civilly or criminally forfeited under § 881 "to any
Federal[,]... State or local law enforcement agency [that] participated directly in the
seizure or forfeiture of the property"); United States v. $12,390.00, 956 F.2d 801,803
(8th Cir. 1992) (upholding forfeiture to federal government of monies seized by local
law enforcement officers in a drug raid); Cavaliere v. Town of N. Beach, 646 A.2d
1058, 1063 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (upholding a cooperative proceeds-sharing
arrangement in which the DEA instituted forfeiture proceedings against a car
originally seized by state officials, over a challenge that use of the federal statute
impermissibly circumvented more restrictive local law). Novel proposals for dual
state-federal prosecutions, first suggested as solutions to the dual sovereignty problem
under double jeopardy, could also be tried here. See LEONARD G. MILLER, DOUBLE
JEOPARDY AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 124-25 (1968) (relating proposals forjoint trial
of state and federal charges).
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3. Cumulating Criminal Sanctions with Civil Sanctions:
Defining When a Civil Sanction Is a "Fine"
Cumulative excessiveness review requires judges to consider all
penalties for the same wrong together, regardless of form or source.
This requires resolving the question of when, if ever, civil sanctions
are "fines" or "punishment" limited by the Eighth Amendment. The
range of civil sanctions that could potentially fall within the scope
of the Eighth Amendment is daunting. It includes deportation,
162
revocation of parole or probation,1 63  prison discipline,1 6 evic-
tion, 165 civil contempt fines, 166 orders barring a defendant from
further contracting privileges, 167 enforcement of university con-
162 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (stating that
deportation is not considered punishment under the Constitution and does not
trigger due process protection, right to trial by jury, or freedom from cruel and
unusual punishments); cf. Harisiades v. Shaugnessy, 342 U.S. 580,594 (1952) (holding
that the Ex Post Facto Clause is not applicable to deportation because deportation is
not a criminal sanction); United States v. Yacoubian, 24 F.3d 1, 9-10 (9th Cir. 1994)
(same).
162 Cf. United States v. Entendencia, No. 93-30367, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23978,
at *5-7 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 1994) (stating that revocation of parole is not considered
punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause).
16 Cf. United States v. Brown, 59 F.3d 102, 104 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that
criminal prosecution for conduct that had already been sanctioned with prison
discipline did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause); United States v. Hernandez-
Fundora, 58 F.3d 802, 807 (2d Cir. 1995) (rejecting defendant's double jeopardy
challenge, stating that "subsequent prosecutions will be barred only in those
exceedingly rare circumstances where the disciplinary sanction imposed is grossly
disproportionate to the government's interest in maintaining prison order and
discipline"); Garrity v. Fiedler, 41 F.3d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting double
jeopardy challenge to conviction for conduct previously punished in prison discipline
proceeding), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1420 (1995); Lucero v. Gunter 17 F.3d 1347, 1351
(10th Cir. 1994) (finding prison discipline remedial, not punitive, and rejecting
double jeopardy challenge); State v. Lynch, 533 N.W.2d 905, 909 (Neb. 1995)
(rejecting a prisoner's doublejeopardy claim that criminal prosecution was barred by
previous administrative disciplinary hearing).
165 Cf. City of New York v. Wright, 618 N.Y.S.2d 938, 939 (App. Term. 1994)
(holding, over strenuous dissent, that eviction was not punitive, and therefore not
barred by double jeopardy); NATIONAL INST. OFJUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, THE
MANHATTAN DISTRICT ATTORNREY'S NARCOTICS EVICTION PROGRAM 8 (1995) ("Legal
scholars believe that eviction would not be double punishment.").
16 Cf. International Union v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552,2562 (1994) (holding a $52
million "civil" contempt fine a criminal penalty that could not be imposed without a
jury trial).
1"7 Cf Bae v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 489, 496-97 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a
retroactive civil debarment statute, which excluded the defendant from Medicare
participation following a criminal conviction, did not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause); United States v. Furlett, 974 F.2d 839, 844 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that an
imposition of a commodities'-futures trading bar after conviction does not amount
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duct codes, 68 removal of professional licenses,169 driver's license
suspensions,"17 forfeiture of contraband, criminal proceeds, or
property used to facilitate crime," 1 forfeiture of smuggled goods
or unreported funds, penalties paid to the government based on the
amount of loss to non-government victims or the amount of gain to
the intended beneficiary of the defendant's offense,17 2 taxes on
substances illegally possessed,173 punitive damages shared with the
to a second "punishment" under the Double Jeopardy Clause); Manocchio v.
Kusserow, 961 F.2d 1539, 1543 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that a physician's exclusion
from Medicare participation following a criminal conviction for Medicare fraud does
not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes); see alsoJames F. Bennett,
Double Jeopardy and the Administrative State 15-20 (Apr. 20, 1995) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (analyzing double jeopardy implications of
debarment sanctions after Halper).
" Cf Ronnie Glassberg, 'U' Refuses to Open Code Hearing at Request of Accused,
MICH. DAILY, Jan. 25, 1995, at 1, 7 (quoting a professor who charged that enforce-
ment of student code of conduct after student was subjected to criminal charges for
the same conduct is double jeopardy).
" Cf Schillerstrom v. State, 885 P.2d 156, 158-59 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (holding
that the revocation of a chiropractor's license was not punishment under the Double
Jeopardy Clause); Loui v. Board of Medical Examiners, 889 P.2d 705, 711 (Haw. 1995)
(stating that suspension of medical license furthered nonpunitive purposes of
protecting public from harm); Rudstein, supra note 70, at 640-42 (noting cases in
which courts have considered claims that license suspension was double punishment
under the Double Jeopardy Clause).
170 The number of drunk driving cases raising issues of double punishment since
Halper continues to explode. For case summaries, see Halper Challenges Swell: A Rule
fortheRare Case?, 9 Crim. Prac. Manual (BNA) 360, 361-62 (July 19, 1995); New Drunk
Driving Defense Rejected by Eight Appeals Courts, LAW. WKLY. USA, July 3, 1995, at 1.
171 Cf United States v. Chick, 61 F.3d 682, 688 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that
forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 2513 (1988) of electronic equipment, allegedly used for
the unauthorized interception of satellite communications for financial gain, would
have been punishment barring subsequent prosecution of owner under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2512 (1988) had the punishments not been based upon separate offenses); supra
note 67 (discussing cases in which courts have found criminal prosecutions precluded
by earlier civil forfeitures).
'2 Cf United States v. Morgan, 51 F.3d 1105, 1115 (2d Cir.) (finding that
"[a]lthough the actual losses.., sustained by the government are not identical with
the harm [the defendant] inflicted on the failed bank," the bank's loss is a reasonable
measure of the government's damages occasioned by the defendant's actions, so that
the order requiring the defendant to pay the government this amount was not
punitive), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 171 (1995).
17 Compare Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (1994)
(finding that Montana's drug tax is "punishment" for doublejeopardy purposes) and
People v. Bracket, Nos. 93CA1278, 93CA1288, 1995 Colo. App. LEXIS 81, at *9
(Colo. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1995) (assuming, without deciding, that if liability were
established, a drug tax would be punishment under Kurth Ranch), cert. granted, No.
955C331, 1995 Colo. LEXIS 322 (Colo. Sept. 11 1995) and Covelli v. Crystal, No.
534178, 1994 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3276, at *12-13 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 21, 1994)
(holding that Connecticut's drug tax is punishment that triggers double jeopardy
1995]
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state,174 customs assessments for smuggled goods, 175 civil penal-
ties of various types,




protection, referring to a legislator's statement that the tax "double-whack[s]" drug
offenders) and Stennett v. State, No. 14-93-00303-CR, 1995 WL 351756, at *3 (Tex.
Ct. App.June 8,1995) (holding that the collection of the Texas Controlled Substances
Tax is punishment barring later prosecution for possession of marijuana) with
Department of Taxation v. Allison (In re Allison), No. BK-93-24478-RCJ, Adv. No. 94-
2024-RCJ, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 136, at *8 (Bankr. D. Nev. Feb. 10, 1995) (holding that
Nevada's drug tax is not punishment triggering double jeopardy) and Milner v. State,
658 So. 2d 500, 502 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994) (finding that Alabama's drug tax is
remedial and not punitive, rejecting the double jeopardy challenge of previously
convicted taxpayers) and State v. Lange, 531 N.W.2d 108, 117 (Iowa 1995) (holding
that Iowa's drug tax stamp does not trigger double jeopardy) and State v. Gulledge,
896 P.2d 378, 389 (Kan. 1995) (holding that Kansas's drug tax was not punishment
barring later prosecution of taxpayer).
174 See supra note 20 (citing cases considering whether such awards implicate the
Eighth Amendment).
"' See, e.g., United States v. Ziegler Bolt & Parts Co., No. 95-03-00162, 1995 Ct.
Intl. Trade LEXIS 4, at *31-32 (Ct. Int'l Trade Jan. 13, 1995) (holding a customs
penalty of nearly $6 million for violations of 19 U.S.C. §§ 1304, 1592 (1988) not
punishment that would trigger double jeopardy or excessive fines protection, even
though the defendant had already been convicted of violating § 1304 and fined
$7500), dismissed on other grounds, 883 F. Supp. 740 (1995).
176 Cf. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 402-04 (1938) (holding that double
jeopardy does not bar the imposition of civil tax penalties following criminal
conviction); United States v. Williams, No. 93-5435, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 13019, at
*13 (4th Cir. May 30, 1995) (per curiam) (rejecting double jeopardy challenge to
prosecution after the Federal Mines Safety and Health Review Commission fined
defendant over $300,000 under 30 U.S.C. § 820(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); United
States v. Hudson, 879 F. Supp. 1113, 1116 (W.D. Okla. 1994) (finding that fine set
according to the Office of the Comptroller of Currency "civil money penalty matrix"
was punitive, noting that the government's losses were not considered in its
determination); Ianniello v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 165, 180 (1992) (holding that the
imposition of a civil fraud penalty following criminal conviction does not violate
double jeopardy); Ex parte State Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 654 So. 2d 1149,
1154 (Ala. 1994) (finding, over dissent, that a $500 fine was not double punishment
for a prosecuted licensee who allegedly sold liquor to underage purchasers); Kvitka
v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 551 N.E.2d 915, 918 (Mass.) (finding a $10,000
fine imposed by the licensing board after the defendant had already been convicted
for unlawfully dispensing drugs constituted a second punishment that violated the
defendant's rights under Halper), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 823 (1990); J. Richard
Johnston, The Civil Fraud Penalty and Double Jeopardy, CAL. TAX LAW., Summer 1994,
at 5, 6 (suggesting that Kurth Ranch may have undermined the holding in Helvering
v. Mitchell).
177 See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,274-75 (1989)
(noting that treble damage awards were authorized at the time of the Framers, but
that the Eighth Amendment did not expressly include exemplary damages within its
scope); Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981) ("The very idea
of treble damages reveals an intent to punish past, and to deter future, unlawful
conduct ... .
178 For other examples of arguably punitive civil sanctions, see Artway v. Attorney
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Not surprisingly, considering the longevity of many of these
potentially punitive civil sanctions, the Justices and their critics have
debated at length the merits of possible methods of distinguishing
those civil and administrative sanctions that should be regarded as
criminal or punitive for one purpose or another from those
sanctions that should be accepted as civil for all purposes.
179
Three decades of opinions on this topic have shaped the outline for
a workable and appropriate method for distinguishing which civil
sanctions are subject to Eighth Amendment review.
Gen., 876 F. Supp. 666, 692 (D.N.J. 1995) (finding that the state Sexual Offender
Registration Act is punitive and refusing to apply it retroactively because of the Ex
Post Facto Clause); In re H.J., 854 P.2d 381, 383 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
the termination of parental rights does not constitute second punishment for double
jeopardy purposes); In re Jeremiah A., 534 N.W.2d 907, 913 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995)
(same); State v. Coolidge, No. 01C01-9307-CR-00202, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS
287, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 30,1995) (holding that a drunk driving defendant
failed to demonstrate that detention of six hours, purportedly for the purpose of
detoxification, was punitive rather than remedial, and rejecting his claim of double
punishment); City of Milwaukee v. Arrieh, No. 91-2628,1994 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1180,
at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 1994) (remanding to trial court the question whether
nuisance abatement proceeding is punishment under the Eighth Amendment).
The Court has upheld pretrial detention for dangerousness as "regulatory," but
it has noted that such preventive detention may become "punitive" if it lasts too long.
See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 n.4 (1987) (intimating "no view as to
the point at which detention in a particular case might become excessively prolonged,
and therefore punitive, in relation to Congress' regulatory goal"). Since Salerno,
courts have struggled to distinguish regulatory detention that does not violate a
defendant's rights to due process from punitive detention that does. See, e.g., United
States v. Orena, 986 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that the due process limit
on the duration of preventive detention requires case-by-case balancing of the length
of detention, the prosecutor's responsibility for the delay, and the proof of
defendant's dangerousness); see also Floralynn Einesman, How Longls Too Long? When
Pretrial Detention Violates Due Process, 60 TENN. L. REv. 1, 42 (1992) (proposing
changes to the Bail Reform Act to ensure the law comports with due process).
179 SeeJonathan 1. Charney, The Need for Constitutional Protections for Defendants in
Civil Penalty Cases, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 478, 507 (1974) (formulating a test for
distinguishing civil sanctions from criminal penalties); Cheh, supra note 1, at 1349
(outlining approaches to help make the distinction between civil sanctions and
criminal penalties); J. Morris Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A
Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379, 435-94 (1976) (recom-
mending that upon a finding that a sanction "imposes a 'disproportionate burden'"
on conduct that is purposive and proscribed a presumption of punishment arises,
which can be dispelled upon a showing that the sanction is narrowly tailored to
accomplish a nonpunitive purpose); Henry M. Hart,Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law,
23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404 (1958) (arguing that the condemnation of the
community distinguishes criminal sanctions from civil sanctions); Mann, supra note
1, at 1816-36 (tracing various approaches the Court has taken since the nineteenth
century).
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a. The General Rule: When Civil Sanctions Are "Fines" Under the
Eighth Amendment
The Court took the first step over thirty years ago when it
concluded that a legislature's choice to label a penalty civil or
administrative does not automatically deprive defendants facing
such a penalty of the constitutional rights ordinarily guaranteed to
criminal defendants. Rather than defer to a legislature's classifica-
tion of a particular penalty as civil, the Court adopted a multifactor
test to distinguish between civil sanctions that are essentially
criminal and those that are not, a test that considers not only the
intended goals of the statute authorizing the sanction but also the
nature of the sanction and its effects.1 80
More recently, the Court has recognized that some civil awards
that fail to qualify as essentially criminal under this test are
nevertheless subject to those provisions in the Bill of Rights that
"limit the government's power to punish,"8 ' namely the Double
Jeopardy and Excessive Fines Clauses. In Halper, the Court refused
to limit the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause to those
criminal charges or civil proceedings that are so punitive that they
must carry the full array of criminal procedure safeguards.
18 2
Four years later, in Austin, the Court found that the same was true
180 In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), the Court found that
the forfeiture of citizenship was a criminal penalty mandating the procedural
safeguards of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments after considering:
(1) Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, (2)
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, (3) whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, (4) whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims ofpunishment-retribution and deterrence, (5)
whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, (6) whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for
it, and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
assigned.
Id. at 168-69. The Court later applied this test to a monetary sanction in United
States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1980) (finding a civil penalty for the discharge
of oil not punitive). Recently, the Court adopted a somewhat less deferential test to
determine whether ajudge's imposition of contempt sanctions was a civil penalty, or
a criminal one that required ajury trial under the Sixth Amendment. See Internation-
al Union v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552, 2563 (1994) (finding criminal the imposition of
$52 million in fines for ongoing out-of-court violations of a complex injunction,
stating that "[w]here a single judge, rather than a legislature, declares a particular
sanction to be civil or criminal, such deference to the state court's finding is less
appropriate").
's' Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2805 (1993).
182 See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989).
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for the Excessive Fines Clause. Reasoning that the distinguishing
quality of a fine under the Eighth Amendment is not whether it is
criminal or civil, but whether it constitutes "payment to a sovereign
as punishment for some offense,"' the Court found that the civil
forfeiture of Austin's home under the federal drug forfeiture statute
met this standard. Together, Halper and Austin create18 a three-
tiered hierarchy of civil sanctions: (1) sanctions that are not
punitive, which require only the safeguards typically afforded to civil
litigants; (2) punitive civil sanctions, which trigger constitutional
limits on the multiplicity and severity of punishment;8 5 and (3)
sanctions that are essentially criminal, which activate all constitu-
tional rights normally associated with criminal cases.
18 6
183 Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989)).
"a Professor Mann has argued that Halper resurrected, rather than created, this
approach. See Mann, supra note 1, at 1842; see also Clark, supra note 179, at 393 n.45
(noting early cases that applied doublejeopardy protections to forfeiture and money-
penalty cases).
" The Court may also adopt the Halper/Austin test to determine which civil
sanctions trigger the protections of the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I of the
Constitution, as lower courts have already begun to do. See Bae v. Shalala, 44 F.3d
489, 496 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that ex post facto analysis "closely parallels" the
analysis used by the Court in Austin and rejecting the multi-factor test of Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963)); Martel v. Fridovich, 14 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.
1993) (finding that release eligibility rule changes were related to community safety,
not retribution or deterrence, and thus did not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause);
Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 393 (NJ. 1995) (rejecting the Mendoza-Martinez test in
favor of the Halper/Austin test for ex post facto issues). But see Artway v. Attorney
Gen., 876 F. Supp. 666, 673 n.8 (D.N.J. 1995) (rejecting Halper and Austin as the
appropriate test for punitiveness under the Ex Post Facto Clause). The president's
power under Article III to grant reprieves and pardons for "offences" against the
United States may also be interpreted to coincide with the double jeopardy limits on
twice prosecuting "offences." But see Evan Caminker, Comment, The Constitutionality
of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 370-71 & nn.150-54 (1989) (arguing that
clemency does not encompass qui tam actions).
Whether the Court will further expand the list of constitutional safeguards
applicable to this in-between category is beyond the scope of this Article. For a
sampling of discussion, see United States v. Private Sanitation Indus. Ass'n, 44 F.3d
1082, 1085 (2d Cir. 1995) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (arguing that a civil RICO action
is "quasi-criminal" and the barring district court's decision to grant summary
judgment in favor of the government as a matter of due process); Commonwealth v.
$9847.00, 637 A.2d 736, 746 (Pa. Commw. Ct.) (concluding that a civil forfeiture
award that amounts to punishment entitles a defendant to the right to appointed
counsel, as a matter of due process), appealgranted, 656 A.2d 993 (Pa. 1994); Coffee,
supra note 160, at 1891 (arguing that certain punitive civil sanctions require the right
to ajury trial in front of an Article IIIjudge); Jay A. Rosenberg, Note, Constitutional
Rights and Civil Forfeiture Actions, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 390, 399, 404-05 (1988)
(advocating that courts extend certain Fifth Amendment guarantees and the right to
counsel to such cases); supra note 1 (citing sources).
"' The Court's reasoning in Halper and Austin implicitly rejected what is perhaps
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The Court also set out in Halper and Austin a viable framework
for determining which civil sanctions are "punishment" subject to
both double jeopardy and Eighth Amendment limits. Once again,
the Court's test starts with a presumption: sanctions denoted as
civil or administrative by the legislature are presumptively nonpun-
itive. This presumption can be rebutted in two ways. A civil
sanction is punitive if the defendant can demonstrate either (1) that
the statute authorizing the sanction cannot "fairly be said to serve"
any remedial goal, or (2) assuming the statute does makes some
attempt to calibrate sanctions to a remedial purpose, that the
particular sanction in question was imposed in a form or amount
unrelated to that purpose.8 7  A remedial purpose is anything
other than deterrence and retribution, the two quintessential goals
of criminal punishment.' 8 In Halper, the $130,000 in penalties
that the government sought ($2000 for each of Halper's sixty-five
claims) bore no rational relationship to the only plausible remedial
aim of the Act-compensating the United States for its losses from
fraud. That portion of the $130,000 that exceeded rough compen-
sation for Halper's fraud ($585 plus the costs of investigating and
prosecuting Halper's offenses, estimated to be at most $16,000) was
punishment.
8 9
the simplest method of distinguishing between criminal and civil sanctions, most
recently advocated by Professor Mary Cheh in her article, supra note 1, at 1330, 1348-
60. Cheh reasoned that the essential difference between criminal and civil
proceedings is not legislative purpose, penalty size, or probable stigma, but rather
that criminal proceedings, unlike civil proceedings, are "ceremonies of guilt
adjudication" that "express society's ideology of individual free will and personal
responsibility and serve as a reaffirmation of moral rules." Id. at 1330. Thus, she
concluded that a sanction can only be criminal "if formally intended to be and
denominated as such" by the legislature. Id. at 1360.
... See Halper, 490 U.S. at 447-48 ("[T]he determination whether a given civil
sanction constitutes punishment in the relevant sense requires a particularized
assessment of the penalty imposed and the purposes that the penalty may fairly be
said to serve."); see also Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169 (stating that one factor distinguishing
criminal from civil sanctions is "whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purposes assigned" to it).
18
8 See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806 (stating that if a sanction "can only be explained
as serving in part to punish," the sanction is not purely remedial); Halper, 490 U.S.
at 448-49 ("[A] defendant who already has been punished ... may not be subjected
to an additional civil sanction to the extent that sanction may not be characterized as
remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution."); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY 2-3, 8-9 (1968) (considering retribution and deterrence "among the
conceivable aims" of a system of punishment); HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF
THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 26 (1968) (noting that the two aims of punishment are
prevention of undesired conduct and retribution for perceived wrongdoing).
189 See Halper, 490 U.S. at 452.
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In Austin, the Court applied this distinction again, to the civil
forfeiture of a home under the federal drug forfeiture statute.
Although the government argued that the provision was designed
to achieve the remedial aims of protecting the community from the
threat of continued drug activity and compensating the United
States for its drug war efforts,19 the Court disagreed. A home, it
observed, absent some showing beyond that required by the
forfeiture statute, poses no continuing threat of illegal activity,
unlike contraband.19 1 Moreover, any relationship between govern-
ment expense and the value of assets forfeited under the statute was
purely coincidental." 2
190 See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811 (reciting the government's argument that
forfeiture under the statute was remedial because removed "instruments" of the drug
trade financed the government's fight against drugs); see also United States v. Santaro,
866 F.2d 1538, 1544 (4th Cir. 1989) ("These remedial purposes [of civil forfeiture]
include removing the incentive to engage in the drug trade by denying drug dealers
the proceeds of illgotten gains, stripping the drug trade of its instrumentalities,
including money, and financing Government programs designed to eliminate drug-
trafficking." (quoting United States v. 2639 Meetinghouse, 633 F. Supp. 979,994 (E.D.
Pa. 1986))).
191 See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811 (noting that possession of real property must be
distinguished from the criminal activities that may take place on the propertyjust as
contraband has been distinguished in Court precedents from the automobiles that
may carry it); see also Marc B. Stahl, Asset Forfeiture, Burdens of Proof and the War on
Drugs, 83J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 274,317-18 & n.190 (1992) (arguing that unless
the property is necessary for the wrongful conduct and difficult to replace, its
forfeiture cannot bejustified by an ostensible remedial goal of depriving criminals of
the "tools by which they conduct their illegal activities"). The forfeiture of
contraband-items that may not lawfully be possessed-has beenjustified as advancing
the government's interest in keeping dangerous items out of the hands of the public.
See, e.g., People ex rel. Waller v. Seeburg Slot Machs., 641 N.E.2d 997, 1005 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1994) (finding that because "slot machines are contraband ... and, thus,
inherently illegal, the defendant has no right to them and he cannot argue that their
forfeiture constitutes an excessive fine"), cert. denied, 647 N.E.2d 1016 (Ill. 1995);
Clark,supra note 179, at 478 (arguing that forfeiture of "contraband whose possession
by any private citizen is unlawful" does not punish because such property is never
legally owned); Stahl, supra, at 306 nn.130-31 (terming forfeiture of contraband
"remedial").
192 See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812 n.14 (stating that, because the value of forfeited
assets can vary greatly, any relationship between the government's costs and the
penalty is "merely coincidental"). The Halper/Austin approach is similar to the test
advocated by Professor Clark nearly 20 years ago, except that Professor Clark
advanced a rebuttable presumption of punishment whenever a sanction singled out
criminal offenders. See Clark, supra note 179, at 459-62 (advocating a purpose test
under which the government, upon a showing that a sanction burdens those who have
committed a criminal offense, must demonstrate that its nonpunitive purpose "was
not capable of fulfillment in a way that would not have placed special burdens on
persons who commit forbidden acts," and noting that the government's "alternative
explanation of a sanction must be couched in terms that retribution and deterrence
1995]
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Several observations lead me to endorse this method of
distinguishing between those penalties that escape Eighth Amend-
ment review and those that do not. First, the Halper/Austin test is
consistent with the premise of this Article that constitutional limits
on multiplicity and proportionality must be considered together, as
a unified limit on total punishment. If the Eighth Amendment is to
serve as a backstop to check the power that legislatures enjoy under
the Double Jeopardy Clause, it is appropriate to employ the same
concept of "punishment" for both."'3
Second, the Halper/Austin definition of civil punishment
imposes a meaningful and sensible limit on total punishment,
without denying to government enforcers the flexibility to choose
that combination of civil, administrative, and criminal penalties that
is most effective and efficient. The aspect of Halper that has proved
most crippling to regulators-and most at odds with the rest of
double jeopardy law-is the Court's decision to deprive them of the
opportunity to pursue all penalties authorized by the legislature. It
is this "one-hit-and-you're-out" ruling of Halper that I argued earlier
has no place in double jeopardy doctrine; I have no quibble with the
Court's efforts to classify some civil sanctions as punishment."'
Removing the "one-hit-and-you're-out" rule of Halper from double
jeopardy doctrine allows prosecutors and regulators to seek more
than one penalty against a defendant for his wrong, yet it doesn't
leave defendants at sea without a raft. Civil punishment is subject
to the presumption against multiple penalties under the Double
Jeopardy Clause as well as to the due process limits discussed
earlier. Furthermore, when neither due process nor double
jeopardy bars successive penalties, the Eighth Amendment may. In
alone do not fulfill").
193 Most courts and commentators have assumed that any award qualifying as a
"fine" for Eighth Amendment purposes under Austin will also be punishment for
double jeopardy purposes under Halper. See; e.g., Rudstein, supra note 70, at 636
(stating that Austin indicated that whatever constitutes "punishment" for Eighth
Amendment purposes also constitutes "punishment" for Fifth Amendment double
jeopardy purposes). But see Henning, supra note 1, at 66-67 (concluding that the
threshold for fines under Austin is lower than that for punishment under Halper).
19 This point bears repeating- I agree that the civil sanction in Halper was
punitive; I disagree that its imposition after conviction violated the DoubleJeopardy
Clause. Because Halper's civil penalty and his conviction were both punishment, and
because the elements of each "offence" were identical, it is correct to presume,
initially, that Congress intended that courts use criminal and civil penalties
alternatively rather than in tandem. But proof of contrary congressional purpose
clearly rebutted this presumption in that case.
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short, the Constitution may not save an offender from legislatively
authorized multiple punishment, but it always rescues him from
legislatively authorized excessive punishment.
My last reason for supporting the Halper/Austin distinction
between punitive and nonpunitive civil sanctions is its relative
simplicity. It has two steps. First, a court must decide if a statute
may fairly be said to serve any remedial goal at all. A judge need
not guess what motives the legislature or government plaintiff had
in mind when enacting or applying a given provision, an endeavor
that would lead to judicial speculation and the adoption of boiler-
plate preambles. Instead, the judge must examine what Justice
Kennedy has termed "objective factors""'5 in order to determine
whether the sanction is rationally related to potential remedial
purposes. These factors include the basis for the penalty calcula-
tions, the legislative history of the sanction, 196 and any statutory
requirement of culpability on the part of the person sanctioned." 7
If the statute sets sanctions without regard to any remedial goal, then
every penalty imposed pursuant to the statute is punishment.
Statutory sanctions that fall into this per se punitive category
include forfeitures of noncontraband instrumentalities of crime, as
in Austin, and those portions of punitive damage awards paid to
states under state-sharing statutes. As the Court in Austin observed,
it would not be "fair" to characterize 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(8),
providing for the forfeiture of real estate that has "facilitated"
narcotics activity, as serving a remedial purpose. 198  A judge or
prosecutor cannot strip punishment of this sort of its punitive
character simply by offering an after-the-fact accounting of govern-
ment losses or other remedial explanations that happen to justify a
195 Halper, 490 U.S. at 453 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
196 See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811 ("The legislative history of § 881 confirms the
punitive nature of these provisions.").
197 See id. at 2812 (noting the "historical understanding of forfeiture as punish-
ment," and the "focus" of the statutory provisions "on the culpability of the owner");
id. at 2814 (ScaliaJ., concurring) (noting that under the statute at issue, the "owner
must not be completely without fault").
... See id. & n.14 (rejecting a case-by-case approach to determining whether a
civil forfeiture constitutes "punishment"); id. at 2812-14 (noting that forfeitures
under § 881(a) are "fines" because the value of the property forfeited is unrelated
to the offense and because the statute requires some culpability on the part of the
owner); see also United States v. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210, 1219-20 (9th Cir. 1994)
(interpreting Austin as focusing on the forfeiture statute, rather than on the
particular award or conduct allegedly punished), amended on other grounds by 56 F.3d
41 (9th Cir. 1995), and petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3161 (U.S. Aug. 28, 1995)
(No. 95-346).
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particular penalty under the statute, because the test is one of
legislative purpose as well as effect. Accordingly, the Court in
Austin correctly refused to contrast the value of the Austins'
forfeited assets with the government's costs in order to determine
whether the forfeiture was punishment. Just as a criminal fine does
not become civil simply because its amount happens to resemble
government losses, the forfeiture of an asset under a punitive
statute does not cease to be punishment just because it happens to
roughly equal the costs of detection and enforcement to the
government plaintiff."'
The majority of statutes authorizing civil sanctions do, how-
ever, contain objective factors demonstrating remedial design.
Sanctions under the False Claims Act, for instance, are at least
somewhat dependent upon actual damages to the government.
Thus, it is fair to say that the False Claims Act serves the
remedial goal of compensation. Under such statutes, not every
resulting sanction is punitive, so the Court requires a second step.
To decide whether a sanction imposed under this type of statute
is punishment under either the Fifth or the Eighth Amendments,
the judge must consider whether the particular sanction exceeds
the statute's remedial purposes."' In Halper, the sanction could
not be justified by the remedial purpose of the False Claims
Act.201 Another example of civil punishment is a civil contempt
1" See, e.g., United States v. McCaslin, 863 F. Supp. 1299, 1302 (W.D. Wash. 1994)
("Even if the value of the property forfeited happens to be the same as or less than
the government's costs of prosecution, the forfeiture is still categorized as punish-
ment because the relationship is accidental.").
21 See Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49 (stating that determination of "punishment"
demands a "particularized assessment of the penalty imposed and the purposes that
the penalty may fairly be said to serve"); United States v. Furlett, 781 F. Supp. 536,
543-47 (N.D. 11. 1991) (considering first whether the purpose of the statute was
entirely punitive, and, if not, whether actual sanctions are so punitive in effect as to
negate remedial purpose, and concluding that the fines imposed by the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) were not so overwhelmingly disproportionate
to the CFTC's investigation and litigation expenses as to be punitive), aff'd, 974 F.2d
839 (7th Cir. 1992).
20' See Halper, 490 U.S. at 452 ("The Court approximated the government's
expenses at no more than $16,000 as compared to the asserted liability of Halper in
excess of $130,000."). The award in Halper was punishment because of its
disproportionality with the purported purposes of the statute. When a conflict exists
between what is authorized by a statute's text and structure and what is authorized
by the legislature's purported purpose, it is appropriate to assume that the legislature
had in mind at least those additional purposes that could explain the text. Otherwise,
Halper could have challenged his penalty under the statute itself, as beyond what the
legislature actually authorized, rather than under the Fifth Amendment. At least one
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sanction set in an amount greater than that needed to coerce future
compliance with court orders, or greater than that needed to
compensate the government for the expenses of dealing with the
contemnor's misconduct (the only remedial purposes that the civil
contempt statute may be said to serve).0 2 Similarly, an order of
forfeiture of the alleged proceeds of crime cannot escape the label
of "punishment" if the government has no proof tracing the
forfeited assets to the crime, and an order barring a defendant from
further contracting privileges is punishment if it cannot be
explained by the goals of preserving professional integrity, protect-
ing the public, or eliminating corrupting influences from govern-
ment dealings.
203
commentator has argued that the penalty in Halper violated the False Claims Act
itself, not the Constitution. See Thomas, supra note 55 (manuscript at 72-74).
202 As the Court has explained:
A contempt fine... is considered civil and remedial if it either "coerce[s]
the defendant into compliance with the court's order, [or] ... compen-
sate[s] the complainant for losses sustained. Where a fine is not compensa-
tory, it is civil only if the contemnor is afforded an opportunity to purge.
... At no point did the trial court attempt to calibrate the fines to
damages caused by the union's contumacious activities or indicate that the
fines were "to compensate the complainant for losses sustained." The
nonparty governments, in turn, never requested any compensation or
presented any evidence regarding their injuries ....
International Union v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552,2558,2561 (1994) (citations omitted).
For another case considering monetary coercion toward a remedial goal, see
Alexander v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 644 So. 2d 238, 244 (La. Ct.
App. 1994) (finding that a "conditional" fine of $5000, payable if the defendant fails
the licensing examination or violates the terms of the licensing board order, is not
punishment for double jeopardy purposes, because it is designed to "protect the
public whom he may seek to serve"), writ denied, 649 So. 2d 423 (La.), and cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 64 (1995).
o Cf Bae v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 489, 496 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that the drug
company president's permanent debarment from service in drug manufacturing
industry was not disproportionate to "the remedial goals of the [Generic Drug
Enforcement Act of 1992] or to the magnitude of his wrongdoing"); United States v.
Bizzell, 921 F.2d 263, 267 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding debarment remedial, and noting
"[i]t is the clear intent of debarment to purge government programs of corrupt
influences and to prevent improper dissipation of public funds"); Clark, supra note
179, at 484-86 (concluding that disbarment could be punitive but noting that
disbarment of offenders typically advances the remedial goal of "preserving public
confidence in the profession"); Rudstein, supra note 70, at 640-45 (discussing cases
involving revocation of license to practice in a profession or exclusion from
participating as government contractor and concluding that such sanctions are
remedial).
Likewise, a civil award under a statute designed in part to provide compensation
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Three types of sanctions, however, continue to trouble lower
courts that now must apply the Halper/Austin distinction: cases in
which the government seeks to forfeit proceeds of criminal
activities,20 4 cases in which the government seeks to forfeit cash or
other assets that a defendant concealed or failed to report, and
to victims may be punitive if the penalty is never paid to the victims. Cf. United
States v. Blodgett, No. 93-3652 MN, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 21564, at *2 (8th Cir.
Aug. 15, 1994) (finding that criminal prosecution for fraud following FTC seizure
under 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(2), 53(b) (1988) of assets in order to provide restitution to
his fraud victims did not violate his double jeopardy rights, noting "a civil sanction
designed for victim restitution is not a criminal penalty unless the sanction bears no
rational relation to the goal of compensation" (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 1414 (1995); see also Charney, supra note 179, at 499 (arguing that sanction is
compensatory only if recouped by individuals injured and in an amount related to
their loss); Clark, supra note 179, at 470 n.270, 472 n.275 (citing cases arguing that
a sanction is compensatory when the government collects funds on behalf of specific
individuals).
204 Compare United States v. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210, 1220-21 (9th Cir. 1994)
(finding that all forfeitures, even of proceeds, under 21 U.S.C. § 881 are punitive),
amended on other grounds by 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995), and petition for cert. filed, 64
U.S.L.W. 3161 (U.S. Aug. 28, 1995) (No. 95-346) and Quinones-Ruiz v. United States,
864 F. Supp. 983, 988-89 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (applying Austin to reach the conclusion
that forfeiture under 31 U.S.C. § 5317(c) (1988) is punitive) and United States v. 4204
Thorndale Ave., No. 92 C 3744, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17415, at *27-28 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 23, 1994) (concluding that because 21 U.S.C. § 8 81(a)(6) is not limited to actual
proceeds of crime, forfeiture under this section is subject to the Excessive Fines
Clause) and People v. $31,500.00, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 836, 843 n.17 (Ct. App. 1995)
(suggesting that forfeiture of proceeds under state statute is punitive) and Stahl, supra
note 191, at 307 n.135 (arguing that any forfeiture of proceeds under 21 U.S.C. § 881
is not remedial, claiming that its punitive purpose is demonstrated by: (1) the ability
of innocent owners to avoid forfeiture of the fruits of others' illegal activities and (2)
the statute's failure to limit forfeiture of proceeds to assets that can be traced entirely
to illegally obtained funds in that § 881(a)-(b) allows for forfeiture of entire assets that
are purchased only partially with the proceeds of prohibited activity) and id. at 314
n.180 (arguing that forfeiture of proceeds cannot be justified by the argument that
the owner never really had a right to own the proceeds in the first place, because the
legal right to own the asset has no impact on the actual deterrent effect of the
forfeiture) with United States v. Alexander, 32 F.3d 1231, 1236 (8th Cir. 1994)
("Forfeiture of proceeds cannot be considered punishment, and thus, subject to the
excessive fines clause, as it simply parts the owner from the fruits of the criminal
activity.") and United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 300 (5th Cir.) (stating that
forfeiture of proceeds is not punitive), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994) and United
States v. Borromeo, 995 F.2d 23, 27 (4th Cir.) (same), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on
other grounds, I F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 1993) and District Attorney v. ladarola, 623
N.Y.S.2d 999, 1005 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (collecting conflicting cases and concluding that
forfeiture of proceeds is not punitive) and Kathleen F. Brickey, RICO Forfeitures As
"Excessive Fines" or "Cruel and Unusual Punishments", 35 VILL. L. REV. 905, 915 (1990)
(concluding that forfeiture of fruits of crime can never be excessive because they were
never the property of the owner) and Memorandum, supra note 21, at B-584.138-231
to 138-237 (stating that the forfeiture of proceeds cannot possibly be considered
"punishment" or a "fine" under the Eighth Amendment).
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cases involving taxes on illegal activities or goods. The proceeds
cases turn on whether depriving a defendant of assets he had no
legal right to own is a remedial or a punitive objective.2 0 5 The tax
and disclosure cases raise a different question, one that should have
been resolved by a careful reading of Austin: When is it fair to say
that a sanction serves the remedial goal of compensating the
government for its costs? Judging from the number of cases
addressing this issue and the variety of approaches to its solution,
even among Justices of the Supreme Court, it warrants further
consideration here.
b. Containing Compensation As a Catch-All Remedial Justyfication
The distinction between sanctions that can "fairly be said" to
further the remedial goal of compensation and those that cannot is
not a problem in many cases. For instance, it made sense for the
Court in Halper to compare the sanction there to government loss-
the penalty provisions of the False Claims Act were calibrated to
actual losses caused by the defendant's culpable acts. But other
sanctions, like those in Austin, are set without reference to govern-
ment loss. Unfortunately, courts examining a variety of civil
sanctions have ignored the relevance of Austin, and instead have
mimicked the reasoning in Halper, sometimes fabricating a compen-
satory purpose where it does not exist.
Consider the disclosure cases first. Some courts have concluded
that the government does not punish a property owner when it
forfeits assets that the owner fails to report in violation of a variety
of disclosure laws, so long as the forfeited assets roughly compen-
sate the government for its costs of detection and investigation.
20 6
... I tend to agree with the majority of courts that have examined this question
that confiscating the proceeds of crime, like confiscating contraband, serves remedial
as well as punitive goals. See also the Court's discussion of the forfeitability of the
proceeds of criminal activity in Caplan & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491
U.S. 617,627-28 (1989). The question is unavoidable in the face of a double jeopardy
challenge, but an Eighth Amendment challenge to an order forfeiting proceeds offers
an easier tack, at least if the forfeiture of proceeds is the only "punishment" for
defendant's wrong. Even assuming that the forfeiture of proceeds is a fine, the
amount is easily warranted by the punitive goal of deterrence. Indeed, effective
deterrence would require at the very least that the defendant be deprived of the
profits of his crime.
206 Compare United States v. $69,292, No. 93-56545, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 20701,
at *7 (9th Cir. Aug. 7 1995) (concluding that forfeiture under 31 U.S.C. § 5317 is
punitive) and United States v. $145,139, 18 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir.) (holding, over the
dissent of Judge Kearse, that the forfeiture of undeclared funds under 31 U.S.C.
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What these courts overlook is that the amount of sanctions under
these statutes varies not with the amount of government expense,
but only with the value of the assets that the defendant fails to
report, a measure as unrelated to the goal of compensating the
government as those controlling the forfeiture of "instrumentalities"
in Austin.2 7 Without some calibration to government loss, forfei-
tures under these statutes cannot be rationalized as compensatory
any more than the forfeiture in Austin.
A look at the tax cases, in particular at the Justices' opinions in
Kurth Ranch, reveals the same flawed reasoning. In Kurth Ranch, the
Court considered whether the Double Jeopardy Clause barred
Montana from collecting a tax on illegally possessed marijuana, after
the taxpayer had already been convicted and sentenced for the
crime of possessing the same marijuana. The amount of the tax was
set by statute to be the greater of either ten percent of the market
value of the marijuana or $100 per ounce. There was no evidence
§ 5317(c) did not violate either the DoubleJeopardy or the Excessive Fines Clauses
because the money was the instrumentality by which the crime was committed), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 72 (1994) and United States v. $50,000, No. 93-C-3874, 1994 WL
75145, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 1994) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to
forfeiture of currency under 31 U.S.C. § 5317 (a), reasoning that forfeiture of items
involved in customs violations is wholly remedial and serves as a "reasonable form of
liquidated damages") and High Star Toys, Inc. v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 176, 181
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (concluding that the Consumer Products Safety Commission was not
barred by Austin from seeking civil penalties for violation of the Federal Hazardous
Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1263 (1988), after Customs had already forfeited some
of the offending product under statute providing for forfeiture of any illegally
introduced merchandise, 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c), reasoning that the forfeiture of a
portion of the offending goods here is different than the forfeiture of noncontraband
separate property used to facilitate an illegal transaction) with Quinones-Ruiz v.
United States, 864 F. Supp. 983, 991 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (finding that forfeiture of
unreported funds is punishment barred by Halper after transporter/owner has already
been convicted of failing to report the cash and has been sentenced to two years
probation and a $50 fine). See also United States v. Haywood, 864 F. Supp. 502, 507
(W.D.N.C. 1994) (finding that the purpose of forfeiting laundered funds was to
"recoup the loss from the money laundering scheme" and that the amount of the
government's loss was equal to the amount of funds that would have been forfeited
as illegal proceeds had they not been laundered and kept secret from government
detection).
20 A similar situation arises when the government seizes cash used in bribery-the
bribe money may have been legally acquired, and its amount is not necessarily related
to any remedial purpose of the government. See e.g., United States v. Slusher, No.
92 Cr 322-02 (CSH), 1995 WL 417077, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.July 13, 1995) (ordering the
parties to address in a subsequent hearing the legal question "whether or not [seizure
of bribe money under] 18 U.S.C. § 3666 may fairly be characterized as remedial," in
a case in which the bribe money was received by a supervisor of the New York State
Department of Motor Vehicles).
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that the Montana legislature designed this assessment to approxi-
mate public losses from a taxpayer's drug possession. 208 Instead,
like the forfeiture provisions in Austin, any correlation between the
state's actual expenses from the defendant's drug activity and the
tax assessed was entirely coincidental. Both the majority and Chief
Justice Rehnquist in his dissent recognized the absence of any
calibration between sanction and compensatory purpose.2 09 Even
so, the Court could not resist going on to consider whether the
threatened tax exceeded potential government expenses, leaving
open the argument that even when compensation for such expenses
is a completely fictitious legislative goal, government expenditures
are always relevant to the characterization of a penalty as remedial
or punitive.210 In her dissent, Justice O'Connor went even fur-
ther, embracing the comparison between government loss and
' AsJustice Kennedy suggested, seesupra text accompanying note 195, preambles
or statements of purpose in statutes cannot alone establish a compensatory rationale.
Otherwise, boilerplate language would immunize even the most punitive civil
sanctions from review. Even if such language was relevant, the Montana legislature
noted in its preamble only that "some" of the revenues from the tax would "be
devoted to continuing investigative efforts directed toward the identification, arrest,
and prosecution of individuals involved in conducting illegal continuing criminal
enterprises that affect the distribution of dangerous drugs in Montana," Department
of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1941 n.4 (1994), not that the tax amount
itself approximated government loss from this activity.
"9 See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1948 (stating that examining whether the tax
exceeds rough compensation would be "inappropriate" on the facts, since the tax
statute serves entirely different purposes). ChiefJustice Rehnquist put it best:
[T]he reasoning quite properly employed in Halper to decide whether the
exaction was remedial or punitive simply does not work in the case of a tax
statute. Tax statutes need not be based on any benefit accorded to the
taxpayer or on any damage or cost incurred by the Government as a result
of the taxpayer's activities. Thus, in analyzing the instant tax statute, the
inquiry into the State's "damages caused by the [Kurth's] wrongful conduct"
*.. is unduly restrictive.
Id. at 1950 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also Clark, supra note
179, at 468 ("[A] compensatory purpose should perhaps be recognized only if that
purpose affirmatively appears on the face of the law and some formula is provided
to estimate the sum of compensation due by reference to actual state costs.").
210 See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1948 ("Even if it were proper to permit such a
showing, Montana has not claimed that its assessment in this case even remotely
approximates the cost of investigating, apprehending, and prosecuting the Kurths, or
that it roughly relates to any actual damages that they caused the State."). Noting
that the tax was imposed at an "unrivaled" "high rate," that it had an "obvious
deterrent purpose," that it was exacted only after the taxpayer had been arrested for
the conduct that gave rise to the tax obligation, and that it was imposed on goods that
the taxpayer had no legal right to possess and that had already been confiscated, the
Court concluded that Montana's drug tax was no normal revenue law. Id. at 1946-48.
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sanction amount as the only permissible method for drawing the
punitive/nonpunitive distinction, on the facts of Kurth Ranch or
seemingly in any case.
211
The cost of apprehending, prosecuting, and incarcerating drug
offenders may be a handy stand-in for some sort of ceiling on state
taxing authority, but utility is no substitute for relevance. If the tax
in Kurth Ranch was punishment, it was not because the amount
assessed had no relationship to compensation, a purpose the statute
did not purport to achieve, but because it exceeded other legitimate
remedial purposes that the tax could be fairly interpreted to
accomplish. Chief Justice Rehnquist had the right idea. He first
reviewed the structure and language of the tax provision and found
that the tax had the nonpenal purpose of raising revenue and had
little to do with compensating the state for drug detection and
enforcement costs. 2 12  Using similar types of taxes imposed on
lawful products as a comparison for what tax assessments are
reasonable given the remedial purpose of raising revenue with
excise or property taxes,21 he concluded that Montana's tax was
not punitive.214 His method was more faithful to Halper and Austin
than that of any other Justice.
215
211 Although baldly stating that Montana's legislature "determined that $100 per
ounce of marijuana is an appropriate estimate of its costs of drug control," id. at
1954,Justice O'Connor reasoned that the defendant failed to show that the amount
of the tax was not rationally related to Montana's compensatory objectives:
Our double jeopardy cases make clear that a civil sanction will be consid-
ered punishment to the extent that it serves only the purposes of retribution
and deterrence, as opposed to furthering any nonpunitive objective. This
will obtain when, as in Halper, the amount of the sanction is "overwhelming-
ly disproportionate" to the damages caused by the wrongful conduct and
thus "is not rationally related to the goal of making the Government whole."
Id. at 1953 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
212 See id. at 1949 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
213 The United States, too, argued that a tax on illegal goods can be "punitive" but
only when it is not of the type and amount "ordinarily imposed on legal goods." Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Kurth Ranch (No. 93-
144); see also Reply Brief of Petitioner at 14-15 Kurth Ranch (No. 93-144) (citing
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937) (approving a tax 20 times the value
of the illegal commodity) and Excise Act of 1791, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 199 (taxing whiskey
at over 60% of value)).
214 See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1952 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
215 The Kurths argued that Montana's legislature could not have been serious
about raising revenue from the possession of drugs because it taxed only possessors
who were arrested or convicted of the crime of possessing drugs. See Brief of
Respondents at 10, Kurth Ranch (No. 93-144) (arguing that if the tax were solely for
a revenue raising purpose, "it could have been carefully tailored to achieve that
purpose without being necessarily linked to a criminal prosecution"). But this cannot
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The eagerness of Justice O'Connor and many lower courts to
paper over sanctions that should be marked as punishment with a
compensatory label216 is easily traceable to the central flaw of
Halper-its prohibition of legislatively authorized multiple punish-
ments. No doubt it is more expedient to avoid the consequences of
that rule by refusing to find that a penalty constitutes punishment
than to challenge the rule directly.217 ConsiderJustice O'Connor's
be right. Any civil sanction limited to defendants who participate in otherwise illegal
activity would be punitive under this view, even though there are legitimate
nonpunitive reasons to seek compensation, revoke licenses, recover lost revenues,
ensure future compliance, provide restitution for victims, and so on from those who
are arrested and convicted, rather than from all possible offenders. See Allen v.
Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 370 (1986) ("That the State has chosen not to apply the
[Sexually Dangerous Persons] Act to the larger class of mentally ill persons who might
be found sexually dangerous does not somehow transform a civil proceeding into a
criminal one."). Even the Court was not prepared to rely on the statute's isolation
of criminal offenders alone as proof of its punitive nature. See Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at
1947 nn.19-20. Moreover, even if this was a feature that, on its own, was sufficient to
support a finding that a particular sanction was punitive and not remedial, it cannot
be a necessaty feature of civil punishment. For example, the forfeiture provisions in
Austin were punitive, but they affected criminals and noncriminals alike. A hapless
owner's negligence in allowing his property to be used in crime can fall far short of
establishing criminal liability but may subject him to forfeiture.
216 Several courts have tried to explain civil forfeiture as compensatory. See, e.g.,
United States v. United States Fishing Vessel Maylin, 725 F. Supp. 1222, 1223 (S.D.
Fla. 1989) (deeming forfeiture of a $55,000 boat rationally related to injury caused
to the government by fish and game violations, so that forfeiture under 16 U.S.C.
§ 3374(a)(2) (1988) did not constitute doublejeopardy following criminal conviction
of owner); Freeman v. 1215 E. 21st St., No. CX-94-484, 1994 WL 440263, at *3
(Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 1994) ("[Fjorfeiture might violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause unless it reflects no more than the actual costs to the state due to his criminal
conduct."); Ex parte Camara, 893 S.W.2d 553, 558 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that
the defendants failed to show that the forfeiture of their mobile home and lot before
their criminal prosecutions lacked a rational relation to the state's loss); see also Ex
parte State Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 654 So. 2d 1149, 1154 (Ala. 1994)
(finding that a $500 penalty recently imposed upon a state liquor licensee for selling
to minors was "rationally related to the State's cost of regulating its licensees,"
although a dissentingjustice argued that the statute authorizing the fine had nothing
to do with compensating the state for any costs or losses, and that the amount of the
fine was therefore irrelevant to the determination of whether it was punishment).
217 Also tripping up some courts is the Court's reference in Halper to the rarity of
the case in which a civil penalty will amount to punishment. See United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989). This statement is true enough in the context of
penalties under the False Claims Act because compensation explains all but the rare
sanction under that statute. But the characterization does not apply to penalties like
those under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988), providing for the forfeiture of real estate
used or intended to be used to facilitate narcotics violations. As the Court observed
in Austin, any relationship between the amount of a penalty under this provision and
purported remedial purposes is purely coincidental-every penalty, notjust the rare
case, involves punishment. See e.g., People ex rel. Waller v. 1989 Ford F350 Truck,
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alarm that the Court's decision in Kurth Ranch would bar states
entirely from taxing criminalized conduct.2 8  A better way to
relieve this concern is to oust Halper's "one-hit-and-you're-out" rule
from the Double Jeopardy Clause, not eviscerate, as her test does,
the Court's admirable attempt to distinguish punitive from
nonpunitive sanctions under the Constitution."'9
Under Justice O'Connor's test, the amount of government loss
caised by any given wrong can be manipulated with so little effort
that almost any sanction, it seems, can be explained as compensa-
tion. The test would classify as rough remedial justice any civil
award against any defendant involved in drug activity, as long as
that award does not exceed that defendant's fair share of not only
the state's drug enforcement budget (past, present, and future) but
also drug abuse education, deterrence, and treatment expenses.
220
642 N.E.2d 460, 464-66 (Ill. 1994) (interpreting Austin to render in rem forfeitures
under a statute that resembles 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) or (7) to be subject to the
Excessive Fines Clause).218 See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1953 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
219 It is my position that even if the tax in Kurth Ranch was punitive, its imposition
did not deprive the Kurths of any right secured to them by the Double Jeopardy
Clause. Because the Montana legislature clearly intended both penalties to be
imposed cumulatively, any presumption that the legislature intended the penalties to
be alternative was rebutted.
'2 See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1953 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting) (noting that the
"State and Federal Governments spend vast sums on drug control activities," that
"Montana has a legitimate nonpunitive interest in defraying the costs of such
activities," and that the "Kurths are directly responsible for some of these expendi-
tures-the costs of detecting, investigating, and raiding their operation, the price of
prosecuting [and incarcerating] them.., and part of the money spent on drug abuse
education, deterrence, and treatment"). Justice O'Connor recognized that because
"measuring the costs actually imposed by every participant in the illegal drug trade
would... [be too] complex," the state was entitled to estimate. Id. at 1954; see also
United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 299 (5th Cir.) (noting that the forfeiture was not
disproportionate because illegal drug sales produce up to $100 billion per year, while
costing government and society up to $120 billion per year), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
574 (1994); United States v. 40 Moon Hill Rd., 884 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1989)
(allowing forfeiture of nearly 18 acres of land, home, and other structures, reasoning
that "the billions the government is being forced to spend upon investigation and
enforcement-not to mention the costs of drug-related crime and drug abuse
treatment, rehabilitation, and prevention-easily justify a recovery in excess of the
strict value of the property actually devoted to growing ... marijuana"); United States
v. Haywood, 864 F. Supp. 502, 508 n.8 (W.D.N.C. 1994) (finding that forfeiture of
$280,000 was not punishment, reasoning that "[gliven the vast sums of money spent
by State and Federal Governments on drug control activities and the size of the...
drug conspiracy, the fine involved here is simply not disproportionate to the damages
caused by the wrongful conduct"); Commonwealth v. Wingait Farms, 659 A.2d 584,
590-91 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995) (finding the forfeiture of farm, vehicles, and horses
not punitive, and noting that the "potential damage to society from the use of
PORTIONING PUNISHMENT
The State of Montana in its brief to the Court in Kurth Ranch noted
that one study estimated in 1980 that "the total direct and indirect
cost of drugs on society was almost 47 billion dollars."221 It would
be hard to come up with a dollar limit over which any drug-related
forfeiture, tax, or other sanction becomes punitive under this
theory.
222
Compensable harm must be limited to that caused by the
defendant's particular conduct, not by the actions of others.223 A
broad definition of harm that includes harm from others like the
defendant, and foreseeable as well as actual harm, makes sense if
the sanction was meant to deter conduct; deterrence looks forward,
toward expected harm from all future violators.2 24  Conversely,
compensation faces back in time and is actor-specific.
The remedial goal of compensation also cannot support a
sanction that exceeds an estimate of actual damages to the plaintiff.
Some judges have also expanded the compensatory justification of
Halper by allowing one sovereign to recover for another sovereign's
[$483,760 of] marijuana is incalculable").
22 Reply Brief of Petitioner at 16 n.14, Kurth Ranch (No. 93-144).
Such reasoning is especially suspect in cases that resemble the forfeiture in
Austin, in which the federal government appeared to incur little enforcement expense
compared to the state that prosecuted Austin for his crime. See Brief for Petitioner
at 1-32, Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) (No. 92-6073) (noting that
state, not federal, authorities investigated, arrested, charged, convicted, and
imprisoned Austin).
For critiques of the use of compensation as a catch-all remedial purpose, see
Charney, supra note 179, at 499-500 (arguing that unless the value of a property
transmitted to an identifiable recipient is actually calculated by "estimating the value
of the interests lost by the recipient as a result of the actions of the defendant," the
government would be allowed to blur, for its own benefit, "the distinction between
compensatory and punitive actions"); Clark, supra note 179, at 471 ("If indeed the
motive is compensation, the government should proceed under rules which ...
demonstrate a close relationship between loss suffered and compensation sought.");
Stahl, supra note 191, at 330-31 nn.236-40 (citing cases discussing compensation as
a remedial purpose);James B. Speta, Note, Narrowing the Scope of Civil DrugForfeiture:
Section 881, Substantial Connection and the Eighth Amendment, 89 MICH. L. REV. 165,
190 (1990) (criticizing the argument that civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881 simply
compensates the government for the costs of enforcing the drug laws, noting that
such an argument could explain all criminal fines as merely remedial compensation
for enforcement expenses); id. ("A civil remedy exists only when the costs of the
single act can be associated with a specific harm.... The costs of past and future
drug enforcement cannot be traced to the particular activity giving rise to forfei-
ture.").
"4 Thus it is proper to consider these factors when asking whether a punishment
is excessive, as opposed to asking whether a sanction amounts to punishment. These
two questions may too easily be conflated in a case raising double jeopardy and
Eighth Amendment claims.
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losses.22 5 As Judge Noonan objected, this "gives the government
an essentially arbitrary choice as to the system whose expense is
shared and a virtual blank check as to the amount it can assess."
22
Determining whether a sanction is compensatory requires not
only an estimate of those losses but ajudgment about how much the
penalty may exceed the loss and still be remedial. The Court has in
the past recognized that damages sustained by the government need
not be replicated exactly by individual penalties in order for those
penalties to be "compensatory."2 7 Some courts have suggested
that civil sanctions do not trigger constitutional scrutiny under the
Double Jeopardy Clause or the Excessive Fines Clause even when
those sanctions exceed three times the amount of the loss.
228
2 The lower court in Kurth Ranch, for example, was willing to go even farther
than justice O'Connor and allow Montana to recover sanctions that bore some
rational relationship to "the staggering costs associated with fighting drug abuse in
this county." In re Kurth Ranch, 986 F.2d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 1993) (emphasis
added), afl'd, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
6 United States v. Walker, 940 F.2d 442, 444 (9th Cir. 1991) (Noonan, J.,
dissenting) (objecting to the majority's conclusion that the defendant's fine bore a
reasonable relationship to costs of administering the customs system as a whole).
Not only are government attorneys expanding the concept of compensable injury
beyond logical limits, but they may also neglect to factor in amounts already repaid.
The government must not be permitted to argue that a sanction is remedial when it
has already secured restitution. This issue arose in United States v. Barnette, 10 F.3d
1553 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 74 (1994). After securing convictions on 17
counts of fraud, bribery, and tax charges, the United States brought a civil action
seeking between $18 million and $50 million in damages under RICO, the False
Claims Act, and "various common law theories." The United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit explained that any civil damage recovery must be offset by
the $7 million the defendant had already paid as restitution in the criminal action.
See id. at 1560; see also United States v. Pani, 717 F. Supp. 1013, 1017 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(noting that the government subtracted restitution paid in prior criminal action in
calculation of the civil penalty).
17 See Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 153-54 (1956) (finding that
double damages plus $2000 per offense assessed against convicted defendants who
defrauded the government were nonpunitive, escaping the DoubleJeopardy Clause,
because the damages resulting from this injury may be difficult or impossible to
ascertain, and the sanction served the function of a liquidated damages clause);
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1943) (noting the general
practice of allowing double, treble, or even quadruple damages); Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391,401 (1938) (finding that a 50% tax on tax deficiencies resulting
from tax fraud was not intended as punishment but instead served to reimburse the
government for the expense of investigation and loss from the taxpayer's fraud).
"8 See United States v. Barnette, 10 F.3d 1553, 1558-60 (11th Cir.) (concluding
that a 3.2:1 ratio between the amount of civil penalties sought and the amount of loss
suffered by the government as a result of the defendant's conduct does not implicate
the Double Jeopardy Clause), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 74 (1994); Connecticut ex rel.
Blumenthal v. Tobacco Valley Sanitation Serv. Co., 818 F. Supp. 504, 508 (D. Conn.
1993) (concluding that the defendants could not challenge the imposition of treble
PORTIONING PUNISHMENT
Such a bright-line rule has the positive effects of reducing litigation
and uncertainty, eliminating the need to reevaluate past pronounce-
ments concerning treble damages and leaving intact the well-
established authorization of double and triple damages in private
actions before and after the adoption of the Fifth and Eighth
Amendments.22 9 Yet, while double or treble damages may be
rough remedial justice in many or even most cases, where actual
damages are very high, tripling that amount may be well above any
conceivable total cost to the government.230  Consequently, a
presumption rather than a bright line test would be a better rule
here.
c. When the Government Is Not a Party
The above analysis identifies which civil sanctions are punitive
enough to qualify as "fines" or punishment so that they may be
considered together with other criminal penalties under the Eighth
Amendment. To qualify as a fine, however, a civil sanction must
not only be sufficiently punitive, it must also be sufficiently public.
Even an obviously punitive sanction is not a fine if it is awarded in
a suit between private parties. 23 ' Does the Eighth Amendment
damages plus attorneys' fees in an antitrust suit under the DoubleJeopardy Clause
because such penalties "may reasonably be considered remedial"); cf. United States
v.J & T Coal, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 925, 928 (W.D. Va. 1993) (holding that civil penalties
of nearly $300,000, almost twice the amount spent on investigating and litigating
sanctions, did not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes).
See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,273-76 (1989)
(concluding that large punitive damage awards were recognized before the Eighth
Amendment and that the Eighth Amendment is inapplicable to such damages in civil
suits between private parties); Calvin R. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive
Damages: Some Lessonsfrom History, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1273 (1987) ("An award
of two to three times actual damages might be thought presumptively within the
constitutional limits, inasmuch as the practice of double or treble damages has a
historical pedigree.").
"" Cf State v. Sokol (In re Sokol), 181 B.R. 27, 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that
civil treble damages awards imposed for conduct already punished in a criminal
proceeding are not per se unconstitutional, because the determination of whether the
penalty will be constitutional must await litigation of the amount of defendant's theft
and the imposition of a penalty against him).
See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 275. The Court explained:
[E]ven if we were prepared to extend the scope of the Excessive Fines
Clause beyond the context where the Framers clearly intended it to apply,
we would not be persuaded to do so with respect to cases of punitive
damages awards in private civil cases, because they are too far afield from
the concerns that animate the Eighth Amendment.
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limit punitive civil sanctions that are awarded in a suit between
private parties but that are payable, in part, to the state or federal
government? This question arises in two types of suits-those
authorized by qui tam statutes that permit private plaintiffs to
litigate in the government's interest and then keep a portion of the
award, 2 and punitive damages actions between private parties
governed by a "state sharing" or "split recovery" statute that entitles
the state to a specified portion of each punitive award.3 3
The name listed as plaintiff should not determine whether a
clearly punitive sanction is a fine; what matters is the identity of the
payee. Criminal actions are sometimes prosecuted by private
parties, in both state and federal courts, as they were before the
dawn of the public prosecutor.234  Just as the participation of
private parties should not render these otherwise typical criminal
prosecutions any less criminal,2 35 the presence of a private party
acting as collection agent for the government should not render
punitive awards paid to the state any less punitive. 23 6  Courts
2 The Court in Browning-Ferris left this question unanswered, suggesting that qui
tam awards may be limited by the Excessive Fines Clause. See id. at 276 n.21; see also
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451 n.11 (1989) (declining to express an
opinion as to whether a qui tam action is properly characterized as a suit between
private parties for the purposes of double jeopardy). At least one federal court has
decided that the Eighth Amendment limits such awards. See United States ex rel.
Smith v. Gilbert Realty Co., 840 F. Supp. 71, 74 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (finding that qui
tam damages constitute punishment under the Halper test).
233 See supra note 20 (collecting cases examining the application of the Excessive
Fines Clause to punitive damages awards split between plaintiff and forum state).
' Contempt proceedings furnish the best known examples of this. See Young v.
United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 801 (1987) (allowing courts to
appoint private prosecutors in contempt actions only after the U.S. Attorney declines
to prosecute); Dudley, supra note 148, at 1058-59 (describing private prosecution of
contempt charges and listing cases in which private parties have litigated contempt
proceedings). Private parties have litigated noncontempt prosecutions as well. See
generally New Jersey v. Kinder, 701 F. Supp. 486, 491 (D.N.J. 1988) (noting "a
widespread practice in the municipal courts of New Jersey [of allowing] citizens to
enforce the laws of the state in instances where the municipal prosecutor routinely
does not prosecute because of a lack of resources"); John D. Bessler, The Public
Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REV. 511, 531-36
(1994) (describing cases in which private parties participated in prosecuting criminal
actions).
. "'See United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2872 n.3 (White,J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (assuming that even though the contempt charge was
prosecuted by a private party, double jeopardy still applied).
' Evan Caminker has argued that defendants in qui tam suits do not deserve any
more procedural protection than civil defendants facing other private plaintiffs,
because statutory constraints on the qui tam plaintiff already offer defendants in such
suits greater protection from unwarranted litigation than criminal defendants enjoy.
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reviewing Eighth Amendment challenges to cumulative punishment
must include these awards as well.
4. Cumulating Different "Offences"-Defining the Unit of
Culpability Under the Eighth Amendment?
The previous sections have proposed which civil and criminal
sanctions may be subject to proportionality review under the Eighth
Amendment in any case. This section examines which of these
penalties a judge must consider together in a given case. If the
Eighth Amendment will serve as a check on the disproportionate
punishment that may result from overlapping sanctions and multiple
"offences" for the same wrong, then judges assessing the propor-
tionality of the latest penalty under the Eighth Amendrnent must
consider all prior penalties for that wrong. Eighth Amendment
review, in other words, is concerned with the excessiveness of
punishment inflicted for particular conduct, not the excessiveness
of whatever penalty is assigned to a discrete offense by the legisla-
ture. If judges could strike down only single penalties in relation to
single, legislatively defined offenses, they would be powerless to
control the totality of punishment inflicted by government. Which
penalties, then, punish a defendant for the same wrong? Conceptu-
ally, this is the "same offence" problem of double jeopardy law
transplanted into the Eighth Amendment.
An example may illustrate the issue. Assume a defendant
agreed to assist a drug deal, permitted his home to be used as a
transfer point, and was prosecuted. Because of the amount of drugs
involved in the transaction, the defendant could be sentenced to
mandatory life in prison under state law.237 Our defendant's
home could be forfeited in federal court as an instrumentality of his
See Caminker, supra note 185, at 373-74. None of these constraints, however, provide
protection from excessive penalties as opposed to frivolous claims. For more detailed
treatment of this question, see Valerie R. Park, Note, The False Claims Ac4 Qui Tam
Relators, and the Government: Which Is the Real Party to the Action?, 43 STAN. L. REV.
1061, 1087-92 (1991) (concluding that defendants in federal qui tam cases should be
able to raise double jeopardy and Eighth Amendment challenges); see also Klaben,
supra note 20, at 141-47, 150, 156 (arguing that a punitive damages award is subject
to review under the Excessive Fines Clause when a state split-recovery statute grants
to the state a prejudgment interest in the award, noting that a split award might
escape Eighth Amendment review if the state's share was allocated to an entity
"wholly separate from the government and free of state control").
"7 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (rejecting an Eighth
Amendment challenge to a sentence of life without parole by a defendant convicted
of possessing 672 grams of cocaine).
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illegal activity. If he drove his car to meet others to plan the
transaction, it too could be forfeited.2"8  He could be taxed in a
state tax assessment proceeding.219 A separate conspiracy convic-
tion would be possible in either state or federal court, or in both.
Double jeopardy may permit the successive imposition of all of
these penalties, depending on the legislature's intent, but without
cumulative excessiveness review, the proportionality of each of these
penalties would be assessed independently, and it is likely that none
of these penalties would be judged excessive in isolation.
240
If a judge considered these penalties together, however, the
judge might conclude that, given the totality of defendant's conduct
and all of the different harms addressed by these many penalties,
the total penalty exceeds constitutional limits. The judge must first
decide whether to cumulate all of the penalties or just some of
them. Even if these penalties are separate offenses under double
jeopardy law-either because each contains a distinct element or
because there is clear legislative intent that each should be imposed
successively-some or all of them might be considered together
under the Eighth Amendment. The concept of punishment under
the Eighth Amendment, unlike the textual reference to "offence" in
the Fifth Amendment, is not limited by statutory elements or
legislative intent. But how should they be grouped? If the
conspiracy and car forfeiture penalties in the above hypothetical
effectively punish the defendant for conspiring to violate the law as
opposed to dealing drugs, perhaps they should not be cumulated
with penalties for the drug sale itself.241  On the other hand,
' See United States v. 1990 Toyota 4Runner, 9 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 1993)
(noting that use of the car in the drug deal "facilitated the attempted transportation,
receipt, and possession of illegal drugs, thus bringing the car within the statute's
grasp").
239 See Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (1994).
240 For other scenarios, see Lear, supra note 56, at 629 ("[A] single sale of drugs
may constitutionally give rise to a series of federal prosecutions for offenses ranging
from distributing drugs within one hundred feet of a video arcade facility and using
a telephone in connection with a drug transaction, to knowingly providing drugs to
a pregnant woman." (citations omitted)); George C. Thomas III, RICO Prosecutions and
the Double Jeopardy/Multiple Punishment Problem, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1359, 1370-86
(1984) (hypothesizing nine possible offenses that a federal prosecutor could charge
a suspect with, given a single criminal scheme, and analyzing whether the Blockburger
test places any limits on this theoretical possibility).
241 Cf United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 380-81 (1992) ("[P]rosecution of a
defendant for conspiracy, where certain of the overt acts relied upon by the
Government are based on substantive offenses for which the defendant has been
previously convicted, does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause."); United States
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perhaps the planning and commission of the offense are all part of
one culpable transaction so that the judge must consider whether
the total of all of these penalties is excessive in light of all of the
defendant's conduct.
The easiest way for judges to group penalties under the Eighth
Amendment would be to employ the formula they now use to
determine when the legislature intended penalties to exist as
mutually exclusive alternatives for the "same offence." Instead of
looking for legislative intent to the contrary, however, they would
ignore legislative intent entirely. It makes sense to use the same test
to identify cumulative penalties under the Eighth Amendment that
one uses to predict probable legislative intent regarding multiplicity
under the Double Jeopardy Clause-if sanctions are similar enough
to presume that a legislature would have intended them to be the
same, then they are probably similar enough to be cumulated under
the Eighth Amendment. Presently, however, the Court's presump-
tion regarding what is the "same offence" under double jeopardy,
the same elements test of Blockburger, is not well-suited to this
function. It is too narrow. A judge deciding which penalties to
lump together under the Eighth Amendment, using only Blockburger
as a guide, would cumulate Halper's civil penalty and criminal
sentence, but might not consider the Kurths' taxes together with
their sentences, or Austin's forfeiture with his sentence242 -two
v. Garcia, 32 F.3d 1017, 1019 n.1 (7th Cir. 1994) ("It is established doctrine that a
conspiracy to commit a crime is distinct from the crime itself.").
242 A drug prosecution and a civil forfeiture proceeding may not trigger the
Blockburger presumption-the underlying drug offense requires intent on the part of
the defendant beyond the negligence required for forfeiture, and forfeiture requires
the use of property, which the underlying offense does not. See United States v.
Leaniz, No. CR-2-90-18, 1995 WL 143127, at *5-6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 1995) ("The
forfeiture proceeding was an in rem action against the property itself, not against the
defendant .... [T]here has been no adjudication of any culpability on his part, nor
has there been any determination of his relationship to the property."); State v.
Romero, No. 01-94-01219-CR, 1995 Tex. App. LEXIS 1852, at *14 (Tex. Ct. App.
Aug. 10, 1995) (noting that forfeiture and drug offenses usually include separate
elements). But see United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 574 (6th Cir. 1995) (rejecting
the argument based on Dixon and Blockburger that forfeiture and conviction are
separate offenses, stating that "the criminal offense is in essence subsumed by the
forfeiture statute and thus does not require an element of proof that is not required
by the forfeiture action"). The tax penalty requires nonpayment of taxes, and the
drug offense requires intent. See Collins v. State, 645 N.E.2d 1089, 1093 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1995) (finding that the Blockburger formula does not bar imposition of both a
drug offense and the state's drug tax because each offense includes an element the
other does not); State v. Perez, No. 04-94-00476-CR, 1995 Tex. App. LEXIS 2273, at
*8 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 1995) (same).
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results I find unsupportable.24 A more inclusive grouping formu-
la is needed that will do a better job than Blockburger of replicating
our intuitive, moral classifications of culpable conduct.
Advocates ofjudicial restraint need not shudder at a test under
the Eighth Amendment that groups together more penalties than
Blockburger does today. The line that separates the disproportionate
from the proportionate is sufficiently blurry that the grouping
decision will, in many cases, make no difference to the success of an
individual defendant's claim of excessive punishment. Moreover,
when it does, the limit will not always operate like double jeopardy,
barring a subsequent penalty proceeding entirely, but will instead
require only that the latest penalty imposed be mitigated by
degree.
24 4
United States v. Louisville Edible Oil Prods., 926 F.2d 584 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 859 (1991), is one example of many cases that may warrant grouping under
the Eighth Amendment beyond that provided byBlockburger, had the defendant raised
an Eighth Amendment claim. The defendant had objected on double jeopardy
grounds to the cumulation of several state fines and subsequent criminal penalties
under the Clean Air Act and CERCLA. Because of the dual sovereignty exception
and because each federal claim contained a distinct element under Blockburger, the
court rejected the double jeopardy claim, even when assuming the state sanctions
amounted to punishment under Halper. See id. at 586-88. Under cumulative
excessive review, probably all of these sanctions would be assessed together. See
Guerra, supra note 1, at 1200 (noting cases in which courts allowed separate
prosecutions of offenses that would be the same but for the element that the firearm
affected interstate commerce).
143 Consider for example, the remarkable decision by the Illinois Court of Appeals
in People v. Pudlo, 651 N.E.2d 676 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995), in which two of the three
judges decided that two offenses were not the same under Blockburger because one
required a property owner to remove refuse and the other prohibited the owner from
allowing it to accumulate. See id. at 678.
244 If a court finds that a sentence is unconstitutionally severe, it may resentence
or remand for resentencing to a lesser term. When the excessive penalty is a
mandatory sentence, and no legislatively authorized lower penalty is available, courts
have improvised, resentencing under prior statutes, as if the defendant had been
convicted of the next most serious lesser included offense, sometimes resentencing
to a term that would be constitutional, even though such a term has no legislative
approval. See generally Palm, supra note 25, at 76-77 (noting that in situations in
which sentences are unconstitutional, "state courts have adopted a number of
different approaches to resentence offenders").
Remitting forfeitures has proven controversial, however. Forfeiture statutes
generally do not authorize courts to forfeit only part of a piece of property or to
order payment in cash or other property in lieu of the forfeited asset. Some courts
have assumed that when forfeiture of an entire asset would violate Eighth Amend-
ment limits, ajudge can tailor the forfeiture to those limits, either by ordering that
only a portion of the asset be forfeited, by limiting other punishment, or by ordering
the relinquishment of substitute assets. Others have adhered rigidly to the statutory
premise of indivisibility. Compare United States v. Bieri, 21 F.3d 819, 824 (8th Cir.)
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Beyond these preliminary observations, I will not here attempt
to offer a tidy solution to the offense/conduct problem that, in the
doublejeopardy context, has prompted more than a century of legal
debate.245 The point is that the Court cannot escape this intracta-
ble problem simply by allowing legislatures to define "same offence"
under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Not only does the problem
persist in the debate over whether Blockburger is the proper proxy
for legislative intent under the Double Jeopardy Clause, 246 it also
(authorizing forfeiture of less than the whole in order to tailor a remedy to fit within
the "broad boundaries of constitutional proportionality"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 208
(1994) with United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 364 (4th Cir. 1994) ("[A]
judgment of forfeiture is largely an all-or-nothing situation, and an inquiry into
excessiveness can determine only on which side of the line the facts place the
property.") and United States v. 318 S. Third St., 988 F.2d 822, 828-29 (8th Cir. 1993)
(agreeing that courts do not have authority to subdivide property in order to create
proportional forfeitures, but may refuse to order a forfeiture at all when proportion-
ality concerns warrant) and United States v. Plat 20, Lot 17, 960 F.2d 200, 207 n.7 (1st
Cir. 1992) (rejecting claimant's argument that the court has power to order forfeiture
of less than the whole amount, noting that such a rule would "interfere with
Congress's unmistakable intent") and United States v. 461 Shelby County Rd. 361,857
F. Supp. 935, 939 (N.D. Ala. 1994) ("No court, high or low, has thus far told this
court how to 'split the baby,' so to speak, and this court is not Solomon."). See also
Stahl, supra note 191, at 326 n.220 (arguing that the government should sell property
and reimburse the claimant for the value of the nonoffending portion).
In my view, the reluctance of courts to mitigate excessive forfeiture is caused, in
part, by mistaken fidelity to the fiction that the forfeited property, not the owner, is
the culprit. By the time ajudge gets around to determining the excessiveness of a
judgment of forfeiture, the judge has already decided that it is the owner that is
culpable, and that forfeiture is hisfine. There is nothing so sacred about a chunk of
land or a truck or a plane that its value cannot be portioned between the owner and
the government. Regulations already provide that, upon proper application, when
"extenuating circumstances indicat[e] that some relief should be granted to avoid
extreme hardship," the federal government may mitigate the effect of a forfeiture by
charging a penalty instead. See 28 C.F.R. § 9.5(c) (1994). Governments also share the
value of forfeited assets between themselves when more than one law enforcement
agency assists in securing the judgment of forfeiture. If a government is willing to
share the value of an asset with another agency to preserve goodwill, it cannot
complain about sharing the value of an asset with its owner to preserve constitutional
principles.
245 Compare e.g., SIGLER, supra note 47, at 101, 129, 133 (terming the problem
"virtually insoluble" at least until the "recodification and integration of criminal law"
and concluding that "[tihe problem of the scope of the criminal act has not been
solved in England any more than it has in the United States" and that in Canada, the
tests are "almost unintelligible") and Westen & Drubel, supra note 35, at 115
("Previous attempts to define offenses other than by reference to the legislature's
intent have all failed.") with J.A.C. Grant, Successive Prosecutions by State and Nation:
Common Law and British Empire Comparisons, 4 UCLA L. REV. 1, 8-16 (1956) (noting
that courts successfully barred successive prosecutions for the same offense within,
and among, the several sovereigns of the British Empire).
246 See supra text accompanying note 81.
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plays a prominent role in the review of overlapping penalties under
the Eighth Amendment.
B. Determining Excessiveness
Assuming that one has identified the penalties that must be
evaluated under the Eighth Amendment and grouped them in
sensible categories, the next step is to determine whether or not
their sum total exceeds constitutional limits. This step is key-if the
Eighth Amendment is to limit a legislature's ability to pile on
punishment and replace pre-Dixon doublejeopardy limits that in the
past only sporadically and clumsily held punishment to reasonable
proportions, then judicial review of the severity of punishment must
have substance and strength. Some form of proportionality analysis
that compares the severity of the penalty to the gravity of the
offense and the culpability of the offender is required, such as the
one the Court adopted in Solem.
In addition, review under the Eighth Amendment should include
three features in order to respond to cumulative punishment. First,
the analysis should be flexible enough to address varying risks of
excessiveness, allowing for increased scrutiny of especially problem-
atic punishments. Second, review under the Eighth Amendment
must measure the proportionality of punishment for all penalties,
monetary or nonmonetary, in the same way, so that even when
courts compare penalties that appear to be apples and oranges, they
are comparing them for the same feature. Finally, in cases involving
multiple penalties for related conduct, courts should take special
care to guard against unwarranted double-counting.
1. Heightened Scrutiny for Certain Categories of Punishment
The closeness with which courts examine punishment under the
Eighth Amendment need not be identical in all types of cases.
Capital punishment has received closer regulation from the Court
than other penalties247 primarily because of the finality and
24 The Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment to guarantee to every capital
defendant a right to an individualized sentence and the opportunity to present
mitigating evidence at the sentencing proceeding. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302,318 (1989) (-[A] sentencer may not be precluded from considering, and may not
refuse to consider, any relevant mitigating evidence offered by the defendant as the
basis for a sentence less than death."). Noncapital defendants, on the other hand,
may be sentenced under mandatory sentences that provide for no individualized
consideration of offender or offense. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996
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severity of the sanction,24 but also because the history of discrimi-
natory application of the penalty by juries and prosecutors has
sensitized the Court to the risk of arbitrary and disproportionate
death sentences. Other noncapital penalties also pose a heightened
risk of arbitrariness and disproportionality, although for different
reasons. They too may warrant heightened vigilance on the part of
courts under the Eighth Amendment, although perhaps not the
individualized treatment that the Court mandates for each and every
death sentence. Stricter scrutiny might entail presumptions or
other burden-shifting or -setting devices, or a flexible multifactor
analysis that requires reviewing judges to consider the greater risk
of excessiveness in these cases.
249
First, contempt raises a unique risk of excessive punishment that
should prompt close review. This risk is not thatjudges, as opposed
to legislatures or juries, cannot be trusted to assess proportionate
punishment. If that were the premise, then judicial review of
sanctions under the Eighth Amendment would be perverse.
Instead, contempt sanctions are more likely to be disproportionate
than other penalties because of the judge's role as "judge of his own
cause."
250
(1991) (rejecting a claim that imposition of a mandatory life sentence without parole
in the absence of individualized consideration violates the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause and stating that "[w]e have drawn the line of required
individualized sentencing at capital cases, and see no basis for extending it further").
214 SeeHamelin, 501 U.S. at 995 ("Our cases creatingand clarifying the 'individual-
ized capital sentencing doctrine' have repeatedly suggested that there is no
comparable requirement outside the capital context, because of the qualitative
difference between death and all other penalties."); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively
different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long.... Because of that
qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability
in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.");
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,289 (1972) (Brennan,J., concurring) ("The unusual
severity of death is manifested most clearly in its finality and enormity. Death, in
these respects, is in a class by itself."); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The
penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree
but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability.... And it is unique ... in its
absolute renunciation of all that is emobodied in our concept of humanity.").
249 Cf Joseph L. Hoffmann, On the Perils of Line Drawing: Juveniles and the Death
Penalty, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 229, 266-75 (1989) (suggesting that a rebuttable presump-
tion against the execution of defendants below a certain age at the time they commit
their offenses is superior to a bright-line rule barring such executions under the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause).
o See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 199 (1958) (Black,J., dissenting). The
Court's past willingness to scrutinize carefully contempt sanctions suggests that the
Court has already recognized a need for special scrutiny in such cases. See Spallone
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Second, forfeiture provides incentives to prosecutors to seize
assets, without regard to proportionate punishment. Critics of
forfeiture have long objected to its potential for abuse.251 Prose-
cutors who benefit indirectly, if not directly, from forfeiture
revenues and who use forfeited assets2 5 2 find civil forfeiture a
convenient and lucrative alternative to criminal prosecution.
2 5 3
Targeted defendants become those offenders who own the most
valuable assets, not those offenders who pose the greatest threat to
society.254 As two critics have charged, civil forfeiture may have
v. United States, 493 U.S. 265,276 (1990) ("[I]n selecting contempt sanctions, a court
is obliged to use 'the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.'" (quoting
United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444, 454 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Anderson
v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821))) (citation omitted)); Dudley, supra note
148, at 1028 n.9, 1065 (noting that the Court's frequent reiteration of this principle
"suggests that it perceives the severity of the [contempt] sanction as distinctly
important in this context"). In contempt cases in which a judge is the subject of
personal insults, the Court has held that due process requires a differentjudge to hear
the contempt charges. See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 466 (1971)
(requiring a different judge in a case in which the defendant called the trial judge a
"dirty sonofabitch," a "dirty tyrannical old dog," and a "fool," and told the judge to
"[g]o to hell" and "[k]eep [his] mouth shut").
21 Courts are well aware of the incentives of forfeiture. See United States v.James
Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 502 n.2 (1993) (noting a 1990 Justice
Department memorandum urging the initiation of more forfeiture proceedings in
order to meet the Department's targeted $470 million budget).
212 See, e.g., Michael F. Alessio, From Exodus to Embarrassment: Civil Forfeiture Under
the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 48 SMU L. REv. 429, 453 nn.172 & 174
(1995) (describing prosecutors who adopt seized sports cars as their own and agents
who stop buyers coming in to the state but not couriers driving out of the state
because seized cash is more useful to the agency than seized drugs); ef. People ex rel.
Sandstrom v. County of Pueblo, 884 P.2d 707, 712 (Colo. 1994) (holding that the
district attorney's share in proceeds of asset forfeitures does not disqualify the district
attorney's office under a state statute requiring special prosecutors in cases in which
the district attorney has an interest).
" See, e.g., Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241, 1251-53 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that
a prosecutor was not protected by absolute immunity in a civil suit brought by a
property owner who gave up property worth $100,000 in return for dismissal of
criminal charges, after being given only one hour to decide, without an opportunity
to contact his attorney; the property was later sold to two individuals with alleged ties
to the prosecutor's office for $20,000, even though the owner had tried to buy back
the property for $100,000). Some claim that 80% of those who lose property in
federal forfeiture proceedings are never charged with a crime. See M. Lynette Eaddy,
How Much Is Too Much? Civil Forfeitures and the Excessive Fines Clause After Austin v.
United States, 45 FLA. L. REV. 709, 715 (1993).
s"See David Fried, Criminal Law: Rationalizing Criminal Forfeiture, 79J. CIM. L.
& CRIMONOLOcY 328, 387-88 (1988) (arguing that the determination of which co-
conspirators are subject to forfeiture "should not depend upon accidental and
irrelevant details in the manner in which the crime was carried out," such as in whose
house the conspirators chose to meet or store their contraband).
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"more to do with rent-seeking by legislators and law enforcement
officials than with the eradication of drug use."255 The risk of
disproportionate punishment from forfeiture is also aggravated by
the lack of a clear method by which a judge or jury can tailor the
amount of the forfeiture sanction to the gravity of the owner's
offense.
256
Finally, I must mention one type of penalty to which some
judges have already extended greater protection under the Eighth
Amendment, but which I believe does not warrant heightened
vigilance by courts: forfeiture of the home. At least one court has
stated boldly that because a person's homestead has been protected
from government invasion throughout history more carefully than
other property, "[i]t is much more likely that the taking of the
homeplace would constitute an excessive fine than the taking of
other property of equal value."257 This argument resonates with
Fourth Amendment doctrine that restricts government access to the
home more severely than access to other property.25" The reluc-
tance to forfeit homes may also be linked to judicial predictions that
such forfeitures will punish innocent family members and only "add
to the list" of homeless, unemployed, and government-dependent
individuals.259
5 DonaldJ. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Civil Forfeiture and the War on Drugs:
Lessons from Economics and History 45 (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
' See United States v. One 1990 Ford Ranger Truck, 888 F. Supp. 1170, 1174
(N.D. Ga. 1995) (noting that the jury was not asked to determine excessiveness nor
"fo find a'substantial connection' between property and offense before approving the
forfeiture"); Stahl, supra note 191, at 321-24 (noting that even those courts that
require a "substantial connection" between property and illegality under the statute
accept virtually any connection between the property and drug activity).
17 United States v. 461 Shelby County Rd. 361, 857 F. Supp. 935, 938 (N.D. Ala.
1994) (finding forfeiture of home and lot excessive and extending special protection
to homesteads); see also United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d 974, 985 (9th
Cir. 1995) (stating that in determining proportionality, the court must consider "the
intangible, subjective value of the property, e.g., whether it is the family home");
United States v. 9638 Chicago Heights, 27 F.3d 327, 331 (8th Cir. 1994) (including
in excessiveness analysis consideration of "the fact that the property was a residence"
and the effects on "innocent occupants.., including children"). But cf. United States
v. Lot 5, 23 F.3d 359, 363 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding that federal drug forfeiture
statutes preempt protection of homestead property from forfeitures accorded by the
Florida Constitution), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 722 (1995).
2s See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-90 (1980) (stating that the
physical entry and search of a home is the primary evil that the Fourth Amendment
is meant to prohibit).
I See, e.g., United States v. Oakes, 11 F.3d 897, 899 (9th Cir. 1993) (agreeing that
the prosecutor's decision to seek a mandatory sentence for a first-time offender, while
1995]
190 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144:101
This is a very curious position. To begin with the historical
argument, although direct seizure of homes may be novel, many
forms of punishment have carried with them the collateral conse-
quence of the loss of the home. There seems to be no reason to
limit stricter excessiveness review to home forfeitures alone and not
to extend it to penalties that threaten certain loss of rented or
purchased shelter. Second, forfeiture of a home does not always
strand innocent third parties. 60 Even when it does, plenty of
other penalties exist that harm these individuals just as severely.
Finally, a lower tolerance for home forfeiture might be based,
alternatively, on the home's supposed special significance to the
person punished. But assets of comparative significance are likely
to surface-one man's living room is the next man's heirloom.
261
In short, there is no persuasive basis for singling out the forfeiture
of residences, as opposed to forfeitures in general, for special
treatment under the Eighth Amendment.
26 2
2. Proportionality Review for All Penalties,
Including Civil Forfeiture
I argued earlier that all penalties must be at least subject to
review for excessiveness under the Eighth Amendment in order for
the Bill of Rights to limit cumulative punishment imposed through
multiple penalties or in multiple proceedings. But just any sort of
also forfeiting his home and thereby rendering his wife and two small children
homeless, led to "bizarre" results), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1569 (1994).
o Depending on the property laws of the state in which the home is located, the
United States may have to wait until the death or divorce of an innocent owner
spouse to take over ajointly owned home. See United States v. 44133 Duchess Drive,
863 F. Supp. 492, 500-03 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (reviewing Eleventh and Sixth Circuit law
on this point).
"' The Ninth Circuit has recently settled on a proportionality test that requires
an assessment of the subjective value of the property to the owner, and it suggested
that one example of property with intangible value is the home. See 6380 Little Canyon
Rd., 59 F.3d at 985 (requiring courts to take into account "the intangible, subjective
value of the property, e.g., whether it is the family home").
2s Judges also need not approach penalties imposed in a civil proceeding with a
sharper Eighth Amendment scalpel than they would use for criminal sentences. Some
courts have reasoned that excessiveness is more likely to be a problem when conduct
is proven by evidence which falls short of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.
On its face, this logic has some appeal, for the surer we are that a defendant
committed an offense, the less squeamish we are about punishing him for it. But if
the combination of loose procedure and stiff penalty seems irksome, the proper
response is to tailor the procedure to the penalty, not the other way around. The
Eighth Amendment should not be pressed into service as a substitute for procedural
due process.
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consideration of excessiveness will not do. Cumulative review of
penalties requires that all penalties must be evaluated in roughly the
same way--for disproportion in relation to the offender's culpability.
This common-sense notion has been neglected by many judges
puzzling over how to assess the excessiveness of civil forfeiture
penalties after Austin because of Justice Scalia's deft submission of
a competing theory in his Austin concurring opinion.
Although the Court in Austin was content to let lower courts
figure out how to assess the excessiveness of civil forfeitures, Justice
Scalia was not. He argued that as long as the relationship of the
property to the crime was "close enough to render the property,
under traditional standards, 'guilty' and hence forfeitable," civil
forfeiture, however punitive, could not be excessive.2 63  In his
view, the Eighth Amendment analysis must ignore the value of the
forfeited asset and the culpability of the offender, and instead
consider only whether the property has a close enough relationship
to illegal activity. Many lower courts and the Department ofJustice
have leapt at this suggestion, perhaps because it allows them, once
again, to avoid direct review of the proportionality of punishment,
or perhaps because very few forfeitures would surpass its limits.
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2" See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2815 (1993) (ScaliaJ., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
' The versions of Scalia's test now in use in state and federal courts range
from the simple to the very complex. The Department ofJustice has a fairly simple
model:
A civil or criminal forfeiture should not violate the Eighth Amendment
where:
A. The criminal activity involving the property has been sufficiently extensive
in terms of time and/or spatial use of the property; or
B. The role of the property was integral or indispensable to the commission
of the crime(s) in question; or
C. The particular property was deliberately selected to secure a special
advantage in the commission of the crime(s).
Memorandum, supra note 21, at B-584.138-246. The Fourth Circuit recently unveiled
a hybrid, three-part, five-subfactor test to determine if the property forfeited was
sufficiently "guilty" to come within Eighth Amendment limits:
[I]n determining excessiveness of an in rem forfeiture under the Eighth
Amendment... a court must apply a three-part instrumentality test that
considers
(1) the nexus between the offense and the property and the extent
of the property's role in the offense,
(2) the role and culpability of the owner, and
(3) the possibility of separating offending property that can readily
be separated from the remainder.
In measuring the strength and extent of the nexus between the
property and the offense, a court may take into account the following
1995]
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However attractive, this conception of excessiveness has no place in
the Eighth Amendment.
26 5
Not only is this "relationship" or "nexus" test at odds with an
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment that requires judges to
protect defendants against cumulative punishment, it is inconsistent
with the Court's decision to characterize civil forfeiture as punish-
ment in the first place. To be a "fine" at all, excessive or not, the
forfeiture must punish the owner for the owner's culpable act. The
Eighth Amendment does not protect Cessnas, Cadillacs, buildings,
and bank accounts from excessive penalties; it protects the people
who own them. Proportionality can only be measured in relation-
ship to the owner's culpability; the relationship of the property to
the offense is meaningless once it is determined that the forfeiture
is a "fine."266 In addition, the Court has already noted that
factors:
(1) whether the use of the property in the offense was deliberate
and planned or merely incidental and fortuitous;
(2) whether the property was important to the success of the illegal
activity;
(3) the time during which the property was illegally used and the
spacial extent of its use;
(4) whether its illegal use was an isolated event or had been
repeated; and
(5) whether the purpose of acquiring, maintaining or using the
property was to carry out the offense.
United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 365 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1792 (1995).
2' For these reasons, the Department of Justice was shortsighted when it
asserted recently, "there is no reason why [the standard developed under the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause] should automatically translate as the
standard for determining challenges under the Excessive Fines Clause." Memoran-
dum, supra note 21, at B-584.138-245. Perhaps the two standards need not be
identical, but there is a reason why proportionality must serve as the root of each-
the need to assess the constitutionality of cumulated, as opposed to isolated,
punishment.
' See, e.g., People ex rel. Waller v. 1989 Ford F350 Truck, 642 N.E.2d 460, 466
(Ill. 1994) ("[The relationship test] is patently inadequate and necessarily conflates the
[E]ighth [A]mendment excessive fine analysis with the determination of whether the
property is subject to forfeiture in the first instance."); Thorp v. State, 450 S.E.2d 416,
418 (Ga. 1994) (adopting the proportionality test, noting that "[s]ince the claimant
is the person punished for the offense ... it would be illogical not to consider
relevant the extent of the claimant's involvement in the offense" (quoting United
States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 734 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 1994))). Other
courts have combined the two theories. See, e.g., United States v. Milbrand, 58 F.3d
841, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that excessiveness of forfeiture of uncharged
owner depends upon (1) the harshness of the forfeiture, (2) the relationship between
the property and the offense, and (3) the culpability of the owner).
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excessiveness analysis for criminal forfeiture must focus on the
extent and degree of the defendant's culpability, the gravity of the
offense, and the value of the property forfeited. 26 7  There is no
reason that the analysis for determining the excessiveness of the
fine of civil forfeiture should differ at all from the analysis used to
assess the fine of criminal forfeiture. Each punishes the owner for
wrongful conduct.
3. Calibrating Penalties and Culpability
When Offenses Overlap
The last essential modification of Eighth Amendment doctrine
that I propose is perhaps the most important-heightened judicial
vigilance of penalties that punish the same conduct more than once.
Doublejeopardy doctrine is the wrong vehicle for limiting legislative
prerogative to fragment the same conduct into various overlapping
offenses; the threat of excessive punishment from multiple penalties
is more appropriately controlled by Eighth Amendment review. In
short, courts must take care to ensure that multiple punishment
(permitted by the Fifth Amendment) does not become dispropor-
tionate punishment (forbidden by the Eighth Amendment).
The risk of undue double-counting may arise whenever the same
conduct is punished by separate offenses. It is most acute, however,
in cases in which there is some doubt about whether the legislature
(or legislatures) defining separate offenses considered their
cumulative punitive effect.268 One example of this risk involves a
"" See Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2776 (1993) (holding that the
court of appeals should have considered the forfeiture "in the light of the extensive
criminal activities which petitioner apparently conducted through this racketeering
enterprise over a substantial period of time"). On remand, the court of appeals set
out a more detailed excessiveness analysis for assessing the constitutionality of
criminal forfeiture, which also did not consider the degree to which the property was
involved with the crime. See United States v. Alexander, 32 F.3d 1231, 1235-37 (8th
Cir. 1994). The Department of'Justice advocates the use of the same standard in civil
and criminal forfeitures as well, but rejects proportionality review in favor of a
relationship test. See Memorandum, supra note 21, at B-584.138-286 n.96 (asserting
that the analysis should be based on whether the property was tainted by unlawful
use, rather than on "the relative seriousness of the particular violation, the owner's
relative degree of culpability, or the owner's criminal history").
':- Legislative efforts to coordinate penalties can reduce the threat of excessiveness
from overlapping punishment, but they cannot eliminate it. For instance, sentencing
guidelines in the federal system and in several states have considered some of the
risks of cumulation by grouping offenses and defining situations in which sentences
are concurrent or consecutive. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL
§§ 3D1.1-.5 (1993) (instructing judges to use the most serious offense as a starting
1995]
194 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 101
defendant convicted of several crimes, each of which contains a
common element that also constitutes a crime.26 9 Excessiveness
may also arise from the imposition of a large number of modest
penalties for related conduct. In the words of Justice Field: "It
does not alter its character as cruel and unusual that for each
distinct offence there is a small punishment, if, when they are
brought together, and one punishment for the whole is inflicted, it
becomes one of excessive severity."M7 ° The imposition of succes-
point and to add on successive reduced penalties based on the nature of the
additional crimes); David Boerner, Sentencing Guidelines and Prosecutorial Discretion,
78 JUDICATURE 196, 200 (1995) (noting that sentencing guidelines systems have
varying solutions to what the author calls the problem of setting a "volume discount"
for multiple related crimes, but that all reduce the discretion of the judge about
whether to make some or all sentences run concurrently or consecutively); see also
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE SENTENCING Standards 18-1.2 to 1.3 (American Bar
Ass'n 1994) (recommending that everyjurisdiction establish a permanent sentencing
commission or agency to create determinate sentencing provisions that limit the
discretion of sentencing courts); MODEL PUNITIVE DAMAGES ACT § 10 (Discussion
Draft 1995) (providing set-off for prior punitive damages awards for "the same act or
cour[se] of conduct"). Certainly, courts reviewing cumulative punishment that has
been explicitly authorized by a legislature or its agents owe more deference to such
penalties than they owe to cumulative punishment that has not been considered and
approved by the legislative branch. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999
(1991) (Kennedy,J., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment) (stating that
courts "'should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures
necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes'"
(quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983))). Still, no one jurisdiction's
commission can fully coordinate the punishment of all jurisdictions, nor can
legislative choice entirely displace judicial review under the Eighth Amendment.
29 For instance, assume a defendant is convicted in state court of possession with
intent to deliver one ounce of marijuana and receives 20 years and is also convicted
in federal court of possession of that ounce of marijuana near a school, receiving 25
consecutive years, and conspiracy to, possess that ounce of marijuana, receiving 20
more years, for a total cumulated penalty of 65 years. Double jeopardy presently
allows separate prosecution and penalties for all three offenses because of their
independent elements, but there is one crime common to them all-possession of that
ounce of marijuana. If we learn that both the state and federal legislatures also set
the maximum penalty for the possession of one ounce of marijuana at 15 years, then
it begins to look as if our defendant's multiple punishment may have been excessive
punishment as well. A better estimate of the cumulative punishment due our
hypothetical defendant may be 40 years, not 65: 15 years (for the possession itself)
plus 5 years (the extra penalty for planning to deliver it) plus 10 years (the premium
for possessing those narcotics near a school) plus 5 years (the extra penalty for
conspiring). When an element common to multiple penalties also constitutes a crime,
double-counting the penalty for that lesser included offense may exceed not only
legislative design, but the bounds of the Eighth Amendment. Admittedly, because
proportionality review cannot and should not be reduced to an equation, and because
multiple penalties often do not contain components as neatly packaged and pre-
weighed as those in the above hypothetical, this kind of analysis must serve as a
guideline rather than as a rule.
270 O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323,340 (1892) (Field,J., dissenting). Professors
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sive criminal and civil penalties requires careful analysis as well.
However varied these contexts, the guiding premise remains the
same: Because the Eighth Amendment serves as a citizen's last
defense against excessively severe punishment that may result from
the proliferation of overlapping penalties, a court cannot review
cumulative, multiple punishments for related conduct with the same
deference that it would extend to a one-shot penalty.
IV. CUMULATIVE REVIEW AS COMMON SENSE
Undoubtedly, the cumulative review of penalties I propose
requires judges to make difficult distinctions, including when civil
sanctions are punishment, which penalties must be considered
together, and when combined penalties become unconstitutionally
severe. But the difficulties are not insurmountable. Perhaps the
best proof of the practicality of this approach is the willingness of
judges to adopt it on their own.
Several judges have already begun to consider total punishment
under the Eighth Amendment regardless of when, where, or how
many penalties are imposed. For instance, a panel of the Sixth
Circuit recently evaluated a cruel and unusual punishment challenge
to consecutive sentences for a firearms conviction and a robbery
conviction arising out of the same conduct by evaluating the total
punishment for both penalties together. 27 1 Other courts evaluat-
ing excessive fines challenges to civil forfeitures that follow convic-
tions are asking whether the owner has been "sufficiently punished"
for his conduct by the criminal sentence so that further punishment
through civil forfeiture would be excessive. 272 Judges considering
Paul Robinson andJohn Darley surveyed several hundred nonlawyer respondents who
assigned longer penalties for two crimes than for one but did not double the
sentence. The authors refer to this as the "multiple-offense discount notion." PAUL
H. ROBINSON &JOHN M. DARLEYJUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 189-97 (1995).
271 See United States v. Duerson, 25 F.3d 376, 384 (6th Cir. 1994) ("Congress
contemplated that the penalties for the two rimes ... could reach a total of 360
months, and we are not prepared to say that a total of 157 months is either cruel or
unusual." (emphasis added)).
2 See, e.g., United States v. 461 Shelby County Rd. 361, 857 F. Supp. 935, 939-40
(N.D. Ala. 1994) (finding that further punishment of homeowners through forfeiture
of their $70,000 home was excessive, considering that the owners, husband and wife,
had each pled guilty to drug charges, served their five year sentences (custody and
probation, respectively) and had paid or were paying the fines, court costs, and
restitution ordered as part of their sentence). Courts considering the excessiveness
of criminal forfeiture have also considered related sentences of imprisonment. See,
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Eighth Amendment challenges are also combining state and federal
penalties, implicitly acknowledging that the Eighth Amendment
limits the totality of punishment imposed by all governments.7
A similar trend is emerging in cases involving due process challeng-
es to multiple punitive damage awards. Unable to limit punitive
damages between private parties using the Eighth Amendment,
courts are beginning to employ the Due Process Clause to perform
the same function, limiting the totality of cumulated penalties.
27 4
These judges understand that punishment which may not be
excessive alone may become excessive if repeated. It is time this
intuition became a routine ingredient of the constitutional review
of punishment.
e.g., United States v. Alexander, 32 F.3d 1231, 1237 (8th Cir. 1994) (ordering the
district court on remand for excessiveness analysis to "consider the sentences imposed
in determining whether the forfeiture has been grossly disproportionate" (emphasis
added)); United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648, 664 (9th Cir. 1988) (evaluating for
excessiveness a forfeiture of nearly $2 million along with five years of probation on
mail fraud conviction, concurrent sentences of 10 years for RICO violations and
interstate transportation of fraudulently obtained funds), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1030
(1989); United States v. Littlefield, 821 F.2d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that
the court must determine that the forfeiture of the entire property "together with
other punishments imposed is not so disproportionate to the offense committed as
to violate the Constitution"); United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1415 n.10, 1416
(9th Cir. 1987) (ordering the district court to assess the total penalty, including
forfeiture, jail time, and fines, to determine whether the combined penalty exceeds
constitutional limits and to limit either the forfeiture or the other penalties if it does).
"' For example, one trial judge relied on the dual sovereignty exception to double
jeopardy to reject the defendants' double jeopardy challenge to their federal
prosecution after state forfeiture proceedings, but went on to note:
Defendants also contend that this criminal prosecution constitutes an
excessive punishment which violates the Eighth Amendment even if it is not
prohibited by the DoubleJeopardy Clause. Based on the present record I
am unable to conclude that the forfeitures in this case were so excessive as
to bar any further punishment through criminal prosecution.
United States v. Collins, 877 F. Supp. 516, 519 n.2 (D. Or. 1995); see also United
States v. 429 S. Main St., 843 F. Supp. 337, 342 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (rejecting excessive
fines challenge to federal civil forfeiture of home after state conviction, considering
"combined penalty" of forfeiture and state sentence of one year and fine of $6000 for
three drug sales), aff'd in part, 52 F.3d 1416 (6th Cir. 1995).
74 See supra note 32.
